Mens Rea Without Actus Reus

My weekly halachah column for parashas Be’Haalosecha:

Parashas Be’Ha’alosecha concludes with the episode of Miriam and Aharon “speaking against” Moshe and the consequent affliction of the former with tzara’as. The Torah later (Devarim 24:9) adjures us to “Remember what Hashem thy G-d did unto Miriam”. The Ramban (Sefer Ha’Mitzvos #7), following the Sifri, understands this as a commandment to verbally recount Miriam’s conduct and its consequences so that we should avoid the sin of lashon ha’ra (evil speech, i.e., slander) and its punishment. The Chofetz Chaim (Esin #1) declares that one who speaks lashon ha’ra perforce violates this commandment, as at best he must have forgotten Miriam’s punishment at the time of the offense, and if he remembered it and nevertheless sinned, he has the far worse status of an apostate with regard to the prohibition of lashon ha’ra. Elsewhere (Shemiras Ha’Lashon Sha’ar Ha’Tevunah #12), the Chofetz Chaim explains that although we observe that people do speak lashon ha’ra subsequent to, and even during (!) their remembrance of Miriam, this is due to the merely superficial nature of their remembrance.

The Rambam (Hilchos Tumas Tzara’as 16:10) points out Miriam was punished despite the presence of numerous factors mitigating the severity of her lashon ha’ra: she was his older sister, had raised him, and had risked herself to save him from the sea; she had not actually criticized him, but merely erroneously equated him with other prophets (failing to recognize the uniqueness of his prophecy); and Moshe had not minded her comments. We can therefore infer the egregiousness of the sin of the “villains and fools” who speak arrant slander.

My friend R. Daniel Z. Feldman recently published “False Facts and True Rumors: Lashon HaRa in Contemporary Culture”. I consider R. Feldman one of the very best contemporary English language (or really, any language) writers on halachah, combining a deep and broad familiarity with the traditional literature with an understanding of modern society and culture, and a command of traditional analytical methods of Torah study with the thoughtful and serious consideration of the realm of meta-halachah.

About a year ago, R. Natan Slifkin challenged the Chofetz Chaim’s often reiterated insistence that the dispensation of תועלת in the laws of lashon hara requires purity of intent:

A while ago – I forget the details – I was telling some people about how a certain person posed a harmful influence. One person objected that this was lashon hara. When I pointed out that it was leto’eles, for public benefit, this person argued that it is still only permissible if the speaker’s motivations are pure. Since my motivations were suspect, then it was not permissible.

Now, the first observation to be made here is that Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan’s “Laws” of lashon hara are not “laws” in the same sense as the laws of Shabbos found in the Shulchan Aruch. A must-read on this topic is Benjamin Brown’s “From Principles to Rules and from Musar to Halakhah: The Hafetz Hayim’s Rulings on Libel and Gossip,” which you can read at this link. Furthermore, while the Chafetz Chaim’s conclusions became the standard for much of the Orthodox community, this was primarily simply due to his being the first person to systematically discuss the topic.

But what about within the parameters of the Chafetz Chaim’s framework? Is it truly forbidden to warn people of someone’s faults if one’s motivations are not pure? Surely this makes no sense – why should these other people be put in harm’s way just because of one’s own shortcomings?

If we look at the Chafetz Chaim’s discussions of this topic, an interesting discrepancy can be seen. When discussing the laws of lashon hara and cases where it is permitted in order to help others, he lists purity of intent as being an essential condition (Hilchos Lashon Hara 10:2). But later, when discussing the laws of rechilus (tale-bearing) and cases where it is permitted in order to help others (Hilchos Issurei Rechilus 9:2), while he likewise lists pureness of intent as being an essential condition, there is a footnote to his Be’er Mayim Chaim commentary. In the commentary, he notes that even if one does not have purity of intent, one must nevertheless still relate the rechilus. After all, we are discussing a case where it is in order to help others from being harmed, and there is a mitzvah of Lo Ta’amod Al Dam Re’echa, not to stand by when someone is going to be hurt. Rather, he says, when describing purity of motive as a requirement, he means that one should try as much as possible to focus on doing it for positive purposes.

