Month: July 2011

The World That Wasn’t, Revisited

Rav Yitzchok Zilberstein relates:

מספר [הגר”ח פלאג’י] על תקנה שהיתה בעירם איזמיר שבתורכיה ,שכל חתן המשתדך עם משפחה מן העיר, אינו נכנס לבית הכלה.

וממשיך הגר”ח פלאג’י לספר על חתן אחד שגזר עליו שלא ישא את כלתו משום חשד מסויים שהיה על חתן זה. החתן לא ציית לדברי הגאון, ובליל שבת, בסעודה הראשונה שערכו לחתן ולכלה, ‘נהרס הבית …’1

R. Zilberstein delicately glosses over the background of and rationale for the edict against a fiancé entering the home of his fiancée, and the precise nature of the “particular suspicion” against the bridegroom in question:

הסכמה ותקנה ומנהג עירנו הוא כי כל חתן המשודך עם כלתו אינו נכנס לבית הכלה להשתעשע עם הכלה ואפילו לראותה בלבד כי כבר צווחו קמאי ובפרט הרב של”ה ז”ל במה שנוהגים מנהג פריצים באיזה מקומות להיות החתן בבית הכלה קודם נישואין כי לא יבצר מכמה חטאים ועונות במחשבה להרהר אחריה ובדבור בדברי ניבול וכיוצא ולפעמים במעשה לבוא עליה בימי נדתה … ומצאתי להרב דברי שלמה הלוי ז”ל דרצ”ט ע”א וכ’ הסכמה שלא יכנס הארוס לבית ארוסתו ע”ש ובימינו אירע כמה מאורעות רעות דרבים נכשלו חתן עם ארוסתו ועם חמותו ובאו אחר כך לידי שנאה וקטטה ונתגרשו כמה מאלו

ובאדם אחד שגזרתי עליו שלא ישא את ארוסתו משום דנחשד עם חמותו והביא מהפכים בזכותו לטהר את השרץ ונשאו זה את זה ובליל שבת בסעודה ראשונה נהרס הבית שהיו יושבים בשלחן החתן ונפלו המסובים כולן לתוך שוחה עמוקה ונעשה להם חבורות ושוב אחר ג’ חדשים נתגרשו בפני מחמת קטטה ומריבה ויודע כל שער עמי דכך היה מעשה ועליהם נאמר ופתאים עברו ונענשו

הקל ברחמיו יסיר מסוה העורון מעל עינינו והאר עינינו בתורתך ודבק לבנו במצותיך אכי”ר2

R. Zilberstein continues, taking this opportunity to laud the Turkish Jewish women for their great punctiliousness in “all the categories of modesty”:

בהזדמנות זו כדאי להזכיר שלקהילות ישראל בתורכיה היו זכויות מיוחדות במינן וגם הבעש”ט שעבר פעם בתורכיה אמר שהוא רואה כאן נשמות קדושות שקדושתן מקבילה לתקופת התנאים, וציין שהכל בגלל צניעותן המופלגת של הנשים בגולת תורכיה המקפידות במאוד על כל כללי הצניעות.

But as we have seen above, and even more so in R. Haim Benveniste’s damning indictment of local cultural mores that led to a preponderance of pregnant brides, the standard of Turkish Jewish morality was not quite as high as it could have been.

Further reading at Hidabroot.

  1. עלינו לשבח, במדבר, פרשת קרח עמוד שכב-ג [↩]
  2. רב חיים פאלאג’י, משא חיים, מערכת ש’ אות קכד (שידוכין) עמוד כז. – קשר [↩]

Pagan Theophory In Jewish Anthroponyms

Esther

No one really knows whether the Biblical name Esther is related to the Assyro-Babylonian goddess(es) Ishtar. As per the Wikipedia Talk page for Ishtar:

“Anunit, Atarsamain and Esther are alternative names for Ishtar.”

