Bayesian Inference

UPDATE: I have corrected an inaccuracy in my probabilistic analysis of the Gemara, and I have added to it an example using concrete numbers.

The Mishnah states:

האשה שנתארמלה או שנתגרשה היא אומרת בתולה נשאתני והוא אומר לא כי אלא אלמנה נשאתיך אם יש עדים שיצאת בהינומא וראשה פרוע כתובתה מאתים1

The Gemara analyzes:

וכיון דרוב נשים בתולות נישאות כי לא אתו עדים מאי הוי

אמר רבינא משום דאיכא למימר רוב נשים בתולות נישאות ומיעוט אלמנות וכל הנשאת בתולה יש לה קול וזו הואיל ואין לה קול איתרע לה רובא

אי כל הנשאת בתולה יש לה קול כי אתו עדים מאי הוי הנך סהדי שקרי נינהו

אלא אמר רבינא רוב הנשאת בתולה יש לה קול וזו הואיל ואין לה קול איתרע לה רובא2

This is a classic example of Bayesian inference, albeit expressed in qualitative, rather than quantitative, terms:

Bayesian inference uses aspects of the scientific method, which involves collecting evidence that is meant to be consistent or inconsistent with a given hypothesis. As evidence accumulates, the degree of belief in a hypothesis ought to change. With enough evidence, it should become very high or very low. …

Bayesian inference uses a numerical estimate of the degree of belief in a hypothesis before evidence has been observed and calculates a numerical estimate of the degree of belief in the hypothesis after evidence has been observed. …

Bayes’ theorem adjusts probabilities given new evidence in the following way:

Baye's theorem

where

  • H represents a specific hypothesis, which may or may not be some null hypothesis.
  • P(H) is called the prior probability of H that was inferred before new evidence, E, became available.
  • P(E | H) is called the conditional probability of seeing the evidence E if the hypothesis H happens to be true. It is also called a likelihood function when it is considered as a function of H for fixed E.
  • P(E) is called the marginal probability of E: the a priori probability of witnessing the new evidence E under all possible hypotheses. It can be calculated as the sum of the product of all probabilities of any complete set of mutually exclusive hypotheses and corresponding conditional probabilities:

    Summation

  • P(H | E) is called the posterior probability of H given E.

The factor P(E | H) / P(E) represents the impact that the evidence has on the belief in the hypothesis. If it is likely that the evidence E would be observed when the hypothesis under consideration is true, but unlikely that E would have been the outcome of the observation, then this factor will be large. Multiplying the prior probability of the hypothesis by this factor would result in a larger posterior probability of the hypothesis given the evidence. Conversely, if it is unlikely that the evidence E would be observed if the hypothesis under consideration is true, but a priori likely that E would be observed, then the factor would reduce the posterior probability for H. Under Bayesian inference, Bayes’ theorem therefore measures how much new evidence should alter a belief in a hypothesis.

[One application of Baysian analysis is to the notorious Monty Hall problem, as explained here.]

In our Gemara:

  • H is the hypothesis that the woman was a virgin at her marriage
  • E is the absence of a קול
  • P(H) is רוב נשים בתולות נישאות
  • P(E | H) is low, since רוב הנשאת בתולה יש לה קול
  • P(E) is not stated
  • P(H | E) is הואיל ואין לה קול איתרע לה רובא

The Gemara’s point, expressed in the language of Bayesian probability, is that in the absence of a קול [E], the likelihood of בתולה נשאת [P(H | E)] is significantly lower than our initial assumption of the same [P(H)], given that the likelihood of the absence of a קול had she been a virgin [P(E | H] is low. [This is true regardless of the value of as long as P(E | H) is significantly lower than P(E), which it clearly is, since the absence of a קול is certainly much more likely if our hypothesis of her virginity is false than if it is true.] In the הוה אמינא of the Gemara, P(E | H) was actually zero, and we would therefore reject even the testimony of witnesses to her virginity, normally the gold standard of evidence in Halachah, having no choice but to conclude that they are liars.

For concreteness’s sake, here is the logic expressed using specific, albeit somewhat arbitrary numbers. Let us assign the value of 75% to any רוב, and let us assume that the rate of false positives, i.e., the presence of a קול for a woman who is not a virgin, is quite low, say 5%. So:

  • P(H) is .75
  • P(E | H) is .25
  • P(E) is (.75 * .25) + (.25 * .95) = .425

And plugging these values into Baye’s theorem tells us that P(H | E) = .25 * .75 / .425 ≆ .441

As the Gemara says, איתרע לה רובא.

The principle of this Gemara arose during a presentation that I heard yesterday. The question being discussed was the status of a בעלת תשובה vis-a-vis marrying a Cohen. The problem is that many Poskim rule that an apostate who returns to observance is assumed to be טמאה, with her protestations to the contrary not believed, based on the principle of רוב גוים פרוצים בעריות3, and it would seem to follow that the same should apply to an irreligous Jew, since she has moved in non-Jewish society and followed its norms.