Now, why did the Chafetz Chaim not make this same point in discussing cases where it is permitted to state lashon hara? I don’t know, but it seem very clear that it should equally apply. Perhaps it was simply an oversight. (Alternately, looking carefully at the Chafetz Chaim’s language in discussing lashon hara, it seems to me that he is talking about having proper motive insofar as assessing that there is a genuine chance of helping people, not in terms of one’s inner motives. If I am correct, this is something that has been lost in the ArtScroll translation.)

One who sees the Chafetz Chaim’s work as being a halachic work like the Shulchan Aruch will probably not apply this principle (that purity of motive is not an essential condition) to lashon hara, since the Chafetz Chaim didn’t mention it there. But one who sees the concept of permitted and forbidden speech as being a rational matter of creating a moral society will likewise apply this principle to cases of permitted lashon hara. If it’s a matter of stopping someone from harming others, then it doesn’t make a difference what your personal motives are (except insofar as giving reason to doubly check that it really is a matter of stopping someone from harming others).

It is extraordinary that the works of the Chafetz Chaim, intended to make the world a better place, have often been used to make the world a worse place. Sometimes it is people not giving over harmful information about a shidduch, sometimes it is people not reporting dangerous behavior in a rabbi, sometimes it is people trying to quell frank discussion about social policies. The Torah’s principles of speech are supposed to improve society. We have to use our sechel in applying them.

At the time, I argued that the basic question of whether the need to protect the innocent is somehow overridden by the problematic motivation of the intervener seemed to be the subject of dispute between the Sema and the Taz. They argue over whether the dispensation for a third party to use force against one attempting to perpetrate an assault in order to protect his victim from harm is limited to where we have no reason to suspect the intervener of any personal animus toward the aggressor:


[אם] זה הבא להציל ולהכות המכה אינו בר הכי דרגיל לאפרוש מאיסורא דכמה פעמים רואה שמכה אחד לחבירו ואינו חושש לאפרושי המכה מאיסורא אז אמרינן דאסור להכות לזה המכה דודאי מכח שנאה בא להכותו ולא בא להפרישו מהאיסור1


ואיני יודע טעם לזה החילוק דכיון דדינא הוא שיכול להציל על ידי הכאה את המוכה מה {לנו} בזה שיש לו שנאה על המכה מכל מקום הוא עושה מצוה להציל את המוכה וכי בכוונת הלב תליא מלתא ואף אם אין דרכו כן לפעמים אחרים הרי לא יפה עשה באותן הפעמים אמנם בהאי מעשה שפיר קעביד ומצוה קעביד2

The Erech Shai apparently sides with the Taz that intent is irrelevant insofar as the action is objectively correct, and he actually applies this standard to lashon hara. He is discussing the question of whether truth is a defense against liability for the tort of defamation, and he argues that insofar as the dissemination of the defamatory information is in some way beneficial to the public, this eliminates any liability, despite the purely malicious intent of the defamer. He does seem to take for granted, however, that malicious action is nevertheless sinful, and he is merely arguing that it is unreasonable that the halachah would establish a penalty for an action that is inherently desirable:

הג”ה [הקורא לחבירו] עבד או ממזר והוא אמת פטור

בשבות יעקב חלק א’ סימן קע”ט כתב בקורא לחברו גנב ומברר בעדים שהוא גנב חייב דשאני עבד וממזר שאינו יכול לתקן בתשובה ומצוה לפרסמו שלא להתחתן בו …

ול”נ דגם בגנב נ”מ שנדע שהוא פסול לעדות ושבועה וגם להזהר ממנו ואף דכונתו אינו רק לביישו ועברה הוא מכל מקום כיון דמבייש בדברים שנו חכמים דפטור רק תקנת גאונים לקנוס כמבואר בבית יוסף מנ”ל דתקנו לקנוס על האמת ותקנתא לרשיעי ולא מתקנו מלתא דאתי לידי תקלה שלא יתפרסמו עוברי עבירה הפסולין לעדות ושבועה … אם לא נדע שהוא גנב לא נשמר ממנו ומצוה לפרסם החנפים ואף דזה לא מיכוין למצוה מכל מקום כיון שגוף הדבר מצוה אין לקנסו וכמו שכתב הט”ז לקמן סימן תכ”א סעיף י”ג.3

[I hope to return in a future post to the basic question of whether halachah recognizes truth as a defense against libel and slander.]