I have removed the sentence from the article lead; article Atarsamain makes no mention of the goddess being a counterpart of Ishtar, and the link between biblical Esther and Ishtar is highly disputed by scholars – the article shouldn’t state it as a fact. – Mike Rosoft (talk) 08:13, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Actually, the fact that there are valid linguistic correspondences between the word Ishtar and Hebrew Ester, suitable to a late Akkadian loanword to west Semitic (but not suitable to an inherited cognate, of course) is not very controversial, as far as I’m aware. What many people are skeptical about is whether this has any great significance or deep meaning… AnonMoos (talk) 22:38, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Actually, Anunit is a seperate goddess, she isn’t Ishtar, Cuthaean Creation Legend: ‘I prayed to Ishtar, (…), Zamama, Anunit, Nabu, (…) and shamash the warrior’ I think that you are confusing the Ishtars with the goddess herself. The Ishtars were a group of goddesses, that included both Ishtar and Anunit. Is there any references to Atarsamain being female? [User:Abdishtar|talk] 15:25 31 January 2010 —Preceding unsigned comment added by Abdishtar (talk) 22:50, 4 February 2010 (UTC) (talk • contribs) 20:25, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

There actually is some support in our tradition for a connection between Esther and Ishtar; the Talmud mentions an opinion that Esther’s ‘real’ name was Hadassah, and that the name Esther was given to her by “the nations of the world”:

ויהי אומן את הדסה קרי לה הדסה וקרי לה אסתר

תניא ר”מ אומר אסתר שמה ולמה נקרא שמה הדסה על שם הצדיקים שנקראו הדסים וכן הוא אומר והוא עומד בין ההדסים

רבי יהודה אומר הדסה שמה ולמה נקראת שמה אסתר על שם שהיתה מסתרת דבריה שנאמר אין אסתר מגדת את עמה וגו’

ר’ נחמיה אומר הדסה שמה ולמה נקראת אסתר שהיו אומות העולם קורין אותה על שום אסתהר1

What is אסתהר? Rashi explains it to be a reference to the moon:

אסתהר. ירח יפה כלבנה:2

Rav Ya’akov Emden disagrees, and interprets it as Venus:

על שום אסתהר. נ”ב בתרגום איוב על הפסוק אם אראה אור כי יהל. נראה שאסתהר אינו לבנה אלא הוא שם כוכב נוגה שאורו מזהיר:3

This is also the view of the Targum Sheni to Esther:

איתקרי שמא אסתר בשם כוכב נוגהא יונית אסתירא והדסה אתקריית בשם צדיקיא4

And indeed, the Yalkut Shimoni has the above Talmudic passage with the words כוכב הנוגה interpolated:

ויהי אומן את הדסה. קרי לה הדסה וקרי לה אסתר, תני רבי אומר אסתר שמה, ולמה נקרא שמה הדסה על שם צדיקים, וכן הוא אומר והוא עומד בין ההדסים אשר במצולה, ר’ יהודה אמר הדסה שמה, ולמה נקרא שמסה אסתר שמסתרת את דבריה, וכה”א אין אסתר מגדת מולדתה, רבי נחמיה אומר הדסה שמה, ולמה נקרא שמה אסתר שהיו עובדי אלילים קורין אותה כוכב הנוגה על שם אסתהר5

Solomon Buber, in a gloss to a similar Medrash, asserts that the reference to כוכב נוגה is an addition to the authentic text by some commentator:

המלות “כוכב נוגה” נוסף מאיזה מפרש על המלה אסתהר, וכן בתרגום שני …6

The גט מסודר asserts that “the name Esther did not sprout from holy earth, for it is from the Persian language, as is known and as is stated in the Medrash and Gemara”. He adduces this in support of the principle that even names that are not indigenously Jewish have the technical status of שם עברי in the context of Gittin:

שם שנמצא בלשון הקודש, כגון בנימין, אסתר, נקרא שם עברי. ושם שבא מלשון העמים, כגון הירש, פעסל, נקרא שם לעז.7

גם לשון ארמי חשוב כלשון הקודש, ולכן כל השמות אשר יבואו בתנ”ך ובגמרא נחשבים לשמות עברי.

הן נמצאו בגמרא איזה שמות, אף כי רק מעט מזעיר, אשר מקור שרשם אינו לא בלשון ארמי ולא בלשון הקודש, כגון אלכסנדר, שהוא מלשון יוני. אבל אחרי כי השמות האלה הורגלו בין עמנו בעוד שלשון ארמי הי’ בפיהם נעשו לשמות לשון ארמי ונחשבים כשמות קודש, וגם יען כי כתובים בספרי חכמינו ז”ל.

הלא אף שם אסתר לא נצמח על אדמת קודש, כי הוא מלשון פרסי כידוע וכדאיתא במדרש ובגמרא … אבל בכל זה נחשב לשם עברי מפני שהורגל בפי היהודים בעודם מדברים בלשון הקודש וגם כתוב בכתבי הקודש, וכן נמי אלכסנדר וכדומה.