One (out of several) arguments raised by the presenter was as follows: He noted that he had been informed, by a Posek with much experience in these matters, that 95% of בעלות תשובה actually admit that they are טמאות, and even though we have no idea of what percentage of the remaining 5% are telling the truth, it is nevertheless indubitably clear that רוב טמאות admit to their history4. He therefore reasoned, by analogy to the above Gemara, that whenever a woman insists that she is טהורה, the argument against her purity that רוב גוים פרוצים בעריות is weakend by the opposing, supporting argument that רוב טמאות admit to their status, and she does not.

The reaction to this suggestion by the audience was mild pandemonium. While I staunchly defended the plausibility of the idea, nearly everyone else who expressed an opinion, as well as a couple of my colleagues to whom I later related it, seemed to find it at least dubious, if not downright preposterous. I did not, however, hear anyone articulate a clear objection. Of course, one can simply deny the claim of 95% of בעלות תשובה admitting to being טמאות, but if, for the sake of argument, we grant it, I challenge the reader to either concede the point, or clearly articulate why it is incorrect!

  1. כתובות ריש פרק שני []
  2. שם דף ט”ז ע”א – ע”ב []
  3. See שולחן ערוך אה”ע סימן ז’ סעיף י”א בהגה []
  4. We are tacitly assuming that the rate of false positives, i.e. admissions of טומאה by טהורות, is very low. Obviously, if we assume that admission or denial of טומאה is completely independent of her true status, then we can derive nothing at all from her denial. []

Balloon Boy and Child Custody Halachah

Balloon Boy

The nation’s attention has been lately riveted upon the sad, sordid, bizarre, Warholian saga of Balloon Boy. The LA Legal Examiner reports that Child Protective Services has been contacted:

Child Protective Services have been called into the case to determine whether or not the three Heene boys are living in a “safe” environment.

Larimer County Sheriff Jim Alderden told reporters his office has contacted Child Protective Services about the family. …

Child Protective Services will focus their investigation on the children’s well-being.

[Hat tip: The Family Law Prof Blog]

Child Custody in the Absence of Contention

When I first heard of this, I wondered: while there is a fairly robust body of Halachah on child custody, as far as I know, all the cases discussed involve contention over custodial rights between the father, mother and / or members of their respective families. I am aware of no precedent for a Beis Din involving itself in the domestic arrangements of a family in which the parents are happily married and not contending over custody. I raised this question with my Havrusa, who suggested that a Beis Din could nevertheless take action based upon the principle of בית דין אביהם של יתומים הוא, but I still wanted an authoritative source or precedent.

Serendipitously, a mere several days later I noticed that Rabbi Zvi Gartner (author of כפייה בגט and member of the editorial board of אוצר הפוסקים) makes precisely this point:

שהנה נראה פשוט שטובת הילד איננה ערך העומדת בפני עצמו, והראיה שמעולם לא שמענו שמשום טובת הילד בעלמא יבואו הבית דין ויוציאו הילד מתחת יד הוריו הגרים יחד בשלום ובשלוה, אלא ודאי שכל עיקרה כמכריע בין ההורים [או משפחתם]. וגדר הדבר שגם להאב, וגם להאם, הזכות להחזיק בילדם … והואיל וזה אי אפשר כעת שהם גרים בנפרד, מוכרחים הם להתפשר באיזה צורה שהיא, ועיין שו”ת משיב דבר חלק ג’ סימן י’ והעמק דבר דברים ט”ז, כ’, שבכגון זה פשרה מן התורה לדעת הכל, וכמו ששנינו בסנהדרין ל”ב ע”ב צדק צדק תרדוף אחד לדין ואחד לפשרה, וכהך דשתי ספינות כו’. ומעיקר הדין אין כללים איך יתפשרו, אלא הבית דין ידונו ויפשרו בכל מקרה ומקרה כפי ראות עיניהם בגופו של דבר. ושוב קבעו חז”ל כללים ומסמרות, ללכת אחר טובת הילד, ר”ל שטובת הילד יקבע להם איך להתפשר, ר”ל כשטובתו אצל אביו יעדיפו זכות האב, וכשטובתו אצל אמו יעדיפו זכות שלה. אבל על כל פנים גם בשדנים בפועל בטובת הילד, מכל מקום קוטב הדיון סובב על זכויות ההורים, ונמצא שהם הם בעלי הדברים1

But what the right hand taketh away, the left hand giveth (partially) back,2 for R. Gartner immediately qualifies the above with this concluding paragraph:

[מיהו, כל האמור בטובת הילד בעלמא, אבל בשקיימת סכנה ממשית לילד לפי ראות עיני בית הדין, או גשמי, או רוחני, בזה ודאי מסתבר שמהוה ערך בפני עצמו ודנים וחוזרין ודנים, ומסתבר גם שמוציאים בכגון זה גם משני הורים הגרים יחד. אך מסתבר שהדברים אמורים רק בבית דין קבוע וחשוב שכלפיהם ניתן לאמור שאפוטרופוסים של יתומים המה, ולא בסתם בית דין, וכל שכן לא בבית דין של זבל”א כו’. ומסתבר גם שהבית דין עצמם יקבעו אם ומתי קיימת דרגא של סכנה ממשית המצדיקה התערבות בית הדין שלא במסגרת דין ודברים שבין ההורים, וכבר סתמו הסמ”ע והש”ך ח”מ סימן כ”ב ס”ק ג’ שהדיינים אינם חשובים נוגעים בדבר להכריע אם יש להם סמכות או לא, ועיין עוד שו”ת דברי ריבות סימן קנ”ה]:3

The Theoretical Underpinning Of the Halachos of Child Custody

R. Gartner’s initial restriction is based on his remarkable outlook on the Halachah of custody, that although the entire body of law on the topic revolves around the question of טובת הילד, the fundamental issue is actually the adjudication of the conflicting rights of the parents and their families, and we are really invoking the issue of the child’s welfare only as a means of choosing between these rights.

