Hagar the Horrible?

From this week’s Parsha:

ט וַתֵּרֶא שָׂרָה אֶת-בֶּן-הָגָר הַמִּצְרִית, אֲשֶׁר-יָלְדָה לְאַבְרָהָם–מְצַחֵק. י וַתֹּאמֶר, לְאַבְרָהָם, גָּרֵשׁ הָאָמָה הַזֹּאת, וְאֶת-בְּנָהּ: כִּי לֹא יִירַשׁ בֶּן-הָאָמָה הַזֹּאת, עִם-בְּנִי עִם-יִצְחָק. יא וַיֵּרַע הַדָּבָר מְאֹד, בְּעֵינֵי אַבְרָהָם, עַל, אוֹדֹת בְּנוֹ. יב וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל-אַבְרָהָם, אַל-יֵרַע בְּעֵינֶיךָ עַל-הַנַּעַר וְעַל-אֲמָתֶךָ–כֹּל אֲשֶׁר תֹּאמַר אֵלֶיךָ שָׂרָה, שְׁמַע בְּקֹלָהּ: כִּי בְיִצְחָק, יִקָּרֵא לְךָ זָרַע. יג וְגַם אֶת-בֶּן-הָאָמָה, לְגוֹי אֲשִׂימֶנּוּ: כִּי זַרְעֲךָ, הוּא. יד וַיַּשְׁכֵּם אַבְרָהָם בַּבֹּקֶר וַיִּקַּח-לֶחֶם וְחֵמַת מַיִם וַיִּתֵּן אֶל-הָגָר שָׂם עַל-שִׁכְמָהּ, וְאֶת-הַיֶּלֶד–וַיְשַׁלְּחֶהָ; וַתֵּלֶךְ וַתֵּתַע, בְּמִדְבַּר בְּאֵר שָׁבַע. טו וַיִּכְלוּ הַמַּיִם, מִן-הַחֵמֶת; וַתַּשְׁלֵךְ אֶת-הַיֶּלֶד, תַּחַת אַחַד הַשִּׂיחִם. טז וַתֵּלֶךְ וַתֵּשֶׁב לָהּ מִנֶּגֶד, הַרְחֵק כִּמְטַחֲוֵי קֶשֶׁת, כִּי אָמְרָה, אַל-אֶרְאֶה בְּמוֹת הַיָּלֶד; וַתֵּשֶׁב מִנֶּגֶד, וַתִּשָּׂא אֶת-קֹלָהּ וַתֵּבְךְּ. יז וַיִּשְׁמַע אֱלֹהִים, אֶת-קוֹל הַנַּעַר, וַיִּקְרָא מַלְאַךְ אֱלֹהִים אֶל-הָגָר מִן-הַשָּׁמַיִם, וַיֹּאמֶר לָהּ מַה-לָּךְ הָגָר; אַל-תִּירְאִי, כִּי-שָׁמַע אֱלֹהִים אֶל-קוֹל הַנַּעַר בַּאֲשֶׁר הוּא-שָׁם. יח קוּמִי שְׂאִי אֶת-הַנַּעַר, וְהַחֲזִיקִי אֶת-יָדֵךְ בּוֹ: כִּי-לְגוֹי גָּדוֹל, אֲשִׂימֶנּוּ. יט וַיִּפְקַח אֱלֹהִים אֶת-עֵינֶיהָ, וַתֵּרֶא בְּאֵר מָיִם; וַתֵּלֶךְ וַתְּמַלֵּא אֶת-הַחֵמֶת, מַיִם, וַתַּשְׁקְ, אֶת-הַנָּעַר.1

And Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian, which she had born unto Abraham, mocking. Wherefore she said unto Abraham, Cast out this bondwoman and her son: for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, even with Isaac. And the thing was very grievous in Abraham’s sight because of his son. And God said unto Abraham, Let it not be grievous in thy sight because of the lad, and because of thy bondwoman; in all that Sarah hath said unto thee, hearken unto her voice; for in Isaac shall thy seed be called. And also of the son of the bondwoman will I make a nation, because he is thy seed. And Abraham rose up early in the morning, and took bread, and a bottle of water, and gave it unto Hagar, putting it on her shoulder, and the child, and sent her away: and she departed, and wandered in the wilderness of Beersheba. And the water was spent in the bottle, and she cast the child under one of the shrubs. And she went, and sat her down over against him a good way off, as it were a bowshot: for she said, Let me not see the death of the child. And she sat over against him, and lift up her voice, and wept. And God heard the voice of the lad; and the angel of God called to Hagar out of heaven, and said unto her, What aileth thee, Hagar? fear not; for God hath heard the voice of the lad where he is. Arise, lift up the lad, and hold him in thine hand; for I will make him a great nation. And God opened her eyes, and she saw a well of water; and she went, and filled the bottle with water, and gave the lad drink.2

A couple of years ago, we noted, and sharply dissented from, an interpretation of this poignant episode that is very critical of Hagar’s attitude and conduct:

Several of my acquaintances insist that the conventional understanding of the episode (which they endorse) yields a serious indictment of Hagar’s character. While not necessarily unsympathetic toward her, they maintain that Hagar’s casting aside her son and moving apart from him so that she “will not see the death of the child” was selfish and callous; thinking only of the mitigation of her own grief, she was unwilling to remain with her dying son and provide him with whatever comfort she could in his final moments.