At the time, I did not have the benefit of R. Feldman’s magnificent work; I now see that he notes that the Chofetz Chaim himself elsewhere mentions this dispute between the Sema and the Taz. Here’s an excerpt of R. Feldman’s treatment of the general topic:

However, the very premise of the Hafetz Hayim, that a motive of “purpose” does not by itself justify the relating of information if it is tainted by an accompanying ulterior motive has been the subject of some debate. … Once again, a serious objection can be raised from the need to protect the innocent; it may be that the only one in a position to provide this protection nonetheless bears a personal animus against the subject.

More conceptually, as many note, the premise can be challenged, particularly when the question is abstracted to a broader issue in talmudic law: the role of intent or ulterior motive in undermining the legitimacy of suspending prohibitions under extenuating circumstances. … The theoretical underpinnings of the issue are substantial enough that a later scholar, Rabbi Gershon Robinson, devoted an entire book to defending this premise of the Hafetz Hayim, particularly against the background of the broader talmudic issues. The author notes that lashon hara may differ significantly from other areas of Jewish law in which mixed motivations are present. … if one has such an antipathy toward another that he is eager to speak negatively about him, that bias may fundamentally affect the content that he is relaying and indeed the decision to convey it in the first place.

Practically, this issue is complex and indeed the Hafetz Hayim himself emphasizes different elements of the equation at various points throughout his writings. While the specifics of this consideration are controversial, it seems that two fundamental points emerge from the debate. First, one who is tainted by antipathy toward the subject is prone to the prevalent biases and prejudices that may skew the reliability and even the basic truth of the report, even if he believes he is motivated by the protection of another; thus, a more objective source, if available, is greatly preferable. Second, when there is no alternative, it is incumbent upon the speaker to take all steps possible to compensate for his predisposition and to present as untainted a report as is feasible. …4

In a note, R. Feldman discusses the Sema and Taz:

[Hafetz Hayim] cites a dispute in a different area of Jewish law [the aforementioned Sema and Taz], the analysis of which allows for two views on either extreme of this position: that intent is irrelevant, and necessary speech is permitted regardless; and that not only ulterior intent but the mere presence of preexisting animus disqualifies (thus also rendering intent irrelevant, in the opposite way). The dispute between the Sema and the Taz is discussed at length in Tokhahat Hayim; see also Rabbi Moshe Samsonowitz, Keriya BaKeriya 1, pp. 190-91; Kodesh Yisrael 15; and Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak HaKohen Kook (of Rechovot) in the journal Marpei Lashon IV, pp. 6-12. See also the discussion of the topic by Rabbi Yehonatan Rozler, He’arot Rigshei Hayim to Hafetz Hayim, miluim, pp. 483-87.5

In light of the comments of the Erech Shai above, it is possible that even the Taz agrees that slander motivated by malice is sinful, despite the objective necessity of saving the innocent victim from harm, and his point is merely that it carries no liability.

We have also previously cited the position of Rav Yisrael Isser Isserlin that intent is the key criterion that determines the boundary between the category of defamation that is absolutely mandated by halachah and that which is forbidden:

וראיתי להזכיר פה ע”ד אשר כל הספרי מוסר הרעישו העולם על עון לשון הרע ואנכי מרעיש העולם להיפוך עון גדול מזה וגם הוא מצוי יותר והוא מניעת עצמו מלדבר במקום הנצרך להציל את העשוק מיד עושקו.