Rabbi David Cohen (Rabbi of Gvul Ya’avez), on the other hand, takes precisely the opposite view of the matter. He maintains as a matter of course that the Beis Din’s primary concern is the interest of the child, and that the parents’ agreement cannot prevent the Beis Din from deciding according to that interest:

אמנם טובת הילד מכריעה על תביעה הנ”ל [דזכות ההורים] וכדברי המבי”ט שהביא מעכ”ת.

אלא דצ”ע איך מהני קנין בנוגע לטובת הילד, ומש”כ מע”כ אינו מעלה ארוכה, דלא מהני קנין אחד בנוגע לטובת השני, ובאמת אם אירע דבר אחר כך שיכולים לומר שמשנה המצב, וטובת הילד הוי שונה ממה שהבית דין פסקו מכבר, ודאי יכולים לבא עוד פעם לבית דין לדון על זה, ואם כן הדבר צריך תלמוד.4

This is the letter to which R. Gartner was responding in his previously cited remarks, by explaining that the child’s interest is merely used to resolve the conflicting claims of the parents, but is not actually our primary concern. R. Gartner is also unconvinced that the Beis Din is indeed free to reopen a custody case that it has already decided:

וכן מש”כ מעכ”ת … לדידי צ”ע טובא, כי יתכן מאד שתיקנו טובת הילד רק בתורת מכריע, אבל כל שכבר נפסק והוכרע הדין לצד אחד, שוב אין פותחים אותו עוד [אלא אם כן יבורר שבית הדין טעו בדבר משנה], וממילא גם שאין מסתכלים שוב על על המתחדש בטובת הילד. … ודבר זה צריך תלמוד והכרעה באמת:5

The veteran Dayan Rabbi Shlomo Tene also seems to share R. Cohen’s perspective, rather than R. Gartner’s:

אנחנו תמיד מתלבטים בענינים אלו, כי מה ערך להסכם בין ההורים, אם טובת הילדים דורשת סידור אחר. שהרי אין זכות לאב או לאם לוותר בדברים הנוגעים בצפור נפשו של ילד. ואם בית הדין [משוכנע] שיש צורך בשינוי ההסכם, הרי ההסכם שנערך בזמנו בשעת הגירושין אין לו שום תוקף.

אמנם לא תמיד קל הדבר להגיע לבירור יסודי שהרי יש הכחשות בין הצדדים, ולא תמיד אפשר להוכיח מי הוא הצד הצודק, [גם] יש לפעמים שמזמנים את הילדים לפני בית הדין כמובן אם הם הגיעו כבר לגיל שיודעים להבחין, כי גם יקשה לבצע פסק דין אם ילד בגיל שבע, שמונה אינו מסכים לעזוב את מקומו ויקשה להעבירו נגד רצונו.6

As we shall see below, Mabit seems to explicitly side with R. Cohen and Tene, ruling that the Beis Din certainly will return a child to the custody of a mother who has previously accepted an alternate arrangement, since we are concerned for the welfare of the child, and there is no difference between our initial consideration of the matter and our subsequent reconsideration thereof.

Rabbi (Prof.) Michael J. Broyde has argued that this fundamental question, whether the Halachas is primarily concerned with the interest of the child or with the rights of his parents and their families, is actually a disagreement between Rosh and Rashba:

It is the thesis of this article that there are two implicit basic theories used in Jewish law to analyze child custody matters and that different rabbinic decisors are inclined to accept one or the other. Indeed, which of these theories one adopts substantially affects how one decides many “hard” cases. One of these theories grants parents certain “rights” regarding their children while also considering the interests of the child, while the other theory focuses nearly exclusively on the best interests of the child. …

The initial question in all child custody determinations is frequently unstated: by what “right” do parents have custody of their children? As explained below, two very different theories, one called “parental rights” and one called “best interest of the child” exist in Jewish law. These two theories are somewhat in tension, but also lead to similar results in many cases, as the best interests of the child often will coincide with granting parents rights.

There is a basic dispute within Jewish law as to why and through what legal claim parents have custody of their children. Indeed this dispute is crucial to understanding why Jewish law accepts that a “fit” parent is entitled to child custody — even if it can be shown that others can raise the child in a better manner.

