For C.S., who provided me with the volume from which our opening case study is drawn.
Buckbeak and His Defense Team
In Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban, the obnoxious and supercilious Draco Malfoy foolishly and boorishly insults Buckbeak the hippogriff, and instantly receives his richly deserved comeuppance:
Trotting toward them were a dozen of the most bizarre creatures Harry had ever seen. They had the bodies, hind legs, and tails of horses, but the front legs, wings, and heads of what seemed to be giant eagles, with cruel, steel-colored beaks and large, brilliantly orange eyes. The talons on their front legs were half a foot long and deadly looking. …
“Now, firs’ thing yeh gotta know abou’ hippogriffs is, they’re proud,” said Hagrid. “Easily offended, hippogriffs are. Don’t never insult one, ’cause it might be the last thing yeh do.”
Malfoy, Crabbe and Goyle weren’t listening; they were talking in an undertone and Harry had a nasty feeling they were plotting how best to disrupt the lesson. …
“This is very easy,” Malfoy drawled, loud enough for Harry to hear him. “I knew it must have been, if Potter could do it … I bet you’re not dangerous at all, are you?” he said, to the hippogriff. “Are you, you great ugly brute?”
It happened in a flash of steely talons; Malfoy let out a high-pitched scream and next moment, Hagrid was wrestling Buckbeak back into his collar as he strained to get at Malfoy, who lay curled in the grass, blood blossoming over his robes.
“I’m dying!” Malfoy yelled as the class panicked. “I’m dying, look at me! It’s killed me!”
“Yer not dyin’!” said Hagrid, who had gone very white. “Someone help me – gotta get him outta here -”
Hagrid subsequently receives a letter, informing him that the school governors have referred the incident to the Committee for the Disposal of Dangerous Creatures:
However, we must register our concern about the hippogriff in question. We have decided to uphold the official complaint of Mr. Lucius Malfoy, and this matter will therefore be taken to the Committee for the Disposal of Dangerous Creatures. The hearing will take place on April 20th, and we ask you to present yourself and your hippogriff at the Committee’s offices in London on that date. In the meantime, the hippogriff should be kept tethered and isolated. …
“You’ll have to put up a good strong defense, Hagrid,” said Hermione, sitting down and laying a hand on Hagrid’s massive forearm. “I’m sure you can prove Buckbeak is safe.” …
“Listen, Hagrid,” [Harry] said, “you can’t give up. Hermione’s right, you just need a good defense. You can call us as witnesses -”
“I’m sure I’ve read about a case of hippogriff-baiting,” said Hermione thoughtfully, “where the hippogriff got off. I’ll look it up for you, Hagrid, and see exactly what happened.”
The trio embarks upon some legal research on Buckbeak’s behalf:
Though Harry had by no means forgotten about Black, he couldn’t brood constantly on revenge if he wanted to help Hagrid win his case against the Committee for the Disposal of Dangerous Creatures. He, Ron, and Hermione went to the library the next day and returned to the empty common room laden with books that might help prepare a defense for Buckbeak. The three of them sat in front of the roaring fire slowly turning the pages of dusty volumes about famous cases of marauding beasts, speaking occasionally when they ran across something relevant.
“Here’s something … there was a case in 1722 … but the hippogriff was convicted – ugh, look what they did to it, that’s disgusting -”
“This might help, look – a manticore savaged someone in 1296, and they let the manticore off – oh – no, that was only because everyone was too scared to go near it …”
They lose the case, and Buckbeak is sentenced to death; Ron undertakes to prepare the appeal:
Ron had taken over responsibility for Buckbeaks’ appeal. When he wasn’t doing his own work, he was poring over enormously thick volumes with names like The Handbook of Hippogriff Psychology and Fowl or Foul? A Study of Hippogriff Brutality.
Unfortunately, they lose the appeal, too, but we cannot divulge Buckbeak’s ultimate fate without spoiling the novel’s dénouement.
שור הנסקל
The law of שור הנסקל clearly would not apply in this particular case, since they are limited to lethal attacks, and not attempted murder, let alone mere assault with intent to injure. But let us counterfactually assume that Buckbeak had actually killed Draco; would the extenuating factor of Draco’s gross provocation yield a valid defense? I am not aware of any discussion of such a mitigating consideration in the law the שור הנסקל itself, but Halachah does contain the possibility of a “כי יחם לבבו” defense for the (human) perpetrator of an assault or tort, as we have discussed some two and a half years ago.