דרך משל במי שראה באחד שהוא אורב על חבירו בערמה על הדרך במדבר להרגו או שראה חותר מחתרת בלילה בביתו או בחנותו היתכן שימנע מלהודיע לחבירו שיזהר ממנו משום איסור לשון הרע הלא עונו גדול מנשוא שעובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעיך וכן בענין ממון הוא בכלל השבת אבידה ועתה מה לי חותר מחתרת או שרואה משרתיו גונבים ממונו בסתר או שותפו גונב דעתו בעסק או שחבירו מטעהו במקח וממכר או שלוה מעות והוא גברא דלא פרענא הוא וכן בעניני שידוך והוא יודע שהוא איש רע ובליעל ורע להתחתן עמו כולן בכלל השבת אבידת גופו וממונו

ועתה איה לנו הגדר והגבול לומר עד פה תדבר ולא יותר והכלל בזה שהדבר מסור ללב אם כונתו לרעת האחד הוא לשון הרע אבל אם כוונתו לטובת השני להצילו ולשמרו הוא מצוה רבה …

A haburah I gave about six months ago on the topic of עביד איניש דינא לנפשיה, in which I discuss some of the above, is available at the Internet Archive.

  1. סמ”ע סוף סימן תכ”א ס”ק כ”ז []
  2. ט”ז שם []
  3. ערך ש”י חו”מ סימן ת”כ []
  4. R. Daniel Z. Feldman, False Facts and True Rumors: Lashon HaRa in Contemporary Culture, pp. 99-101. []
  5. Ibid. n. 28. []
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Mareh, Metaphor and Meaning

Rambam famously asserts that the eschatological description of the wolf dwelling with the lamb and the leopard and the kid lying down together is metaphoric rather than literal:

אל יעלה על הלב שבימות המשיח יבטל דבר ממנהגו של עולם. או יהיה שם חידוש במעשה בראשית. אלא עולם כמנהגו נוהג. וזה שנאמר בישעיה וגר זאב עם כבש ונמר עם גדי ירבץ משל וחידה. ענין הדבר שיהיו ישראל יושבין לבטח עם רשעי עכו”ם המשולים כזאב ונמר. שנאמר זאב ערבות ישדדם ונמר שוקד על עריהם. ויחזרו כולם לדת האמת. ולא יגזלו ולא ישחיתו. אלא יאכלו דבר המותר בנחת עם ישראל. שנאמר ואריה כבקר יאכל תבן. וכן כל כיוצא באלו הדברים בענין המשיח הם משלים. ובימות המלך המשיח יודע לכל לאי זה דבר היה משל. ומה ענין רמזו בהן:
אמרו חכמים אין בין העולם הזה לימות המשיח אלא שיעבוד מלכיות בלבד. …1

Raavad tersely objects:

והלא כתוב בתורה והשבתי חיה רעה מן הארץ

As Radvaz retorts, Raavad’s objection is puzzling: Rambam’s whole point here is that various Biblical verses that prophecy eventual peace between creatures that are currently mortal enemies are not to be understood literally, so what has Raavad added to the discussion by supplying yet another verse to this effect?

ואין זו השגה, כמו ששאר הכתובים משל גם זה משל על אומה רעה כמו שדרשו על חיה רעה אכלתהו.2

The מרכבת המשנה explains that Raavad’s point is that although prophecies in general are conveyed via metaphor, Pentateuchal prophecy must always be understood literally:

עיין השגות נראה כוונתו דדברי תורה אין לפרש דרך משל (כמו נביאים) ואין מקרא שבתורה יוצא מידי פשוטו3

This is presumably based upon the famous set of dichotomies established by Rambam between the prophecy of Moshe and that of other prophets:

ומה הפרש יש בין נבואת משה לשאר כל הנביאים שכל הנביאים בחלום או במראה ומשה רבינו מתנבא והוא ער ועומד שנאמר ובבוא משה אל אהל מועד לדבר אתו וישמע הקול מדבר אליו. כל הנביאים על ידי מלאך. לפיכך רואים מה שהם רואים במשל וחידה. משה רבינו לא על ידי מלאך שנאמר פה אל פה אדבר בו. ונאמר ודבר ה’ אל משה פנים אל פנים. ונאמר ותמונת ה’ יביט כלומר שאין שם משל אלא רואה הדבר על בוריו בלא חידה ובלא משל. הוא שהתורה מעידה עליו במראה ולא בחידות שאינו מתנבא בחידה אלא במראה שרואה הדבר על בוריו.4

