Smuggling, Swearing, and Kissing

A famous midrash:

וַיָּקָם בַּלַּיְלָה הוּא וַיִּקַּח אֶת שְׁתֵּי נָשָׁיו וְאֶת שְׁתֵּי שִׁפְחֹתָיו וְאֶת אַחַד עָשָׂר יְלָדָיו וַיַּעֲבֹר אֵת מַעֲבַר יַבֹּק. ודינה היכן היא? נתנה בתיבה ונעל בפניה. אמר: הרשע הזה עינו רמה היא, שלא יתלה עיניו ויראה אותה ויקח אותה ממני. ר’ הונא בשם ר’ אבא הכהן ברדלא אמר: אמר לו הקב”ה: לַמָּס מֵרֵעֵהוּ חָסֶד [וְיִרְאַת שַׁדַּ-י יַעֲזוֹב], מנעת מרעך חסד, מנעת חסדך מן אחוך, דאלו איתנסיבת לגברא לא זינתה. בתמיה. לא בקשת להשיאה למהול, הרי היא נשאת לערל. לא בקשת להשיאה דרך היתר, הרי נשאת דרך איסור, הה”ד: ותצא דינה בת לאה.1

At least as far back as the medieval period, commentators have been puzzled by this criticism of Jacob for withholding Dinah from Esau: do we really expect a man to give his young daughter to a villain in the hope of reforming him?!

ואם תאמר וכי מי שיש לו אח משומד וכי ישיא לו את בתו שהיא בת ו’ שנים כאשר היתה דינה, והלא משנולד יוסף עבד בצאן, ודינה נולדה עם יוסף בפרק אחד, כמו שעשה הפייט סילוף דינה ביוסף להנחות, ושמא יש לומר שקבל עליו תשובה על מנת שלא יזלזל כו’ כמו שנאמר (לקמן לג:יב) נסעה ונלכה ואלכה לנגדך בשוה ביהדות.2

Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro gives a stunning answer to this question: whatever the objectively correct course of action may have been, Jacob acted out of malice. He did not want his brother to reform, since that would have granted Esau mastery over him:

קשה אדרבא היה ראוי שתחשב לו לצדקה שמנעה מיד הרשע. יש לומר שיעקב לרעה נתכוון שלא היה רוצה שאחיו יהיה צדיק כדי שלא יתקיים בו ברכת הוה גביר לאחיך ולפיכך נענש:3

The sheer cold-bloodedness of this is reminiscent of the thought of another Italian writer, almost exactly contemporary to the Ra’av – Niccolò Machiavelli:

I say that many will perhaps consider it an evil example that the founder of a civil society, as Romulus was, should first have killed his brother, and then have consented to the death of Titus Tatius, who had been elected to share the royal authority with him; from which it might be concluded that the citizens, according to the example of their prince, might, from ambition and the desire to rule, destroy those who attempt to oppose their authority. This opinion would be correct, if we do not take into consideration the object which Romulus had in view in committing that homicide. But we must assume, as a general rule, that it never or rarely happens that a republic or monarchy is well constituted, or its old institutions entirely reformed, unless it is done by only one individual; it is even necessary that he whose mind has conceived such a constitution should be alone in carrying it into effect. A sagacious legislator of a republic, therefore, whose object is to promote the public good, and not his private interests, and who prefers his country to his own successors, should concentrate all authority in himself; and a wise mind will never censure any one for having employed any extraordinary means for the purpose of establishing a kingdom or constituting a republic. It is well that, when the act accuses him, the result should excuse him; and when the result is good, as in the case of Romulus, it will always absolve him from blame. For he is to be reprehended who commits violence for the purpose of destroying, and not he who employs it for beneficent purposes. The lawgiver should, however, be sufficiently wise and virtuous not to leave this authority which he has assumed either to his heirs or to any one else; for mankind, being more prone to evil than to good, his successor might employ for evil purposes the power which he had used only for good ends. Besides, although one man alone should organize a government, yet it will not endure long if the administration of it remains on the shoulders of a single individual; it is well, then, to confide this to the charge of many, for thus it will be sustained by the many. Therefore, as the organization of anything cannot be made by many, because the divergence of their opinions hinders them from agreeing as to what is best, yet, when once they do understand it, they will not readily agree to abandon it. That Romulus deserves to be excused for the death of his brother and that of his associate, and that what he had done was for the general good, and not for the gratification of his own ambition, is proved by the fact that he immediately instituted a Senate with which to consult, and according to the opinions of which he might form his resolutions. And on carefully considering the authority which Romulus reserved for himself, we see that all he kept was the command of the army in case of war, and the power of convoking the Senate. This was seen when Rome became free, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, when there was no other innovation made upon the existing order of things than the substitution of two Consuls, appointed annually, in place of an hereditary king; which proves clearly that all the original institutions of that city were more in conformity with the requirements of a free and civil society than with an absolute and tyrannical government.