כלב רע
We have heretofore considered the applicability of the law of שור הנסקל, but another question presents itself: is Hagrid really permitted to maintain “interesting creatures” who pose a threat to humans? The primary locus here is the Talmudic opposition to the raising of “evil dogs”:
אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש ואמרי לה אמר רב אסי אמר ( ריש לקיש) ואמרי לה אמר רבי אבא אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש כל המגדל כלב רע בתוך ביתו מונע חסד מתוך ביתו שנאמר למס מרעהו חסד שכן בלשון יונית קורין לכלב למס
רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר אף פורק ממנו יראת שמים שנאמר ויראת שקי יעזוב
ההיא איתתא דעיילא לההוא ביתא למיפא נבח בה כלבא איתעקר ולדה אמר לה מרי דביתא לא תידחלי דשקילי ניביה ושקילין טופריה אמרה ליה שקולא טיבותיך ושדיא אחיזרי כבר נד ולד
והשתא דאמרת פלגא נזקא קנסא האי כלבא דאכל אימרי ושונרא דאכלה תרנגולא משונה הוא ולא מגבינן בבבל והני מילי ברברבי אבל בזוטרי אורחיה הוא ואי תפס לא מפקינן מיניה ואי אמר קבעו לי זימנא דאזלינא לארעא דישראל קבעינן ליה ואי לא אזיל משמתינן ליה ובין כך ובין כך משמתינן ליה עד דמסלק הזיקא מדרבי נתן דתניא רבי נתן אומר מניין שלא יגדל אדם כלב רע בתוך ביתו ואל יעמיד סולם רעוע בתוך ביתו ת”ל לא תשים דמים בביתך:
מתני’ אין מגדלין בהמה דקה בא”י אבל מגדלין בסוריא ובמדברות של ארץ ישראל אין מגדלין תרנגולין בירושלים מפני הקדשים ולא כהנים בארץ ישראל מפני הטהרות אין מגדלין חזירין בכל מקום לא יגדל אדם את הכלב אלא אם כן היה קשור בשלשלת …
תנו רבנן לא יגדל אדם את הכלב אלא אם כן קשור בשלשלת אבל מגדל הוא בעיר הסמוכה לספר וקושרו ביום ומתירו בלילה תניא רבי אליעזר הגדול אומר המגדל כלבים כמגדל חזירים למאי נפקא מינה למיקם עליה בארור אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן בבל כעיר הסמוכה לספר דמי תרגמה נהרדעא דריש ר’ דוסתאי דמן בירי
ובנחה יאמר שובה ה’ רבבות אלפי ישראל ללמדך שאין שכינה שורה על ישראל פחות משני אלפים ושני רבבות חסר אחת והיתה אשה מעוברת ביניהם וראויה להשלים ונבח בה כלב והפילה נמצא זה גורם לשכינה שתסתלק מישראל ההיא איתתא דעלת למיפא בההוא ביתא נבח בה כלבא אמר לה מריה לא תיסתפי מיניה שקולי ניביה אמרה ליה שקילי טיבותיך ושדיא אחיזרי כבר נד ולד:
Rambam’s codification:
וכן אסרו חכמים לגדל חזירים בכל מקום. ולא את הכלב אלא אם כן היה קשור בשלשלת. אבל מגדל הוא כלבים בעיר הסמוכה לספר. ביום קושרו ובלילה מתירו. ואמרו חכמים ארור מגדל כלבים וחזירים מפני שהיזקן מרובה ומצוי:
One of the earliest authorities on record as having raised the question of the noncompliance of common practice with these texts is the sixteenth century Italian Rav Yehoshua Boaz, who suggests that the precarious situation of the Jews amidst their non-Jewish neighbors legitimizes the custom of maintaining even unchained dogs:
ביום קושרו בלילה מתירו פעמים רבות תמהתי מהיכן נהגו לגדל כלבים ונראה דשמא דוקא בעיר הסמוכה לספר ביום שאינן יראין קושרו אבל בלילה שצריכין שמור יתרה מתירו ואנן שדרין ביניהם אפילו ביום מתירין בעיר הסמוכה לספר כלילה דמי כי היכי דעיר הסמוכה לספר מתירין בלילה הכי נמי לדידן אפילו ביום. הגהות:
Maharshal rejects this, arguing that this is an overstatement of the danger, and moreover, we simply cannot allow conduct dangerous to the public welfare, security concerns notwithstanding:
ואם כן פלא בעיני, על מה נוהגין עכשיו שמגדלים. … ובחידושי מרדכי מצאתי הטעם, … ולא נהירא כלל, חדא, דעינינו רואות דאין אנו צריכין שימור יותר ביום. אף על פי שאנו דרים ביניהם, לעניין שיצילו אותנו הכלבים, יותר מעיר הסמוכה לספר. ועוד נהי דאיכא חששא טובא האידנא, וצריכה יותר שימור. מכל מקום אינה נראה להתיר כלבים, דאיכא השמת דמים בביתך, וסכנת נפשות. מחמת חששא דשימור ממון. ולא אמרו חכמים אלא ומתירו בלילה, כלומר בזמן שאין אנשים מצויים, וליכא השמת דמים בביתך שכיח כלל. מה שאין כן ביום.