The above discussion has been about prophetic verses, regarding future events. What about narrative passages, describing historical ones? We have previously discussed, at some length, the various positions of Rambam, his interpreters, and Ralbag as to whether Adam, Eve, Cain, Abel and Seth were actual people. It is also important to note that “the fourth and final climax” of the “Maimonidean controversy”, at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries, was largely about alleged hyper-allegorization of Biblical characters and objects by Provencal Maimonidean rationalists. As Encyclopedia Judaica puts it:

When the controversy flared up again for the fourth and final time at the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th century, the immediate catalyst was the extreme allegorical exegesis of certain rationalists. In the century since Maimonides’ death, philosophy and science had become deeply entrenched in Jewish culture. Therefore, whereas in the 1230s the traditionalists sought a total ban on the study of philosophy, in the fourth and final climax of the controversy the traditionalists also accepted the validity of philosophy and science. They did not seek to ban totally the study of philosophy, but only to limit it, especially among the youth who lacked the intellectual and spiritual maturity to deal with its challenges to tradition. What they rejected was the philosopher’s extreme allegorization of Scripture and alleged denial of creation and miracles, which they saw as basic to the affirmation of the Torah. …

Abba Mari Astruc ha-Yarḥi of Lunel turned to Rashba (Rabbi Solomon b. Abraham *Adret ) in Barcelona for guidance on the rationalists’ allegorical interpretations, which he saw as heretical. … Astruc charged the philosophers with treating historical figures and events in the Bible purely symbolically, at the expense of their historicity; with regarding Plato and Aristotle, rather than the Torah, as the criteria of truth; with rejecting miracles and divine revelation; and with being personally lax in observance of Jewish law.

Although these charges, especially those of interpreting biblical figures purely symbolically and laxity in observance, were consistently denied by the rationalists, such as Menahem b. Solomon Meiri and Jedaiah b. Abraham Bedershi ha-Penini, they were on some level accurate. For example, Jacob b. Abba Mari Anatoli (1194–1296), the son-in-law of Samuel ibn Tibbon, in his book Malmad ha-Talmidim, had interpreted the patriarchs and matriarchs allegorically, rather than historically. Abraham and Sarah symbolized form and matter; Lot and his wife symbolized the intellect and the body; Isaac symbolized the active soul, and his wife Rebecca the intelligent soul; Leah symbolized the perceptive soul, and her sons the five senses; Leah’s daughter Dinah represented sensations induced by imagination; Joseph symbolized practical reason, while Benjamin symbolized theoretical reason. He also interpreted the seven-branched menorah (candelabrum) as representing the seven planets, the twelve tribes as symbolizing the constellations, and the Urim and Thummim of the high priest as representing the astrolabe.5

The traditionalists feared that such views could only lead to laxity in observance. If the Torah is true only on a symbolic level, the commandments might also be interpreted purely symbolically, at the expense of their actual observance, which is based on the literal text. Nevertheless, their attacks on individual rationalists like Levi b. Abraham b. Ḥayyim of Vilefranche (who seems to have been the immediate catalyst of the outburst), were unwarranted, since these rationalists, as they themselves insisted in their own defense, did not in fact go beyond Maimonides’ views or give up strict observance of the law, despite their radical allegorization. …

After much hesitation, and spurred on by the influence of Asher b. Jehiel, Rashba and the Barcelona community issued a ḥerem on July 26, 1305, against “any member of the community who, being under the age of 25 years, shall study the works of the Greeks on natural science or metaphysics, whether in the original language or in translation.” Works by Jewish philosophers were excepted, as was the study of medicine. … A ban was also pronounced against all who “say about Abraham and Sarah that in reality they symbolize matter and form; that the 12 tribes of Israel are [an allegory] for the 12 planets … [and] that the Urim and Thummim are to be understood as the astrolabe instrument.… Some of them say that everything in the Torah, from Bereshit to the giving of the law, is entirely allegorical”.