The above views might be corroborated by any number of examples, such as those of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of monarchies and republics, who were enabled to establish laws suitable for the general good only by keeping for themselves an exclusive authority; but all these are so well known that I will not further refer to them.4

I discuss the above (Jewish) sources, as well as several cases in the halachic literature involving the smuggling of people and goods, in my lectures and halachah column for this past parashas Lech-Lecha. The lectures, along with accompanying handout, are available at the Internet Archive. Here’s the column:

In parashas Lech-Lecha, when Abram is about to enter Egypt, he requests of his wife Sarai that she say that she is his sister (12:13). According to the midrash, this was merely Abram’s fallback plan; he actually attempted to smuggle Sarai into Egypt by hiding her inside a box, but was forced by customs inspectors to open the box (Bereishis Rabbah 40:5).

A famous account of an attempt to smuggle women past border officials by dissembling about their relationships to the smugglers appears in the seventeenth century work Shut. Chavos Yair (#182). Two men were traveling from Frankfurt to Worms, and two women, one married with her husband in Worms, and the other her single daughter, wished to make the same journey. The women lacked the requisite travel documents, without which they would be subject to a fine at the checkpoint in Oppenheim, so they asked the men to declare them as their wife and daughter respectively, since the mens’ documents allowed them to travel freely with their wives and family members. At the checkpoint, the customs official refused to believe the mens’ declarations, and insisted that they swear to their veracity, or else prove their kinship by kissing the women. The men replied that they could not kiss the women, since they were currently niddah, a fact that the women confirmed. After some further negotiation, the men eventually settled with the customs agent for a minimal sum, but one of them subsequently reported the episode to the author of Chavos Yair, who penned an analysis of the relevant halachic issues.

He concludes that since the men had been attempting to deceive the official, who was appropriately carrying out his duty by investigating their claims, it was prohibited for them to kiss the women or even to swear that the women were niddah based upon their representations, even if they were afraid that by failing to do so they would suffer financial harm, and it was certainly prohibited for them to falsely swear to their kinship, even to avoid a great loss.

  1. בראשית רבה עו:ט []
  2. מושב זקנים בראשית לב:כג []
  3. עמר נקא שם []
  4. Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, First Book, Chapter IX. []

Commentary On the Cooking Of Kids

The following verse is repeated, word for word, letter for letter, ניקוד for ניקוד, and טעם for טעם, in parashiyos Mishpatim and Ki Sisa:

רֵאשִׁ֗ית בִּכּוּרֵי֙ אַדְמָ֣תְךָ֔ תָּבִ֕יא בֵּ֖ית יְקוָ֣ק אֱלֹקיךָ לֹֽא־תְבַשֵּׁ֥ל גְּדִ֖י בַּחֲלֵ֥ב אִמּֽוֹ׃

Oddly, ArtScroll’s translation of the verse varies considerably, if not necessarily substantively, between the two instances:

The choicest first fruit of your land shall you bring to the House of Hashem, your G-d; you shall not cook a kid in the milk of its mother.1

The first of your land’s early produce you shall bring to the Temple of Hashem, your G-d. Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.2

[ArtScroll translates the final instance of the admonition of לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו, in parashas Re’eh, as:

you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.3]

Ibn Ezra, of course, would maintain that these sorts of trivial discrepancies do not matter, and that disregard of them is actually the way of “all scholars [writing] in all languages” (although I don’t think that ArtScroll would accept this position of Ibn Ezra):

אמר אברהם המחבר: משפט אנשי לה”ק פעם יבארו דבורם באר היטב ופעם יאמרו הצורך במלות קצרות שיוכל השומע להבין טעמם. ודע כי המלות הם כגופות והטעמים הם כנשמות והגוף לנשמה כמו כלי. ע”כ משפט כל החכמים בכל לשון שישמרו הטעמים ואינם חוששים משנוי המלות אחר שהם שוות בטעמן. והנה אתן לך דמיונות:

אמר ה’ לקין: ארור אתה מן האדמה. כי תעבוד את האדמה לא תוסף תת כחה לך נע ונד תהיה בארץ. וקין אמר: הן גרשת אותי היום מעל פני האדמה. ומי הוא שאין לו לב שיחשוב כי הטעם אינו שוה בעבור שנוי המלות.

