Tanach – בין דין לדין

Daughters and Distinctions: Part II

This is the second post in our series on the three invidious distinctions between males and females in the halachah of inheritance. The previous post discussed the rule that a son has precedence over a daughter in inheriting their parents; this one discusses the rule that a father inherits his children but a mother does not.

This halachah has aroused the least controversy of the three in question, although it is the subject of a brief but remarkably halachically inaccurate comment of Ibn Ezra. The context is the very obscure legal framework within which Naomi, Ruth, Boaz, and the anonymous “redeemer” were operating at the conclusion of Megillas Rus:

וּבֹעַז עָלָה הַשַּׁעַר וַיֵּשֶׁב שָׁם וְהִנֵּה הַגֹּאֵל עֹבֵר אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר בֹּעַז וַיֹּאמֶר סוּרָה שְׁבָה פֹּה פְּלֹנִי אַלְמֹנִי וַיָּסַר וַיֵּשֵׁב.

וַיִּקַּח עֲשָׂרָה אֲנָשִׁים מִזִּקְנֵי הָעִיר וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁבוּ פֹה וַיֵּשֵׁבוּ.

וַיֹּאמֶר לַגֹּאֵל חֶלְקַת הַשָּׂדֶה אֲשֶׁר לְאָחִינוּ לֶאֱלִימֶלֶךְ מָכְרָה נָעֳמִי הַשָּׁבָה מִשְּׂדֵה מוֹאָב.

וַאֲנִי אָמַרְתִּי אֶגְלֶה אָזְנְךָ לֵאמֹר קְנֵה נֶגֶד הַיֹּשְׁבִים וְנֶגֶד זִקְנֵי עַמִּי אִם תִּגְאַל גְּאָל וְאִם לֹא יִגְאַל הַגִּידָה לִּי ואדע [וְאֵדְעָה] כִּי אֵין זוּלָתְךָ לִגְאוֹל וְאָנֹכִי אַחֲרֶיךָ וַיֹּאמֶר אָנֹכִי אֶגְאָל.

וַיֹּאמֶר בֹּעַז בְּיוֹם קְנוֹתְךָ הַשָּׂדֶה מִיַּד נָעֳמִי וּמֵאֵת רוּת הַמּוֹאֲבִיָּה אֵשֶׁת הַמֵּת קניתי [קָנִיתָה] לְהָקִים שֵׁם הַמֵּת עַל נַחֲלָתוֹ.

וַיֹּאמֶר הַגֹּאֵל לֹא אוּכַל לגאול [לִגְאָל] לִי פֶּן אַשְׁחִית אֶת נַחֲלָתִי גְּאַל לְךָ אַתָּה אֶת גְּאֻלָּתִי כִּי לֹא אוּכַל לִגְאֹל.

וְזֹאת לְפָנִים בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל עַל הַגְּאוּלָּה וְעַל הַתְּמוּרָה לְקַיֵּם כָּל דָּבָר שָׁלַף אִישׁ נַעֲלוֹ וְנָתַן לְרֵעֵהוּ וְזֹאת הַתְּעוּדָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

וַיֹּאמֶר הַגֹּאֵל לְבֹעַז קְנֵה לָךְ וַיִּשְׁלֹף נַעֲלוֹ.

וַיֹּאמֶר בֹּעַז לַזְּקֵנִים וְכָל הָעָם עֵדִים אַתֶּם הַיּוֹם כִּי קָנִיתִי אֶת כָּל אֲשֶׁר לֶאֱלִימֶלֶךְ וְאֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר לְכִלְיוֹן וּמַחְלוֹן מִיַּד נָעֳמִי.

וְגַם אֶת רוּת הַמֹּאֲבִיָּה אֵשֶׁת מַחְלוֹן קָנִיתִי לִי לְאִשָּׁה לְהָקִים שֵׁם הַמֵּת עַל נַחֲלָתוֹ וְלֹא יִכָּרֵת שֵׁם הַמֵּת מֵעִם אֶחָיו וּמִשַּׁעַר מְקוֹמוֹ עֵדִים אַתֶּם הַיּוֹם.1

Then went Boaz up to the gate, and sat him down there: and, behold, the kinsman of whom Boaz spake came by; unto whom he said, Ho, such a one! turn aside, sit down here. And he turned aside, and sat down.