Crucially, no party to this controversy defended the hyper-allegorization in question. The Encyclopedia continues by noting that “The condemnation of extreme allegory did not arouse opposition”, but the truth goes far beyond that: in Rav Yedaiah Ha’Bedarsi’s brilliant, eloquent and classic “Letter of Apology” to Rashba, the response to the allegations of hyper allegorization is utter dismay and outrage at the accusations, imprecations against the calumniators, and even gentle and subtle but pointed criticism of Rashba himself for having rushed to judgment without having heard his faction’s version of events:

עוד נזכר בכתב אדוננו [הרשב”א] שלישית:

ולמרות עיני כבוד כל ישראל פורצים לעיני הכל כל גדרי התורה.
ואף באבותינו הקדושים שלחו לשונם מה שלא עשו עובדי עבודה זרה.
כי אמרו שאברהם ושרה חומר וצורה
ושני עשר שבטי ישראל הם שנים עשר מזלות
ויחזירו הכל לתהו ובהו.

אוי לאוזניים שכך שומעות, ואוי לנפש העלובים שכך יאמרו להם באוזניה. על בני שיכוליה שכולם מתאימים מסכימים לבלתי השאיר לתורת אלוהינו שרש וענף, ישורשו מארץ חיים. מי שזו אמונתם ובעד מגידי התלונות מהולכי אורח, ה’ הטוב יכפר, וכסא אדוננו ותורתו נקי עד עולם.

הנה אשר סופר לאדוננו, מעשות צורה והמשל באבות הטהורים, ואמרו באברהם ושרה שהם חומר וצורה. העבודה לא כך היה. והנני מעיד על אמיתת העניין אחר החקירה מפי האומר בעצמו, ומפי רבים מן השומעים שהיו במעמד. …

סוף דבר התקצף האלוקים על קולו והרצו קצת השומעים את הדברים מבלתי הבנת הכוונה ותצא הרעה הזאת על כל יושבי הארץ הנקיים. ולנו אפוא מה תעשה אבי השמיעוך הדברים ולא כהויתן. ואם תרבה להכלים ולהוכיח הדין עמך בזה בשלמות מעלתך שאין לו לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות. והאמנם כי צדיק הראשון בריבו ומחובת השופט שלא יקבל טענות בעל דין אחד עד שישמע טענות בעל דין חברו. וגם בהבלי עסקי בני אדם פן יוציא ממון מתחת ידם שלא כדין. ואם בדיני ממונות כך בדיני נפשות לא כל שכן.

אמנם מאמר היות שנים עשר בני יעקב אבינו ע”ה הם שנים עשר מזלות – זה לא שמענוהו מעולם ולא הוגד לנו בו דבר. אבל שמענו פעמים רבות מקצת הדרשנים ההפך …

חלילה חלילה שימצא אפילו בילידי ביתם של קדושי הארץ ומקנת כספם ושפחותיהם מי שפקפק על היות האבות יסוד התורה כולה. שהכל תלוי עליו, ובברית החזק שכרת להם השם נצלנו כמה פעמים, ונושענו מבלתי היותנו ראויים אליו מצד עצמנו בעת ההיא …

Today, on the left flank of Orthodoxy, we often find suggestions that even major narrative sections of the Torah may not be literally true. R. Herzl Hefter provocatively proposes this with regard to no less seminal an episode than the giving of the Torah:

The general tone of modern society is pluralistic. Truth (with an upper case T) has been replaced by subjective “narratives.” Consequently asserting allegiance to a particular tradition and maintaining a distinct identity is very difficult. In this challenging environment we naturally seek an anchor in certainty which can justify our commitment and construct our particular identity. For many years that anchor has been our belief that the Torah in its present form was communicated by God directly to Moshe. If that belief is undermined, how can we maintain our religious commitment to Torah and mitzvot and our particular identity as Jews?