Rabbi Asher ben Yecheil (Rosh), in the course of discussing the obligation to support one’s children, adopts what appears to be a naturalist theory of parental rights. R. Asher asserts two basic rules. First, there is an obligation (for a man) to support one’s children and this obligation is, at least as a matter of theory, unrelated to one’s custodial relationship (or lack thereof) with the child or with one’s wife or with any other party. A man who has children is biblically obligated to support them. Flowing logically from this rule, R. Asher also states that, as a matter of law, in any circumstance in which the marriage has ended and the mother is incapable of raising the children, the father is entitled to custody of his children. Of course, R. Asher would agree that in circumstances in which the father is factually incapable of raising the children — is a legally unfit father — he would not be the custodial parent. However R. Asher appears to adopt the theory that the father is the presumptive custodial parent of his children based on his obligations and rights as a natural parent, subject to the limitation that even a natural parent cannot have custody of his children if he is factually unfit to raise them. For the same reason, in situations where the Sages assigned custody to the mother rather than the father, that custody is based on a rabbinically ordered transfer of rights. While this understanding of the parent’s rights is not quite the same as a property right, it is far more a right (and duty) related to possession than a rule about the “best interest” of the child. The position of R. Asher seems to have a substantial basis in the works of a number of authorities.7

This seems to me to be a serious misrepresentation of the rulings of Rosh. R. Broyde cites two different responsa of Rosh.8. The former9, as R. Broyde himself acknowledges, merely establishes the father’s responsibility to pay for his son’s nutrition (even one born out of wedlock), and has nothing at all to do with custody. The latter grants the father custody against the mother, but he is explicit that the reason for this is not related to his obligation to provide his children with nourishment!

וששאלת מי שהוא בקטטה עם אשתו ואינו רוצה לגרשה וגם האשה אינה רוצה להיות אצלו כי הוא משחק בקוביא. ויש לו בן פחות משש שנים ורוצה האב שישב הבן אצלו והאם שהיא אשתו רוצה שיהא אצלה הדין עם מי:

יראה שהדין עם האב. אף על גב דאמרינן בכתובות פרק הנושא אמר רב חסדא זאת אומרת הבת אצל האם לא שנא גדולה ולא שנא קטנה, ויש מן הפוסקים שפסקו ואפילו יש לה אב, הני מילי בת לפי שהאם מצויה אצלה בבית יותר מן האב שהוא יוצא למלאכתו ולעסקיו והאם משמרתה ומלמדתה צניעות וארח הנשים. אבל בן שהאב חייב ללמדו תורה ולחנכו למצות צריך שיהא אצל אביו.

וששאלת עם מי תשב הבת אצל אביה או אצל האפוטרופוס שהוא אבי אמה. דבר זה ראוי להתברר על [פי] מי שמכירין את שניהם, אבל לכאורה נראה שהבת יש לה קורת רוח אצל אביה10

So contra R. Broyde, the latter portion of the responsa is explicitly concerned with the girl’s interest, and the former invokes the father’s spiritual obligations toward his son, not his material ones. Moreover, I think that it is clear that even with regard to those spiritual obligations, Rosh’s real point is that the son will benefit from having those attentions paid to him; this is evident from his parallel assertion that a girl’s place is with her mother since she will teach her “צניעות וארח הנשים”. There is no formal obligation upon a mother to do so, and it seems clear that Rosh merely means that it is to the girl’s benefit that she obtain a proper moreal upbringing, and similarly for the son to receive such from his father.

R. Broyde continues:

There is a second theory of parental custody in Jewish law, the approach of Rabbi Solomon ben R. Aderet (Rashba).

R. Aderet indicates that Jewish law always accepts — as a matter of law — that child custody matters (upon termination of the marriage) be determined according to the “best interests of the child”. Thus, he rules that in a case where the father is deceased, the mother does not have an indisputable legal claim to custody of the children. Equitable factors, such as the best interest of the child, are the sole determinant of the custody. In fact, this responsum could well be read as a general theory for all child custody determinations. R. Aderet accepts that all child custody determinations involve a single legal standard: the best interest of the child, regardless of the specific facts involved. According to this approach, the “rules” that one encounters in the field of child custody are not really “rules of law” at all, but rather the presumptive assessment by the talmudic Sages as to what generally is in the best interest of children.

I am not at all convinced that there’s necessarily any difference between the perspectives of Rashba and Rosh. Here is the responsum of Rashba:

שאלה ראובן שמת והניח בנים, והאלמנה תובעת מן האפוטרופסים מזונות מחמת היתומים בניה, והאפוטרופסים אומרים יבואו היתומים אצלנו ונפרנס השנים מהם משלנו והאחרים נקל עליהם מן ההוצאה, והאלמנה אומרת איני רוצה שיהיו בני אצל אחרים אלא אצלי ואף על פי שהאפוטרופסים קרובים הם ואינם ראויים לירש. הדין עם מי.