וזה שכתב הטיב גיטין (שמות אנשים אות ט’ ס”ק ב’) טודרוס הוא שם המשתמש בקודש ובחול ואף על פי שאין לו ביאור בלשון הקודש ואינו במקרא אף על פי כן קורין בו לשם מובהק כמו אלכסנדר וכיוצא בו:8

A strong case can be made for the Venus interpretation, in light of Hazal’s famous association of Esther with the Morning Star – i.e., Venus.

So Esther may have been a name given to the eponymous heroine of the Megillah by the ‘idol-worshippers’ (as per the Yalkut’s text), alluding to Venus, the Morning Star – the planet associated by the Babylonians with Ishtar:

The Babylonians named the planet Ishtar (Sumerian Inanna), the personification of womanhood, and goddess of love.9

Venus (Greek: Aphrodite; Babylonian: Ishtar) is the goddess of love and beauty. The planet is so named probably because it is the brightest of the planets known to the ancients. (With a few exceptions, the surface features on Venus are named for female figures.)10

Another related etymological question is whether the Yiddish names Feivel / Feivish, often accompanying Shraga (as well as other names associated with light and sun, as we shall see), derive from the names of the Greco-Roman god Phoebus Apollo, associated with the sun. Salo Baron takes the derivation for granted:

… the names borne by the two most important leaders of the Jewish communities who headed the first return to Palestine in 538. Sheshbazzar and Zerubbabel are both Babylonian names; indeed, pagan theophorous names. If Sheshbazzar is to be identified with Shenazzar (I Chron. 3:18), the son of the former king Jehoiachin bore a name meaning “The Sun god Shamash [or the Moon god Sin] may protect the son.” His nephew, Zerubbabel, had the rather common Babylonian name, “scion of Babel.”

Of course, the Jews may have been at that time as little aware of the forgotten meaning of common names as is an East-European orthodox Jew today, when he selects for his son what he thinks the specifically Jewish name, “Feivish” derived from Phoebus Apollo. Nor does the author of the ardently nationalistic book of Daniel evince any concern about the Babylonian names of his four noble youths, including the obviously theophorus Belteshazzar and Abed-nego (1:6-7). But the fact that Sheshbazzar was given that name in the early years of his father’s captivity (five of Jehoiachin’s seven sons are mentioned in the Bablyonian tablets of 592) and that he possibly changed his name to Shenazzar under Nabonidus to flatter that king’s enthusiasm for Sin, the Moon god of his native Haran, is the more significant, the less opposition it seems to have invoked in Jewish circles.11

But once again, no one really knows:

“Feivel” does not come from the “Phobos” (aka Apollo), the Greek Sun God! (This was a false etymology put about by German Jewish scholars in the 19th century.) Etymologically, the earliest instances of the the name “Feibush” are written as “Vivs” (Vivus) which is the Latin equivalent of “[C]Haim”, “life”, a name which was given to sick children (and adults) to “confuse the Angel of Death” (who could then no longer find the person named on his “list” who he had to kill).

Uri, Shraga and Phoebus (of which Feivish and Feivel are yiddishized corruptions) all mean basically ‘bright’, ‘shining’, ‘light’.

“Fayvush or Faivel are the kinnuim of Shraga. Fayvush is an ancient Jewish name whose origin was the Latin vivus (living, alive), a loan translation (calque) from Hebrew chaim (life). Later the name Fayvush was erroneously considered to be a derivation from Phoebus, god of the sun–consequently Fayvish became the kinnui not only for the Biblical Hebrew name Uri (light) but for the Aramaic name Shraga (candle) in the Rabbinic period. Folk legends along with true and false etymologies gave rise to these interwoven associations between Hebrew name and kinnui.

For what it’s worth, Rav Efraim Zalman Margolis reports, and apparently takes seriously, such a derivation:

ואני שמעתי טעם כינוי זה לפי שבלשון איטליא לעז של שמש פעביאס ומזה נשתרבב שם פייבש להיות כינוי לאותן שמות שמורים על אור המאיר כגון אורי אור שרגא שניאור שמשון

The phrase “לעז של שמש” is obscure; the Italian word for ‘sun’ is ‘sole’, whereas ‘פעביאס’ (Phoebus) is the (chief) Latin name of the Greco-Roman sun god. In any event, R. Margolis then proceeds to explain why we sometimes find the name Feivish accompanying other names with no such connotation of sun or light:

ואף שהוא כינוי גם לשמות אחרים כבר כתבו שאירע לפעמים מתפשרים האב והאם לקרות שם בנם בשם הקודש של אביו ושם הכינוי של אביה או להיפך ומזה נשתרבבו שמות הקודש מורכבים בכינוים אחרים שאינם מן השם הזה12