Instead, he proposes that the prohibition is only against “evil dogs” (properly defined), but nevertheless concludes that although this is the basis for the prevailing custom, it is not compelling, and a God-fearing individual should be somewhat more stringent:
ונראה דדוקא כלב רע קאמר מתניתין, אבל בסתם כלבים לא איירי, דדוקא כלב רע אסור, משום דר’ נתן, … אבל כלב שאינו רע מותר לגדל. … [ועיין שם שפלפל בזה, וסיים:]
ועל זה סמכו לנהוג היתר. ומכל מקום מהאי ליכא דחייה כל כך. דדילמא האי איירי בכלבא כופרי’ דהיינו כלבים קטנים ונבחי או כלבים גדולים שרגילים לצוד עמהם שגם כן אין רגילים להזיק. … ואף דמתניתין איייר בכלב רע היינו סתם כלב שהוא מנבח על כל מי שאינו מכיר. ומחמת נביחתו הוא קרוי רע אף שאינו נושך כמו שאפרש. לכן כל איש ירא שמים לא יגדל כלב אלא כלבים כופרים. וכה”ג שמשונים בצורתם שהם עומדין לצוד עמהם. או לנוי בבית. אבל סתם כלב לא אף שאינו נושך. מכל מקום אסור משום שהוא מנבח. והאשה מפלת מיראתו. … וכן מביא מעשה דתלמוד בסוגיא זו. שאחד היה שקול לשיני הכלב. והיה מנבח באשה מעוברת והפילה מיראתו. דלא ידעה ששקל לשיניו לאשמועינן שאין היתר לכלב כשהוא מנבח אלא בקשירה.
Rabbi Howard Jachter has an excellent summary of the literature on the topic:
I. The Propriety of Owning Pets
The halachic literature indicates that it has been common practice among Ashkenazic Jews over the past several centuries to own non-farm animals, especially dogs. Rabbinic authorities have debated the propriety and permissibility of this practice. Their positions depend to a great extent on how they harmonize seemingly contradictory talmudic texts which appear in tractate Baba Kama. The Talmud (Baba Kama 15b) cites Rabbi Natan who asserts that one who raises an “evil dog” in his home violates the biblical prohibition “Do not place blood in your home” (Deuteronomy 22:8). The implication is that it is permissible to raise a dog in one’s home provided that the creature is not an “evil dog”. Rabbi Yishmael, in fact, permits one to raise a type of dog known as kofri dogs (Rashi: small dogs or large hunting dogs which do no harm) since they help eliminate rodents (Baba Kama 80a).
On the other hand, the Talmud (Baba Kama 79b) writes that one is forbidden to own a dog unless it is securely chained (if the dog is securely chained it will neither do any damage nor frighten anyone with its bark). Moreover, the rabbis of the Talmud (Baba Kama 83a) pronounced a curse upon one who owns dogs. These statements seem to apply to all dogs.
Rambam (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 5:9), in fact, rules that it is forbidden to raise any dog unless it is secured by chains “since dogs frequently cause considerable damage,” Rambam apparently believes that Rabbi Yishmael’s permissive ruling is contradicted by the Mishanah and Gemara of Baba Kama 79b and 83a, respectively. Rabbi Yishmael accordingly would be the sole authority who permits raising kofri dogs, and thus Rambam believes that the consensus of opinion among talmudic authorities rejects his view.
Most Rishonim, however, including Smag, Yeraim, Tur, and Hagahot Maimoniyot disagree with Rambam and limit this prohibition to “evil dogs.” These authorities believe that the statements that appear on Baba Kama 79b and 83a are limited to “evil dogs”.
Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 409:3) rules in accordance with the opinions which limit the prohibition to an “evil dog”. The Achronim almost without exception accept these opinions as well. Rabbi Yaakov Emden appears to be the lone authority who believes one is forbidden to own any type of dog.