תשובה הבת לעולם אצל האם ואפילו נשאת האם, לא שנא גדולה או קטנה, כדאיתא בפרק הנושא. והטעם כדי שתרגיל האם לבת ותלמדה דרך נשים ושלא תרגיל עצמה בפריצות. אבל הבן יותר ראוי להיות אצל האנשם הקרובים, שהם ירגילוהו וילמדוהו דרך הלמוד ודרך אנשים יותר מן האם, שבני האלמנה דרכם דרך זר. …

ולעולם צריך לדקדק בכלל לדברים אלו אחר מה שיראה בעיני בית דין בכל מקום ומקום שיש בו יותר תיקון ליתומים, שבית דין אביהם של יתומים לחזור אחר תקונן.11

So we see that Rashba’s basic stance is nearly identical to that of Rosh – girls are to be raised by their mothers, for they teache them appropriate feminine conduct and modesty, while sons should be raised by male relatives, for they will teach them Torah and masculine ways. [While Rosh is referring specifically to the father, and he invokes his obligation to teach his son Torah and train him in Mizvos, while Rashba is referring to other male relatives, and he therefore does not mention an actual obligation on their part, it nevertheless seems to me that Rosh, too, may not actually be insisting on the existence of an actual, formal obligation, as I have argued previously, based on the analogy to the mother.]

The fundamental question raised by R. Broyde, though, is whether Rashba’s concluding principle that we must always seek the best interest of the orphans is compatible with the view that custody is primarily about the rights of the parents and their respective relatives. R. Gartner insists that even though the Poskim have emphasized a concern for the interest of the child, nevertheless “טובת הילד אינה ערך בפני עצמה … כל עיקרה מכריע בין ההורים”. I think that it must be conceded that Rashba, with his citation of the principle that “בית דין אביהם של יתומים”, does seem to be assigning their benefit a larger role than merely the basis for a rule for the reconciliation of the conflicting claims of the potential custodians.

R. Broyde continues with a discussion of the question with which we began this essay: will a Beis Din remove a child from his parents’ custody if it believes that he will be better off elsewhere?

An enormous theoretical difference exists between R. Asher and R. Aderet. According to R. Aderet, the law allows transfer of Custodial rights (even from their parents) in any situation where it can be shown that the children are not being raised in their best interests and another would raise them in a manner more in their best interest. According to R. Asher, parents (or at least fathers) have an intrinsic right to raise their progeny. In order to remove children from parental custody, it must be shown that these parents are unfit to be parents and that some alternative arrangement to raise these children consistent with the parent’s wishes and lifestyle (either through the use of relatives as agents or in some other manner) cannot be arranged.

In another version of his article, R. Broyde is somewhat more circumspect, acknowledging the point that R. Gartner and I have made about the utter lack of precedent for such an action on Beis Din’s part, and reiterating the fact that this argument is merely theoretical:

An enormous theoretical difference exists between R. Asher and Rashba. Although there is no record of any rabbinic directive to transfer custodial rights from parents in a situation where it can be shown that the children are not being raised in their best interests and another would raise them in a better manner, yet at least in theory, that would be the position of Rashba.12

As we have seen, R. Gartner uses this very absence of any source in the literature for the involvement of Beis Din in the absence of contention between potential custodians to prove his basic thesis that the child’s interest is merely a factor used to resolve conflicting claims of various relatives, and not a consideration in its own right.

R. Broyde concludes this section of his article:

This legal dispute is not merely theoretical: the particular responsa of Rabbis Asher and Aderet, elaborating on these principles, contain a distinct contrast in result. R. Aderet rules that when the father is deceased, typically it is in the best interest of the child to be placed with male relatives of the father rather than with the mother; R. Asher rules, that as a matter of law, when the mother is deceased, custody is always to be granted to the father (unless the father is unfit). To one authority, the legal rule provides the answer, and to another equitable principles relating to best interest do.

These two competing theories, and how they are interpreted by the later authorities, provide the relevant framework to analyze many of the theoretical disputes present in proto-typical cases of child custody disputes. Indeed, it is precisely the balance between these two theories that determines how Jewish law awards child custody in many cases.

Later in the article, R. Broyde writes:

[A]n examination of the responsa literature and decisions of the Rabbinical Courts in Israel does indicate that two schools of thought exist on this issue. Many decisors rule that these presumptive rules are relatively strong ones and can only be reversed when it is obvious that the parent who would be granted custody (or already has custody) is unfit. Other decisors adopt a lower standard and permit granting custody contrary to the talmudic rules when these presumptions are not in the best interest of the specific child whose case is being adjudicated. …

The contrary approach, based on the best interest of the child, can be found in the responsa of Rabbi Moshe ben Yosef Trani (Mabit) and Rabbi Shmuel ben Moshe (Maharashdam). Mabit describes a mutually agreed upon child custody arrangement between divorced parents which one parent now seeks to breach. Mabit states that it appears to him that the agreement is not in the best interest of the children and thus ought no longer be enforced and that custody is to be granted contrary to the agreement. He understands the “standard of review” to be the best interest of the child and not unfitness of the parent. So too, Maharashdam evaluates the correctness of a (widowed) mother’s decision to move a child to another city away from the family of the father based on the best interest of the child. He concludes by prohibiting such a move, as it is not in the child’s best interest. This approach can also be found in the works of many additional authorities. Both Shochatman and Warburg maintain that this is the predominant school of thought among judges in the Israeli Rabbinical courts who often issue statements supporting this approach. For example, one rabbinical court noted: The principle in all child custody decision is the best interest of the child as determined by the Beit Din. (emphasis added) or Child custody is not a matter of paternal or maternal rights, but is determined according to the best interest of the child …. Beit Din is authorized to determine what is in the best interest of the child … according to the particular conditions of each case. (emphasis added)