  1. מגילה יג. – קשר [↩]
  2. פירוש רש”י שם [↩]
  3. הגהות רב יעקב עמדין שם [↩]
  4. תרגום שני על מגילת אסתר ב:ז [↩]
  5. ילקוט שמעוני אסתר פרק ב’ רמז תתרנג – קשר [↩]
  6. שלמה באבער, אגדת אסתר מכת”י תימן (קראקא תרנ”ז), שם עמוד 20 הערות ותקונים אות כט – קשר‏ [↩]
  7. גט מסודר, מבוא שערים, ריש סעיף א’ – קשר [↩]
  8. שם, בפשר דבר אות ב’‏ [↩]
  9. Venus. (2011, July 21). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 19:03, July 21, 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Venus&oldid=440629526 [↩]
  10. Link. [↩]
  11. Salo Wittmayer Baron, A Social and Religious History Of the Jews, Vol. I p. 119 – link. [↩]
  12. טיב גיטין, שמות אנשים אות ו’ ס”ק י”ב – קשר [↩]

The Fine Art Of Compromise

Another Journal article; cognate lecture, in various formats, is available from the Internet Archive.

Although it is a cliche that everyone is entitled to his day in court, this is actually apparently far from true under American law; Robert Barron tells ups that about two dozen states, plus some federal jurisdictions, allow for court-ordered mediation at least to some degree. In Michigan, for example, a trial judge is authorized to order the litigants to participate in facilitative mediation, even over the objection of a party1

What is the Torah’s perspective toward dispute resolution via mediation or arbitration rather than through the rigid application of the law? Although it is generally known that Batei Din encourage Pesharah, and often even insist on retaining for themselves the right to deviate from the strict Din to impose at least some level of compromise, a careful look at the Sugya and the Halachah yields some surprises.

Are Batei Din Encouraged, Or Even Allowed, To Resolve Disputes Through Pesharah?

There are actually four different Tannaitic opinions on the permissibility and desirability of ‘Bitzua’ (Pesharah):

  1. The Tanna Kama permits Bitzua until the final verdict has been issued2, but does not consider it a Mitzvah.
  2. R. Eliezer b. R. Yosi Ha’Gelili forbids Bitzua, calling it a sin and declaring that it angers Hashem.
  3. R. Yehoshua b. Karchah declares Bitzua a Mitzvah.
  4. R. Shimon b. Menasya permits Bitzua, but only until the Dayyan knows “to where the Din is inclined” (unlike the Tanna Kama, who only forbids Bitzua subsequent to the issuance of the final verdict).

Virtually all Poskim rule in accordance with R. Yehoshua b. Karchah, that Bitzua is a Mitzvah3, but what exactly that Mitzvah entails is far from clear, as we shall see.

Opening With Pesharah

The Gemara explains R. Yehoshua b. Karchah to mean that there is a Mitzvah for the Dayyan to ask the litigants “Do you want Din or do you want Pesharah?”, and records that this was the practice of R. Huna; the Poskim disagree whether the Dayyan is actually supposed to mention Pesharah before Din4, or whether the Mitzvah is merely to introduce the option of Pesharah to the litigants, but the sequence of the alternatives in the Dayyan’s question makes no difference5.

Advocating Pesharah

An even more important question is whether Dayyanim are supposed, or even allowed, to attempt to persuade the litigants to accept Pesharah. As we have seen, the Gemara is ambiguous, stating merely that the Dayyan should mention the option of Pesharah and ask the litigants their preference, and major Aharonim line up on opposite sides of the question: Sema6, Nesivos7, and Birke Yosef8 rule that the Dayyan *should* try to convince the litigants to accept a compromise, whereas Maharal (cited, and apparently accepted, by Taz) and Tumim9 maintain that he should *not* do so.

Several Aharonim adopt (fittingly!) compromise positions:

  • Bach10 maintains that the Dayyan should initially merely note the possibility of Pesharah and ask the litigants’ preference, but once they have agreed to accept a compromise, it is the Dayyan’s duty to convince them to abide by their resolution.
  • Rav Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer11 holds that Pesharah is only appropriate where there exists a Lifnim Mi’Shuras Ha’Din responsibility; therefore, he explains, before the Dayyan hears the details of the case, he cannot yet advocate for Pesharah, but may merely mention the option, but after he understands the issue and sees that there exists such an obligation, he should press for compromise.
  • Rav Efraim Navon12 maintains that the Dayyan is not strictly required to urge Pesharah, but he who acts Lifnim Mi’Shuras Ha’Din and does so is praiseworthy13.