Our religious beliefs, convictions, commitments and adherence to practice cannot be held hostage by rigid dogma which asserts historical truths yet demands immunity from inquiry. By accessing our own Kabbalistic and Hassidic traditions which are rooted in Chazal, we can free ourselves from the necessity of asserting historical truths while maintaining and actually fortifying our belief in God and the Torah. Our tradition affords us the instruments with which to encounter biblical criticism without bias and apologetics and come away more committed as Jews. The encounter with modern biblical scholarship actually affords us an opportunity to clarify and refine two crucial and inter-related faith issues: 1) The nature of the Torah and 2) the nature of Divine revelation.

The Nature of the Torah

It is safe to say that the basic assumption of “Torat HaSod” is that the Torah needs to be read symbolically. That means that the elements in the stories of the Torah and the stories themselves point to a Divine reality and that their value does not rest in their literal truth. Thus, for example the Zohar (Bereishit 7b) divides the word “Bereishit” to read “Bet” (=two) “Reishit,” namely two beginnings, one revealed and one hidden. On one level the biblical narrative in sefer Bereishit tells of the creation of the cosmos by God. Yet, according to the Zohar, this narrative is an outer manifestation of a deeper story, the story of how God is revealed to us. The “pshat” narrative is a garment (levush) which paradoxically both obscures and facilitates the revelation of this spiritual reality. The significance of the biblical narrative according to this tradition rests not in its historical accuracy but in the underlying spiritual content.

Rav Kook shared this assumption when, back in 1908, he responded to the “biblical criticism question” of his day, namely how to relate to the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin. His response is so important and relevant that I wish to quote part of it here. (Igrot HaRaayah no. 134. The translation is my own).

Concerning opinions which are derived from recent scientific investigations which on the whole contradict the straight forward meaning (pshat) of the words of the Torah:

“In my opinion … even though these theories are not necessarily true, we are not at all obligated to deny them and stand against them. This is because it is not at all (stress mine-HH) the point of the Torah to inform us of simple facts and occurrences of the past. The main point (‘ikar) is the inner content (tokh). … For us it is of no consequence whether in fact there ever existed in this world a golden age (i.e. the Garden of Eden – HH) in which mankind lived in spiritual and physical bliss or [not]… and thus when we have no vested interest we can judge [these new theories ] fairly.”

The intellectual integrity displayed by Rav Kook in this last sentence should not be lost upon us and should serve as a model for emulation for those engaged in this discussion.

The purpose of the Torah, according to the “sod” tradition is not to convey historical truths but rather to gesture toward a deeper and more profound spiritual reality. It is possible, then, to accept that the Torah in its current form is the product of historical circumstance and a prolonged editorial process while simultaneously stubbornly asserting the religious belief that it none the less enshrouds Divine revelation.

This sort of approach ignores the major traditional literature directly on point as to the limits on allegorization, relying instead on vague allusions to “our own Kabbalistic and Hassidic traditions which are rooted in Chazal” and Torat HaSod”. Indeed, “e. pruzhaner” notes that Rav Kook himself utterly repudiated the notion that “the narrative portions of the Torah are just myths which never actually took place”:

“Rav Kook shared this assumption when, back in 1908, he responded to the “biblical criticism question” of his day, namely how to relate to the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin.”

Actually, the “biblical criticism question” of R. Kook’s day was biblical criticism. Ignoring R. Kook’s actual position while pretending to present his view is the opposite of intellectual integrity. On the issue of biblical criticism, R. Kook’s opposition is well known. See Iggerot ha-Ra’ayah, no. 44,

“For this reason, [some say that] perhaps the narrative portions of the Torah are just myths which never actually took place. But this very doubt can only have been borrowed from the gentiles, for one who feels himself growing and born in [a particular] house knows well the business of that house, and could not possibly think that the living and enduring history of his nation, which is so integrated, ordered, and distinguished, is a fabrication. But we shall walk also with these captives, who have distanced themselves from their father’s table, but without anger, and we shall say to them: Brothers, [even] if it is as you say – matters of legend which have such great capacity to bring about good and blessedness, everlasting hope, and morals, are so precious and noble, so much so that they are in effect words of the living God, and it befits them that anything fixed in their memory should be guarded with honor and great love. This is insufficient to fully revive them, but it will be enough to open a door, to remove the scorn and hate, the rejection and revulsion to anything pertaining to Judaism, even in the hearts of those children who are far away.