Mabit’s actual responsum:

ראובן גרש אשתו והיו לה ב’ בנות ונשארו עמה כדין הבת אצל אמה ונשאת והיה לה מריבה עם בעלה ומשום שלם הבית החזירה הבנים לאביהם אחר שנשא הוא גם כן אשה אחר כך הלך בעלה למרחקים ואין רצונו לחזור כי שלח לה גט זמן והבנות הן מצטערות בבית אביהן מצד אשתו ורוצות לחזור אל אמן עתה שאין בעלה עמה וגם אמן נכמרו רחמיה עליהן והיא רוצה להחזירן בביתה וראובן אומר את נתרצית לתתן ברשותי איני רוצה להחזירן יורנו רבינו אם יכופו אותו להחזירן לה:

תשובה תנן פרק הנושא מוליך מזונותיה למקום שהיא אמה ובגמרא זאת אומרת בת אצל האם לא שנא גדולה ולא שנא קטנה ופירש דקתני למקום שהיא אמה ולא קתני לבית אחיה למדנו שכן טוב שתגדל הבת אצל אמה ובת הנזונת מן האחים זנין אותה בבית אמה ואין כופין אותה לדור אצלם לא שנא גדולה ולא שנא קטנה דמילתא דפסיקא קתני למקום אמה משמע דסתם בת אצל אמה עכ”ל.

למדנו מכאן שתגדל הבת אצל אמה שתלמד לה אומנות נשים וצניעות דרך נשים ואם כן אפילו נתרצית האם לתתן לאב חייב להחזירן כשתרצה היא להחזירן לביתה כי מה שאמרו הבת אצל אמה לא בשביל קירוב ואהבת האם לבת יותר מן האב נגעו בה אלא לתיקון הבת תלמוד דרך ארץ עם אמה כדאמר ואם כן מה לי שנתרצית האם לתתה לו אז וחזרה ונתרצית לקחתה אצלה או שהיתה אצלה מקודם …13

Since Mabit does indeed seem to endorse here a strong “child’s best interest” stance, I was quite puzzled when R. Broyde subsequently places Mabit squarely in the camp of Rosh, maintaining that he “addresses these issues from the perspective of parental rights”:

Four basic legal theories have been set forth. The first asserts that the basic rights and duties of parents are obligations and privileges that are similar to inheritable rights and duties. Thus, in a case where a man who would have custody of his children were he alive dies, his wife, his father inherits the right-obligation-mitzvah-duty to educate the grandchildren; along with that obligation-right-duty-mitzvah he is given custody. Similarly too, if a woman who would have custody were she alive dies, her mother would be entitled to custody assuming she is fit, even if others are more fit.

A second theory can be found in Rabbi Mordechai ben Judah Halevi, Responsa Darchai Noam (E.H. 26), in relation to a situation common in our society. The responsum concerns a man who had just ended his second marriage; his first marriage ended in divorce, and his second marriage ended in the death of his second wife, with whom he had had a number of children. Being unable to take care of these children himself, he arranged for them to be raised by his first wife, whose marriage with him had ended in divorce. The children’s maternal grandparents, from whom the husband was estranged, sought custody. The author of Darchai Noam ruled that since the father was alive, his rights to the children still existed and so long as his custodial arrangements were satisfactory, others (perhaps even others capable of providing a better home) could not seek to subrogate his rights.

According to this approach, relatives have greater rights solely because they are most likely to be appointed agents of the parents. Thus, when a particular parent is alive and entitled to presumptive custody of a child, but is in fact incapable of being the custodial parent, the primary legal factor used to determine which stranger shall receive custody is who is designated as an agent of the parent. Thus, this responsa adopts a theory of agency rather than guardianship as it relates to parental rights.

While the author of the responsa does not phrase the discussion precisely this way, it is manifest that his analysis is predicated on the ability of the father to appoint someone to watch his children (in the absence of the mother). This approach accepts the ruling of R. Asher discussed above, as it addresses these issues from the perspective of parental rights. Such a position is explicitly adopted by Rabbi Moshe Trani who primarily analyzes custody of children as matter of inheritance of rights and agency law according to Jewish law.

So here we are told that Mabit “explicitly adopt[s]” an approach that “accepts the ruling of R. Asher discussed above, as it addresses these issue from the perspective of parental rights”, and that he “primarily analyzes custody of children as matter of inheritance of rights and agency law according to Jewish law”, in apparent direct contradiction to his other responsum cited by R. Broyde, in which he sides with Rashba and endorses the “child’s best interest” stance!

In actuality, though, it appears that some sort of mistake has occurred here, for Mabit in this second responsum says nothing at all about inheritance and parental rights, and on the contrary, he actually quotes Rashba’s formulation of the “child’s best interest” principle!