והנה אמר אליעזר: הגמיאיני נא. והוא אמר: ואומר אליה השקיני נא.

אמר משה: בכור השבי אשר בבית הבור. וכתוב: בכור השפחה אשר אחר הרחים.

ומשה הזכיר התפילה במשנה תורה שהתפלל על ישראל בעבור העגל, ואינו דומה לתפילה הנזכרת בפרשת כי תשא ,למי שאין לו לב להבין והכלל כל דבר שנוי כמו חלום פרעה ונבוכדנצר. ואחרים רבים תמצא מלות שונות. רק הטעם שוה. וכאשר אמרתי לך שפעם יאחזו דרך קצרה ופעם ארוכה. כך יעשו פעמים להוסיף אות משרת או לגרוע אותו. והדבר שוה.

אמר השם: ותכלת וארגמן. ומשה אמר: תכלת וארגמן.

אמר השם: אבני שהם. ומשה אמר: ואבני שהם.

וכאלה רבים ושניהם נכונים, כי הכתוב בלא וי”ו אחז דרך קצרה ולא יזיק. גם הכתוב בוי”ו לא יזיק בעבור שהוסיף לבאר. והנה הוי”ו שהיא נראית במבטא הפה אין אדם מבקש לו טעם למה נגרע ולמה נכתב ולמה נוסף. כי זה וזה נכון. והנה על הנראה שיבוטא בו לא יבקש עליו בכתב טעם. א”כ למה נבקש טעם בנח הנעלם שלא יבוטא בו. כמו מלת לעולם למה נכתב מלא או למה חסר. והנה בני הדור יבקשו טעם למלא גם לחסר. ואילו היו מבקשים טעם לאחד מהם. או שהמנהג היה לכתוב הכל על דרך א’ הייתי מחריש.

והנה אתן לך משל: אמר לי אדם אחד כתוב לרעי וזה כתוב: אני פלוני אוהבך לעולם. וכתבתי פלני בלא וי”ו. אהבך גם כן בלא וי”ו. לעלם חסר. ובא ראובן ושאלני למה כתבת חסרים?!
ואני אין לי צורך לכתוב רק מה שאמר לי. ואין לי חפץ להיותם מלאים או חסרים אולי יבא לוי ויודיעני איך אכתוב. ולא ארצה להאריך רק המשכיל יבין ועתה אפרש לך השאלות הנזכרות.4

I discovered this curiosity while preparing my weekly halachah column for this past parashas Ki Sisa:

Parashas Ki Sisa contains one of the Torah’s three reiterations of the prohibition: “Do not cook [lo sevasheil] a kid [gedi] in its mother’s milk.” (34:26) The prohibition of cooking meat and milk together is not limited to a kid, or to the milk of an animal’s own mother (see, e.g., Chullin 114a); why, then, does the Torah say “in its mother’s milk”?

Ibn Ezra and Bechor Shor (23:19) suggest that the prohibition does refer primarily to the cooking of a kid in its own mother’s milk, since this constitutes cruelty, and is analogous to the slaughtering of an animal and its offspring on the same day (Vayikra 22:28) and the taking of the mother bird with its young (Devarim 22:6). Ibn Ezra explains that the reason the Torah forbids cooking in all milk is that since milk is commonly obtained from commercial sources, and the purchaser may be unaware of the kid’s mother’s location and may not realize that the purchased milk contains the kid’s mother’s milk, the rule that “every doubt regarding a Biblical matter is prohibited” applies.

Bechor Shor also makes the startling assertion that the simple meaning (peshat) of the prohibition is something else entirely: the words lo sevasheil here do not mean “do not cook” but rather “do not ripen”, i.e., do not allow a kid [presumably a first born one, which must be offered as a sacrifice and given to a priest] to grow and be raised on its mother’s milk, but offer it immediately. The prohibition is thus analogous to the commandment in the beginning of the verse: “The choicest first [reishis] fruit of your land shall you bring to the House of Hashem, your G-d”. [Bechor Shor seems to understand reishis not as a description of the fruit to be brought, but rather as an imperative to bring the fruit immediately upon its formation.]

Some commentators take this idea even further, and explain that the word gedi here actually means fruit, and ‘mother’ refers to the tree on which it grows, so this portion of the verse itself is an exhortation to bring the first fruit immediately to the House of Hashem, and not to allow it to ripen on the tree (Hadar Zekeinim ibid., and cf. there for yet another reading of the verse).