The question, though, is how to define an “evil dog”. Rashi (explaining why the Mishnah (Baba Kama 79b) forbids raising a dog unless it is chained) writes “it bites and it barks, thereby causing pregnant women to miscarry.” Rashi can be interpreted in one of two ways (since he uses the Hebrew letter vav which sometimes means “and ” and sometimes means “or”). The first possibility is that an evil dog is one that both bites and barks, and the second possibility is that it is one that either bites or barks. Rabbi Shlomo Luria (Yam Shel Shlomo Baba Kama 7:45) is inclined to adopt the second possibility and suggests that a dog is considered to be “evil” if it barks, even if it does not bite. The reason for this, the Talmud recounts, is that a dog’s bark may cause a woman to miscarry, the Talmud (Baba Kama 83a), in fact, records two incidents of women who miscarried because they were frightened by dogs. Therefore, Rabbi Luria suggests that the only dogs one may own are the kofri dogs that Rabbi Yishmael explicitly asserts are permitted. Rabbi Luria seems to indicate that one is permitted to own these dogs even if they bark. Apparently, since people are aware that these dogs are not harmful, they know that they need not fear these dogs’ bark.
Nevertheless, Rabbi Luria limits his ruling to “God-fearing individuals” and concludes his discussion by station “therefore, we must excuse the Jewish people (i.e., those who own dogs which bark but do not bite) but praised is one who is careful [to limit his ownership to kofri type dogs] and blessings should be conferred upon him.” The implication is that there is some halachic justification for those Jews who own dogs who bark but do not bite. The justification seems to be based on an interpretation of Rashi’s description of an “evil dog” as one which both bites and barks. Accordingly, only a dog which bites would frighten a woman with its bark and possibly cause a miscarriage.
Shulchan Aruch Harav (Hilchot Shmirat Guf V’nefesh, number three) adopts a similar, albeit somewhat more firm, stance on this issue. He notes that Jews commonly own dogs that bark but do not bite and that some authorities justify the practice by limiting the definition of an evil dog to one that bites. Shulchan Aruch Harav asserts, however, that this view is rejected by the consensus of halachic authorities and that the category of “evil dogs” includes those dogs which bark even though they do not bite. Therefore, he concludes that “all God-fearing Jews should be certain to keep their dogs that bark tied up in iron chains while people are awake, even if their dogs merely bark but do not bite. On the other hand, Knesset Hagedola (Choshen Mishpat 409:4) notes that common practice among Jews is not to accept the stringent view of Yam Shel Shlomo and Shulchan Aruch Harav. He indicates that the custom is to own dogs which bark as long as they do not bite.
Although Knesset Hagedola writes that common practice among observant Jews is not to follow the opinion of Yam Shel Shlomo, it appears proper to follow the latter’s opinion. First Shulchan Aruch Harav, which is recognized as a major halachic work, supports Rabbi Luria’s position. Second, the Talmud considers a dog’s fearsome bark to be a public nuisance. Hence, if one chooses to own a dog, one should be certain not only that the dog does not bite, but also that the creature does not frighten people with its bark. However, if one finds it absolutely necessary to raise a dog that may cause harm (for protection, for example), one must be certain that the animal is tied up securely at times when it may do damage either with its bite or its bark.
Rabbi Yaakov Emden (Sheilat Yaavetz, number 17) adds a further restriction to the type of dog one may own. He writes that one is permitted to own a dog if the creature serves an economic or protective purpose. However, he strongly condemns ownership of a dog as a pet as being a waste of time and precisely the [abhorrent] behavior of the uncircumcised.”
Nevertheless, Rabbi Emden does not marshal sources to support this position and appears to constitute a minority view. Shulchan Aruch and most authorities limit the talmudic prohibition to ownership of “evil dogs”. The clear implication is that one may own a dog for any reason, provided it is not an evil dog. Moreover, the Talmud indicates that Jews used various animals for recreational purposes. The Mishnah (Shabbat 90b) relates that children used to play with a certain type of locust. The Talmud (Baba Batra 20a) tells of a certain type of bird known as “kalanita”, which can be used by a child to play. These two passages seem to demonstrate that the Mishnah has no objections to keeping animals for enjoyment contrary to the position of Rabbi Emden. Rabbi Emden might respond that these passages do not discuss dogs and do not prove that one may keep a dog as a pet. Rabbi Emden might agree that one may own a pet which does not require much attention. Perhaps he believes that only keeping a dog as pet mimics “the abhorrent behavior of the uncircumcised.”
Our discussion regarding dogs appears to apply to ownership of other animals as well. Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 261:1) rules that one may kill an “evil cat” which harms children. Once again the rule is limited to an “evil” animal. The general principle according to most authorities is that one may own a pet provided that the animal does not pose a danger to people or property.
[See the paper for the notes and sources.]
Here is another good discussion of the topic, and here are some less scholarly treatments of the issue (and others concerning animal ownership by Jews).