And he took ten men of the elders of the city, and said, Sit ye down here. And they sat down.

And he said unto the kinsman, Naomi, that is come again out of the country of Moab, selleth a parcel of land, which was our brother Elimelech’s:

And I thought to advertise thee, saying, Buy it before the inhabitants, and before the elders of my people. If thou wilt redeem it, redeem it: but if thou wilt not redeem it, then tell me, that I may know: for there is none to redeem it beside thee; and I am after thee. And he said, I will redeem it.

Then said Boaz, What day thou buyest the field of the hand of Naomi, thou must buy it also of Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of the dead, to raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance.

And the kinsman said, I cannot redeem it for myself, lest I mar mine own inheritance: redeem thou my right to thyself; for I cannot redeem it.

Now this was the manner in former time in Israel concerning redeeming and concerning changing, for to confirm all things; a man plucked off his shoe, and gave it to his neighbour: and this was a testimony in Israel.

Therefore the kinsman said unto Boaz, Buy it for thee. So he drew off his shoe.

And Boaz said unto the elders, and unto all the people, Ye are witnesses this day, that I have bought all that was Elimelech’s, and all that was Chilion’s and Mahlon’s, of the hand of Naomi.

Moreover Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of Mahlon, have I purchased to be my wife, to raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance, that the name of the dead be not cut off from among his brethren, and from the gate of his place: ye are witnesses this day.2

Insofar as the field in question had belonged to Elimelech, why was it being purchased from Naomi and Ruth? What rights did they have in Elimelech’s property? Most commentators assume that they had either kesubah or spousal maintenance rights in his property, or that Naomi had inherited a portion of the field from her father, who had inherited it in turn from his father Nahshon jointly with his brothers Elimelech, Salmon (father of Boaz), and the redeemer.3 Ibn Ezra mentions the possibility of kesubah – but also another possibility:

כי האשה יש לה כתובה, גם האם יורשת הנשאר.4

As we noted a dozen years ago:

[R. Menachem Kasher] attempts to demonstrate that it was specifically Ibn Ezra, “the chief of the Pashtanim”, as opposed to various other exegetes, “the pillars of the Halachah”, who adressed the crucial question of the tension between Peshat and Derash, and he concludes that while the latter maintain that we are permitted to explain even the Halachic passages of the Torah in ways that contradict the Talmudic tradition (although, of course, the actual Halachah is still as Hazal teach), Ibn Ezra insists that these verses be explained only in accordance with the tradition …

But while Rav Kasher may be correct that Ibn Ezra does not usually diverge from Hazal in the area of Halachah, even he is forced to concede that at least occasionally, he does …

Another case where Ibn Ezra seems to ignore a Halachah that even תינוקות של בית רבן know is his explanation of the womens’ right to the field in the narrative of the גאולה in מגילת רות …

While I have no idea how Ibn Ezra’s comment can possibly be reconciled with the Halachah, perhaps we can at least suggest [that] Ibn Ezra was less particular about fidelity to Halachah in his exegesis of passages that are primarily narrative, as opposed to those that are primarily legislative.

רות ד:א-י.‏ [↩]
King James Version. [↩]
עיין שורש ישי (תרנ”א) עמודים סח:-ע: ואגרת שמואל (תע”ב) עמודים מט.-נא. באורך.‏ [↩]
אבן עזרא שם.‏ [↩]

Is Love Blind?