My weekly lectures for parashas Be’Haalosecha, on these themes, are available at the Internet Archive.

  1. מלכים יב:א-ב []
  2. רדב”ז מלכים שם []
  3. מרכבת המשנה מלכים שם []
  4. יסודי התורה ז:ו []
  5. I am not expert in the מלמד, but I suspect that the claim that it does not consider the patriarchs and matriarchs historic is a serious distortion. R. Yedaiah Ha’Bedarsi and his faction venerated the מלמד, and he could not possibly have repudiated the hyper-allegorization in question with the vehemence that he does, and even utterly denied its existence among his faction, if this was indeed the view of the מלמד. On the contrary, the מלמד does seem to accept that the patriarchs and matriarchs were actual historic figures, even if it interprets certain aspects of the relevant biblical narrative allegorically. This basic point is made by R. Yedaiah himself (in a portion of his discussion on hyper-allegorization not excerpted in the main text above), that the Prophets and Hazal sometimes utilized the male and female, and even the specific figures of Avraham and Sarah, as stand-ins for Matter and Form: “ואמנם היות דרך הנביאים לפעמים לתאר הצורה לזכר, והחומר לנקבה, ולכת החכמים ז”ל בזה בעקבותיהם, זה בארו לנו הרב הגדול ז”ל.” Further analysis of the view of the מלמד itself is called for, however. []
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Round and Square Numbers In the Bible

My weekly halachah column for parashas Bemidbar:

In the censuses of parashas Bemidbar and parashas Pinchas, the population totals for almost all the tribes are multiples of one hundred, except for those of the tribe of Gad in the former census and the tribe of Reuvein in the latter. Several commentators assume that these figures are not exact, and that the Torah is rounding (Meshech Chochmah 3:16, Tosefes Brachah to Bemidbar). The earliest known proponent of this view, R. Yeshayah of Trani (cited in Penei David), provides two other Biblical examples of rounding: the Torah (Devarim 25:3) prescribes the punishment of a sinner to be forty stripes, but the Oral Tradition explains that only thirty-nine are actually administered, and the Torah (Vayikra 23:16) commands us to count fifty days between Pesach and Shavuos, but of course, we only count forty-nine.

The Rosh (at the end of Pesachim) asserts one other example of this latter sort of rounding, where a number one less than a multiple of ten is rounded up by one to the multiple of ten: the Torah (Bereishis 46:27) relates that “all the souls of the house of Jacob, which came into Egypt, were threescore and ten” (but only sixty-nine are enumerated). This claim that the discrepancy can be understood as the product of rounding is problematic, however, as the same discrepancy is manifest with regard to the subtotal of thirty-three that the Torah gives for the descendants of Leah, while only thirty-two are enumerated. Here the idea of rounding is inapplicable, and we must seemingly resort to one of the other suggestions offered by the Talmud and the various commentators: the totals include Yocheved, who was born just they entered Egypt (but not earlier, and so is not mentioned in the earlier enumeration – Bava Basre 123a-b), or Yaakov himself (Ibn Ezra, as well as many of the Tosafists), or even Hashem Himself (Da’as Zekeinim Mi’Ba’alei Ha’Tosafos).

In a classic example of the aharonim being “frummer” than the rishonim, despite the fact that the one rishon known to have discussed the point, Rav Yeshayah di Trani the Elder (the Rid), takes for granted that the Biblical figures are rounded, Rav Ya’akov Yisrael Kanievsky (the Steipler) is reported by R. Ozer Alpert to have rejected this notion out of hand:

Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky relates that he initially assumed that the census numbers were rounded, but when he mentioned this to his father, the Steipler responded that a number written in the Torah must be exact, and God must have had a reason why He miraculously caused each tribe to have such even numbers of people.

My weekly lectures for Bemidbar on this topic, along with their handouts, are available at the Internet Archive.

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