ראובן מת ונשארו לו ב’ בנים א’ בן ד’ שנים או יותר וא’ יונק שדי אמו ואלמנתו רוצה ללכת לארץ אחרת ולהוליך ב’ בניה עמה ואבי ראובן מעכב בידה שלא תצא מן המדינה כי הילדים רכים וחס ושלום חושש פן יקראם אסון בדרך אשר הולכים בה: ועוד טוען שהיום או למחר תנשא היא שם ויהיו היתומים נתונים לעם אחר ועיניו לא רואות אם ירצה לסייעם ועוד טוען שהוא חייב מן התורה לחנכם וללמדם ספר תורה וכו’ כדכתיב והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך והרי הא’ מהם הוא קרוב לבן ה’ שנים למקרא וכבר הוא יודע קצת הפרשה בכל שבוע מי יחנך אותו או מי ילמדנו כשיוליכוהו מכאן והמצוה היא מוטלת עליו וכן האחר אם יוליכוהו למרחקים כשיהיה ראוי להתחנך לתורה ולמצוה אם אבי אביו לא יחנך אותו מי יחנכוהו:

תשובה [עיין שם שהעלה שצריך שיהיה הבן במקום שהאב יכול לחנכו, ושוב כתב:] ובנדון זה אבי אביו הוא במקום אביו שהרי חייב הוא מן התורה לחנכו כמו שנזכר בשאלה ומורינו הרב הגדול רי”ב כתב בפירוש להלכות תלמוד תורה שבן בנו הוא כמו בנו שחייב להשכיר לו מלמד בדמים ואם כן בנדון דידן יכול לעכבם שלא תוליכם: [וע”ש עוד, ולהלן בתשובתו הביא את תשובת הרשב”א הנ”ל, ועוד תשובה מהרשב”א, ושתי התשובות הנ”ל של הרא”ש (בכלל פ”ח)]14

Technical Validity of the Kinyan

In the course of his discussion, R. Gartner resolves an objection to the Kinyan that the parties make, accepting the authority of the Beis Din to adjudicate their custody dispute:

ולאור כל הנ”ל נראה לקיים גם מה שנהגו בתי הדין בקבלת קנין ועריכת שטר ברורין בדין ודברים של החזקת ילדים, ולעיל אות א’ הערנו שלפ”ר אין זה אלא קנין דברים בעלמא, כי לו יהא והאב והאם הם בעלי הדברים, סוף סוף אין זה זכות או קנין ממון שיועיל בו קנין: [עיין שם פרטי דבריו.]15

R. Tene also discusses this issue in some detail in his responsum.16 There is yet another responsum on this question by the prominent Philadelphia Rabbi Efraim Eliezer Yallis.17

  1. רב צבי גרטנר, ישורון, כרך ז’ עמודים תק”כ – תקכ”א – קשר. דברים אלו הם חיזוק והסבר לדבריו לעיל שם עמוד תק”ח – קשר []
  2. I have been unable to track down the origin of the idiom which I am here adapting – see here. []
  3. שם עמוד תקכ”א – קשר []
  4. שם עמוד תקי”ט – קשר []
  5. שם עמוד תקכ”א – קשר []
  6. ישורון כרך ח’ עמוד תק”ה – קשר []
  7. Rabbi Broyde appears to have published a version of this article in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society “Child Custody in Jewish Law: A Conceptual Analysis”, available here: (PDF), as well as in the Jewish Law Association Studies, VII (The Paris Conference Volume, S. M. Passamaneck and M. Finley ed.), “Child Custody in Jewish Law: A Pure Analysis” (see here). My excerpts are taken from the version posted at Jlaw, except where specified otherwise. []
  8. JHCS pp. 23-4, n. 3 and n. 5 []
  9. 17:7 []
  10. שו”ת הרא”ש (מהדורת מכון ירושלים) כלל פ”ח סימן ב []
  11. שו”ת הרשב”א המיוחסות לרמב”ן (מהדורת מכון ירושלים) סימן ל”ח []
  12. JHCS p. 26. []
  13. שו”ת מביט חלק ב’ סימן ס”ב – קשר []
  14. שו”ת מביט חלק א’ סימן קס”ה – קשר []
  15. שם עמוד תק”ח והלאה קשר []
  16. The responsum is addressed to Rabbi Shmuel Yehudah Leib Landesman, who was also R. Gartner’s initial correspondent. []
  17. הפרדס, שנה נ”ז חוברת ח – קשר. גם תשובה זו היא לר’ שמואל יהודה לנדיסמן []

Oaths and Their Consequences

One of the most complex and multifarious topics within Hoshen Mishpat and Even Ha’Ezer is that of the judicial oath – its various types, the circumstances which call for their administration, and the consequences for a litigant’s failure to take them. The sheer volume of literature notwithstanding, however, oaths are rarely, if ever, administered by contemporary Batei Din. I have long been obsessed by this point, and I have yet to see any documentation of the time of and reason for their obsolescence. We do know that throughout the nineteenth century, at least, the judicial oath was still a fairly routine part of the court’s business, and although Hasam Sofer1 does mention, explain and endorse a custom to refrain from taking even true oaths, even at the cost of offering significant concessions to one’s opponent to avoid the necessity of swearing, a careful reading of his remarks indicates that he is referring merely to the voluntary piety of litigants, and not to any categorical refusal by the court to administer oaths.