The central narrative in parashas Hayei Sarah is the mission of Avraham’s servant to obtain a wife for Yitzhak. It is generally assumed, by midrashim, other commentaries (including Ibn Ezra, in a passing remark in parashas Yisro1), and contemporary Orthodox students of the Torah that the servant in question was Eliezer, but the servant is not actually identified anywhere in the Biblical text, and the name Eliezer does not appear even once in Hayei Sarah. In fact, the name “Eliezer” appears only once in all of Sefer Bereishis, in Avraham’s plaintive lament to Hashem over his childlessness:

וַיֹּאמֶר אַבְרָם אֲדֹנָי יֱקוִק מַה תִּתֶּן לִי וְאָנֹכִי הוֹלֵךְ עֲרִירִי וּבֶן מֶשֶׁק בֵּיתִי הוּא דַּמֶּשֶׂק אֱלִיעֶזֶר.2

I had long been cognizant of the above, but in the course of preparing for my parashah lectures on פרשת חיי שרה, I was quite surprised to discover that according to one midrashic interpretation (by a sage ironically named “אלעזר”) of the aforementioned verse, “Eliezer” may not have even actually existed at all!

ובן משק ביתי ר’ אלעזר אומר: בן משק ביתי, זה לוט, שנפשו שוקקת עליו ליורשני, הוא דמשק אליעזר, שבשבילו רדפתי מלכים עד דמשק ועזרני הא-ל.

ריש לקיש בשם בר קפרא אמר: בן משק ביתי, בר ביתי הוא אליעזר, שעל ידו רדפתי מלכים עד דמשק, ואליעזר היה שמו, שנאמר: וירק את חניכיו ילידי ביתו שמונה עשר ושלוש מאות.
מנין אליעזר הוה, י”ח וג’ מאות:3

The lectures, on the topic of arranged marriages, with accompanying handout, are available at the Internet Archive. Previous lectures on this topic are also available there, and we have previously written about it here. Following are my weekly cognate halachah columns:

The main topic of parashas Chayei Sarah is the arrangement of the marriage between Yitzhak and Rivkah by Avraham and his trusted servant (often understood to be Eliezer). The Rabbinic tradition does not have much to say about the relative merits of arranged vs. autonomous marriages. We consider here one guideline that it does contain: the Talmudic prohibition against marrying a woman sight unseen, since he may subsequently find her repulsive, “and the Merciful One says ‘thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’” (Kiddushin 41a). Rabbeinu Tam suggests that this may not be normative (Mordechai Kesubos #179), but the consensus is that it is (Shulchan Aruch EH 35:1). The Beis Yosef (ibid.) states that viewing the woman beforehand is only required when it is feasible, but when it is not, due to geographic distance or other factors, it may be dispensed with.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was apparently common in Ashkenazic communities for marriages to be arranged without the couple having ever met. Various halachic authorities attempt to reconcile this practice with the Talmudic admonition:

The Derishah (ibid.) notes that although the couple did not meet prior to the engagement, they did meet before the actual marriage ceremony.

The Beis Hillel (ibid.) adds that this Talmudic concern may actually be the rationale behind the “chasan mahl” (“groom’s meal”), a meal held the night before the wedding during which the groom and bride would see and converse with each other. [This meal is less common today, although it is still practiced in some Chassidic circles (see Nitei Gavriel, Hilchos Nisuin I:4:2).] Some authorities argue, however, that the couple should really meet before the engagement, due to the binding nature of engagements (at least in certain societies) and the fact that breaking an engagement is humiliating to the jilted party (see Nitei Gavriel, Shiduchin Ve’Tenaim Ch. 3 nn. 2-3).

The Derishah (ibid., in an alternative justification) and Beis Shmuel (ibid. s.k. 2) suggest that since due to economic instability or demographic considerations a marriage that is not arranged immediately may wind up never coming to fruition, the requirement for the couple to meet may be dispensed with (as per the aforementioned position of the Beis Yosef).

The central narrative of parashas Chayei Sarah is the mission of Avraham’s servant to find a wife for Yitzchak. As we have previously noted, the Talmud (Kiddushin 41a) prohibits formally betrothing (kiddushin) a woman sight unseen, “lest he see something repulsive in her after the betrothal, and she will become repugnant to him, which will cause him to hate her.” Various commentaries address the question of why this halachah does not seem to have been followed here:

The Sefer Chassidim (#389) explains that Yitzchak had no choice, since he was unable to leave Eretz Yisrael (i.e., as per Avraham’s reiterated insistence to his servant that he not take Yitzchak with him to the land of Avraham’s birth).