Pesharah After the Final Verdict

As we have seen, Pesharah is prohibited after the final verdict, either because it is considered unfair to the victor14, or because it dishonors the Beis Din15. This, too, however is the subject of a major dispute between the Aharonim: Shiltei Gibborim, followed by Shach16 and Nesivos17, argue that this applies only to an imposed settlement, but not one that is accepted by the parties without “any element of compulsion, only persuasion and convincing, and this is a great Mitzvah and the bringing of peace between fellow men”. Bach18, Tumim19 and Birke Yosef20 disagree, maintaining that even this is prohibited, with the latter recording that this was the custom in Eretz Yisrael and Egypt.

Here, too, we find Rabbanim Navon and Kalischer adopting compromise positions:

  1. Rav Kalischer explains that the Dayyan is forbidden to simply suggest, subsequent to the final verdict, that compromise is appropriate, since the litigant may err and believe that the Din is no longer clear to the Dayyan and that he is retracting his verdict, and this would constitute compulsion, but it is unobjectionable for him to clearly explain that although he stands by his ruling as a matter of law, it is nevertheless right and good (yashar ve’tov) to compromise21.
  2. Rav Navon maintains that while the Dayyan may not ask the litigant to authorize an unspecified Pesharah, “for as long as he does not know what he will ultimately concede, his current acquiescence is considered forced”, no one actually disagrees with the Shiltei Gibborim, whose intention is that the Dayyan may present the litigants with a concrete compromise proposal22.

Notes

The relevant Talmudic discussion is Sanhedrin 6b-7a, and Tur / Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat siman 12; all sources are relative to these discussions where appropriate, unless otherwise specified. Heavy use has been made of the invaluable reference work on Hilchos Dayyanim, Halachah Pesukah (Machon Harry Fishel).

  1. Richard Barron, “Which Cases Are Most Suitable For Court Ordered Mediation”, available here (retrieved on Jun. 16, 2011). This clearly reflects society’s view that mediation is often a more desirable solution to a dispute than justice. [↩]
  2. This is the opinion of Rashi; the Shulchan Aruch seems to rule this way, as does the Shach, as well as other Poskim (see Halachah Pesukah n. 88). There is, however, an alternate understanding – see Tosafos (s.v. nigmar ha’din) and Birke Yosef #5 s.v. um”sh ha’Tosafos. [↩]
  3. Halachah Pesukah n. 85 argues that there is a minority opinion that rules like R. Shimon b. Menasya, but Birke Yosef #8 seems to disagree. [↩]
  4. See Beis Yosef, Bach, Birke Yosef #3 and Beis Moshav on se’if beis. [↩]
  5. Resp. Mishkenos Ya’akov #9, Rosh Yosef #11. [↩]
  6. Derishah, and Sema #6. [↩]
  7. Chiddushim #3. [↩]
  8. #9 s.v. u’mikol makom. [↩]
  9. Urim #4. Halachah Pesukah sides with this view, arguing that this is indicated by the language of the Rishonim on our Sugya. [↩]
  10. #4, as understood by Halachah Pesukah n. 62. [↩]
  11. Moznayim Le’Mishpat #3. [↩]
  12. The second, the son of Rav Yehudah Navon, the author of the Kiryas Melech Rav, and the grandson of Rav Efraim Navon the first, the author of the Machaneh Efraim. Rav Efraim Navon II published his Beis Moshav together with his father’s Kiryas Melech Rav. [↩]
  13. Beis Moshav to se’if daled, cited in Halachah Pesukah n. 60. [↩]
  14. Rishonim, as cited in Halachah Pesukah n. 87. [↩]
  15. Rosh Yosef #12, cited in Halachah Pesukah ibid. This is also apparently the view of the Be’er Eliyahu, as cited in Halachah Pesukah n. 105, who states that even if the litigants desire, of their own volition, that the Dayyan arbitrate between them after the final verdict, it is nevertheless prohibited out of concern for the honor of the Beis Din. [↩]
  16. #6. [↩]
  17. #1. [↩]
  18. #4. [↩]
  19. End of #3. [↩]
  20. #9 (and see #10). [↩]
  21. Moznayim Le’Mishpat #4. [↩]
  22. Beis Moshav to se’if gimmel, s.v. ve’nireh de’ha’Shach, cited in Halachah Pesukah n. 101. [↩]