I just encountered this little anecdote, told by Rabbi Aharon Surasky about Rav Shmuel Baruch Werner, which certainly helps illustrate why Batei Din are so reluctant to administer oaths, although we also see that they did still do so at least occasionally as recently as several decades ago, if efforts to dissuade the litigant from insisting upon his right were ultimately unavailing:

ומעשה באדם שנתבע לפניו בדין תורה, ויצא שנתחייב להישבע. אמר לו הגאון ר’ שמואל ברוך, האידנא לא נהגינן לחייב שבועה, אלא על שני הצדדים להתפשר בתביעותיהם. סרב הלה וטען שתובעים אותו בשקר ואינו מוכן לפשרות אפילו יצטרך להישבע. ניסה שוב הגאון ר’ שמואל ברוך לשכנע אותו שיסכים לפשרה, כי לא אריך להישבע גם שבועת אמת, אולם הוא התעקש שברצונו להישבע דוקא. בלית ברירה קבעו בבית דין יום מסוים לשבועתו, והגאון ר’ שמואל ברוך עם הדיינים היו שרויים יום זה בתענית ויחרד לבם, והבעל דין בא לפניהם כשהוא תקיף בדעתו ונשבע כרצונו, אך תיכף ומיד כשיצא מבית הדין פגעה בו מדת הדין לא עלינו ונהרג מפגיעת אוטובוס רחמנא ליצלן, ויהי למופת כי לא ינקה וגו’ (והיה מציין הגאון ר’ שמואל ברוך כי אחרי השבעה הגיעו בני האיש ההרוג לבקש מחילה מבית דין).2

And there is a story of a man who was summoned before him for a Din Torah, and it came to pass that he was obligated to swear. The Gaon R. Shmuel Baruch said to him, today we are not accustomed to obligate one to take an oath, but it is rather incumbent upon the two sides to settle their claims. He refused and argued that they were suing him falsely, and that he is not prepared to compromise even if he shall be required to swear. With no choice, the Beis Din fixed a particular day for his oath, and the Gaon R. Shmuel Baruch, along with the judges, sat that day and fasted and their hearts trembled, and the litigant came before them strong-minded and he swore as he willed, but immediately as he exited the Beis Din he was afflicted by strict judgement, may it not befall us, and he was killed in a bus accident, may God save us, and it was a wonder, as it says “he shall not be absolved etc.” (And the Gaon R. Shmuel Baruch would note that after the Shivah, the sons [or children] of the killed man arrived to seek forgiveness from the Beis Din).

Another case in which a Beis Din of the Rabbanut, in the year 5737, handed down a ruling obligating a party to swear was the subject of this appeal to a panel consisting of Rav Eliezer Goldschmidt, Rav Yosef Qafih, and Rav Shaul Yisraeli:

לפנינו ערעור וערעור נגדי על “פסק-דין חלקי” (כשם שניתן לו על ידי בית הדין) של כבוד בית הדין האזורי לתל אביו-יפו מיום כ”ט טבת תשל”ז (תיק 9451/לד) בו נאמר כדלהלן:

א. על הנתבע-תובע להשבע שבועת היסת, להכחיש את טענותיה של התובעת. …

על זה הוגש ערעור מטעם הנתבע על חיובו בשבועת היסת, וערעור נגדי מטעם התובעת, בו חוזרת על תביעתה לחייב הנתבע ממון כפי התביעה, ולחילופין שבועת התורה ולחילופי חילופין – שבועת המשנה.3

Somewhat relevant to our question of the legitimacy of actually taking the judicial oath is the discussion among the nineteenth century Poskim of a partner who represents the partnership’s interests in court, and is held liable due to his refusal to take an oath ordered by the court. Must he bear the loss himself, or is it considered a business loss, to be divided among the partners as are other losses? Variations of this question are discussed by Rav Moshe Teitelbaum,4 Rav Shlomo Drimer,5 Rav Yitzhak Aharon Ettinger (Itinga) Ha’Levi,6 Rav Yekusiel Asher Zalman Enzil,7 Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad,8 and Rav Dov (Berish) Wiedenfeld (the Tchebiner Rav).9

  1. שו”ת חושן משפט סימן צ’, הובא בפתחי תשובה חו”מ סימן פ”ז ס”ק כ”ב []
  2. ספר הזכרון לר’ שמואל ברוך ורנר, שם משמואל – ראשי פרקים ממסכת חייו וקצות דרכיו, עמוד כ”א []
  3. ספר משפטי שאול – פסקי דין אשר נדונו בבית דין הגדול בירושלים, סימן מ”ה []
  4. שו”ת השיב משה, סימן פ”ח – קשר []
  5. שו”ת בית שלמה, סוף סימן נ”ז … וע”ד אשר שאל []
  6. שו”ת מהרי”א הלוי, חלק ב’ סימן י – קשר []
  7. שו”ת מהריא”ז ענזיל, סימן כ”א – הספר נמצא פה, אבל הדף שבו סימן זה חסר []
  8. שו”ת רב פעלים, חלק ב’ סימן ו – קשר []
  9. שו”ת דובב מישרים, חלק א’ סימן נ”ג []