Some of the Tosafists explain that the Talmudic prohibition only applies to actual kiddushin, and Yitzchak did not perform kiddushin until he met Rivkah. (Moshav Zekeinim) Others, however, assume that the servant did indeed perform kiddushin before Yitzchak ever met Rivkah. (See R. Asher Weiss, Kiddushei Rivkah U’Birchos Erusin [5776])

Some explain that personal observation of the woman is not absolutely necessary, and the man is able to rely upon reports of the woman’s appearance. (Accordingly, Yitzchak was able to rely upon the servant’s assessment of Rivkah.) (Tzeidah La’Derech, beginning of parashas Lech-Lecha)

Some suggest that since the entire problem with marrying a woman sight unseen is that one may subsequently discover that he is repelled by her appearance, one who never plans to look at his wife need not worry about this. Just as Avraham (according to an opinion of Chazal) never looked at his wife Sarah and never even knew what she looked like until the point that they traveled to Egypt, so, too, did Yitzchak plan to follow in his father’s footsteps and never look at his wife! (R. Avraham Yakir, cited in Shut. Va’Yageil Yaakov EH #17) R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, however, disagrees with this approach, arguing that the prohibition of Chazal is universal and does not contain exceptions. Moreover, we see that Avraham ultimately did wind up discovering what his wife looked like. (Cited in Eshkol Yosef issue #212 – see the extensive discussion there and in #214)

Schuhe and Handschuhe

My weekly halachah column:

In Megilas Rus (4:7), it is recorded that: “Formerly, this was done in cases of redemption and exchange transactions to validate any matter: One would draw off his shoe (na’alo), and give it to the other. This was the process of ratification in Israel.”1

While many have understood this verse as referring to the chalitzah ceremony described in parashas Ki-Seitzei (Antiquities of the Jews; cf. Abarbanel Devarim 25:5), this interpretation has almost no adherents within the rabbinic tradition, which understands the verse as describing a form of kinyan (a formal action that ratifies a transaction) called chalipin or kinyan sudar, and includes a debate over who gave his shoe to whom (unlike with chalitzah, where the Biblical text is explicit that it is the woman who removes the man’s shoe):

The verse is interpreted: “Redemption”; that is a sale. … “Substitution”; that is the transaction of exchange. …

With regard to the phrase “To confirm all matters; a man drew off his shoe, and gave it to his neighbor,” the baraisa asks: Who gave the shoe to whom? Boaz gave his shoe to the redeemer, the closest relative of Elimelech, who had the right of first refusal to the land that Naomi, Elimelech’s widow, was planning to sell. The redeemer was transferring that right to the land to Boaz, who was acquiring it by means of his shoe. Rabbi Yehuda says: The redeemer gave his shoe to Boaz. (Bava Metzia 47a).

The halachah follows the former view.

Since the chalipin ceremony is described only in Rus but not in the Pentateuch, there is considerable dispute over whether it is a Biblical law or a rabbinic institution (see S’dei Chemed volume 2 pp. 406-07).

One notable exception to the traditional rabbinic consensus that the ceremony described here has nothing to do with chalitzah is Chizkuni, who explains (“according to the plain meaning of the text”) that the chalitzah ceremony itself is really a form of chalipin, having to do with the transfer of the inheritance of the dead brother (perhaps a ratification of its relinquishment by the brother who is declining to perform yibum, since he would otherwise become his brother’s sole heir)!

A series of mini-haburos that I gave several years ago on the subject of קנין חליפין, within the framework of BMG’s Shivti Learning Program, in which I discuss some of the above points, is available at the Internet Archive:

The translation (by ArtScroll) of “na’alo” as “his shoe” follows the usual meaning of na’al, but some maintain that the word here means “his glove.” (Targum here; Bechor Shor Shemos 3:5) [Omitted from the published version due to space constraints.] [↩]