  1. The Chumash, the Stone Edition (eleventh edition), p. 437. []
  2. Ibid. p. 513. []
  3. Ibid. p. 1013. []
  4. אבן עזרא שמות כ:א []

Justice Denied Revisited

Around this time last year, we discussed the controversy over the theological correctness of the phrase “ולוקח נפשות במשפט” added to ברכת המזון in a house of mourning, in light of the Biblical phrase “וְיֵשׁ נִסְפֶּה בְּלֹא מִשְׁפָּט” and the Talmudic assertion that “יש מיתה בלא חטא”. I have long had a vague sense of perplexity about this controversy: are there not other similar liturgical assertions that all deaths are the working of Divine justice? I never came up with a concrete example, but I recently discovered that Rav Refael Yosef Hazan does discuss one:

כתב הטור בסימן רכ”ד וז”ל

הרואה קברי ישראל [אומר ברוך אתה ד’ אלקינו מלך העולם אשר יצר אתכם בדין וזן אתכם בדין וכלכל אתכם בדין] והמית אתכם בדין

[ו]כך היא הגירסא בהרי”ף והרמב”ם ע”כ וברבינו יונה הביא דבריו מרן הבית יוסף דאף על גב דיש מיתה בלא חטא אפילו הכי דינו דין אמת יע”ש

וקשיא טובא שהרי הרי”ף בפרק שלשה שאכלו גבי ברכת האבל כתב כבה”ג דלא אמרינן לוקח נפשות במשפט וכתבו רבינו יונה והרא”ש שהטעם שלהם דקיימא לן יש מיתה בלא חטא והם ז”ל חלקו עליהם דאף על פי כן כל דרכיו משפט יע”ש. ואם כן קשה להרי”ף איך כתב בברכה זו והמית אתכם בדין הפך מה שכתב בברכת האבל. וגם לרבינו יונה והרא”ש קשה איך לא הקשו מדבריו בברכה זו וכן קשה להרמב”ם דגבי ברכת האבל כתב כהרי”ף וכאן כתב הנוסח והמית אתכם בדין. וכן קשה להבית יוסף דבסימן קפ”ט כתב דנקטינן כהרי”ף והרמ[ב”ם] ובסימן זה כתב דברי רבינו יונה בסתם והם תרי דסתרי וגם נוסחתינו בברכת האבל שלא לומר במשפט ובברכה זו אנו אומרים והמית אתכם בדין וצ”ע.

ואחר החיפוש ראיתי בסדר רב עמרם גאון כת”י שהביא נוסח ברכה זו ואין בה והמית אתכם בדין כנוסח גירסת הרי”ף ושאר פוסקים יע”ש וצ”ע לדין1

Here is my weekly halachah column for this week:

Parashas Haazinu (32:4) contains the declaration: “The Rock! – perfect is His work, for all His paths are justice; a G-d of faith without iniquity, righteous and fair is He.”

We have previously discussed (this column, parashas Haazinu 5777) the debate over the language “[He] takes souls with justice … for all His paths are justice” added to the Blessing after Meals in the home of a mourner: some authorities reject this phrase, due to the Talmudic declaration that “there is death without error [cheit]”, while others defend it based on our parashah’s assertion that “all His paths are justice”.

Another liturgical context in which this tension is manifest is the blessing recited upon seeing graves of Jews. Here the normative, virtually unanimously accepted phrasing is: “Blessed are You, Hashem, … who formed you with justice … and killed you with justice [ba’din] …” (Berachos 58b and rishonim there, Tur and Shulchan Aruch OC end of siman 224). R. Refael Yosef Chazan is quite perplexed by the fact that even those authorities who object to the phrase “[He] takes souls with justice” on the grounds that it is theologically incorrect, apparently have no problem with the phrase “and killed you with justice” (Chikrei Lev OC 1:49).

As noted in our previous column, an additional argument against the claim that all deaths can be considered just is from the declaration in Mishlei that “some are consumed without justice”, and the Talmud’s support thereof with a remarkable anecdote of the underling of the Angel of Death confusing his master’s description of his target and taking the life of the wrong woman by mistake. This same argument is advanced by Maharil in his halachic analysis of a question with much higher stakes than mere liturgical correctness: is flight from a plague-infested area prudent, or actually prohibited? Maharil strongly endorses flight, and in response to his correspondent’s apparent concern that this is an attempt to thwart Hashem’s will, he counters that death is not always a result of His will, since “some are consumed without justice”, and infers from the aforementioned Talmudic account that “sometimes the agent errs” (Shut. Maharil #41)!

  1. שו”ת חקרי לב חלק א’ (או”ח) סימן מ”ט []