I find this attitude deeply upsetting. Hagar is probably still reeling from her shockingly abrupt expulsion from her conjugal home, and is in all likelihood blaming herself for her child’s impending death, since she is, after all, the one who has gotten them lost, and we are lecturing her that a woman of superior character, that we, would behave differently?!

At the time, Wolf2191 commented:

I saw the commentary you cite in the name of your acquaintances as cied by RSRH but I have not had time to check

Yesterday, I did indeed find this perspective taken by Rav Samson Rafael Hirsch, who is unstinting in his disparagement of Hagar’s “unrefined Chamite nature” and the “cruel egotism of [her] brutish character”:

Hagar’s behavior is highly characteristic; it typifies the unrefined Chamite nature. A Jewish mother would never abandon her child, even if all she could do for him would be to speak softly to him, to soothe him if only for a millionth part of a second. One who abandons a child and does nothing because “she cannot bear to see the child’s misery” does not act out of compassion. Such conduct reflects the cruel egotism of a brutish character. True humanity is marked by a sense of duty that is capable of mastering even the strongest of emotions. A sense of duty makes one forget his own painful feelings and enables him to extend help and assistance, even if one can do no more than give the comfort of one’s compassionate presence.

Thus the profound significance of verse 17: God heard not קול הגר (although she, too, wept) but את קול הנער. Weeping that issues from egotism and that accomplishes inaction does not reach the Throne of Glory.

Furthermore, ותשלך את הילד תחת איד השיחים, “she threw the child under one of the shrubs.” She does not care where the child will fall; it does not occur to her that he might fall among thorns which might scratch him, adding needless pain to his tormenting thirst.

All the foregoing shows that Hagar completely lost her head when overcome with her own grief. A mother descending from Avraham would never behave toward her child in such a manner. …

What, then is the meaning of כמטחוי קשת? The bow, of course, is not the object that is shot, but is the instrument, the means for shooting. … Thus, הרחק כמטחוי קשת could mean: “she moved away to a distance, as archers do.” That is, just as archers walk backwards from the target to the furthest point from which they can still see it, so did Hagar walk backwards from Yishmael as far as possible, to avoid seeing his distress, but not so far that he would disappear from her sight. This would be in accordance with the conflicting emotions with which she struggled. To her attachment to Yishmael she allotted only the room that was left in her heart after she had catered to her own feelings of anguish.

God has already heard the voice of your child, there where he lies struggling. Had you trusted in God and not thrown the child there, but laid him gently down; had you not sat down at a distance but remained by his side as befits a mother, then you would have already seen the saving well of water, there, just where he is.

First of all, arise and lift up the boy like a brave mother who never gives way to despair; only then will you be worthy of God’s help. Then give him water to drink.3

I stand by my assessment of this judgment as insensitive and unfair. And if we are stereotyping national character, I submit that it is the Teutonic obsession with orderliness and convention that cannot sympathize with a mother, crazed with grief and guilt over the imminent demise of her child from thirst and illness, “completely [losing] her head”, and that it is the daughter of Ashkenaz, rather than that of Avraham, who “would never behave toward her child in such a manner”.

Of course, this is not to side with the Romantics that feeling and passion are the ultimate guides to correct action; we are staunchly of the party of George Eliot. But the issue here is not whether Hagar’s actions were correct and praiseworthy, but rather whether the poor, desperate woman deserves sympathy or censure.

We close by reminding the reader of Rav Yitzhak Arama’s rather more favorable assessment of Hagar’s character, in the context of the Hagar episode of last week’s Parshah:

מה צורך שיראה לה המלאך כמה פעמים … להודיע שלא היה חסרון הזרע לרוע תכונת השפחה ופחיתותה ספר הכתוב כל הענינים האלה אשר היו בין המלאך ובינה ושכבר הגיע משלמותה וזכות רעיונה אשר הורגלה בהם בבית אדוניה להיות לה דבר המלאך למנוחה והשיבה אל בית גבירתה ולדבר על לבה דברים טובים דברי נחומים עד ד’ פעמים4

What need [was there] for the angel to appear to her many times … to inform [us] that the deficiency of [her] issue [i.e., Yishmael] was not due to the bad character of the maidservant and her shortcoming, Scripture relates all these affairs that transpired between the angel and her, and that as a result of her perfection and the purity of her thoughts, to which she had become accustomed in the home of her master, the word of the angel relieved her and returned her to her mistress’s home, and spoke unto her heart good things, words of comfort, up to four times.5

  1. בראשית כא:ט-יט – קשר []
  2. King James Version – link. []
  3. The Hirsch Chumash (Feldheim Publishers – Judaica Press: Jerusalem – New York, 5762), Sefer Bereshis, pp. 467-9. []
  4. עקידת יצחק, בראשית, סוף שער י”ז []
  5. My translation. []

Sin and Its Consequences

We have seen the midrashic criticism of Jacob’s insensitivity in his harsh response to Rachel’s desperate demand for him to provide her with children, and its declaration of the consequences for his descendants. This is quite reminiscent of Ramban’s celebrated, provocative indictment of Sarah’s oppression of Hagar, and Abraham’s tacit complicity therein, and his assertion that this mistreatment is the root of our terrible suffering at the hands of Ishmael:

ותענה שרי ותברח מפניה. חטאה אמנו בענוי הזה, וגם אברהם בהניחו לעשות כן, ושמע ד’ אל עניה ונתן לה בן שיהא פרא אדם לענות זרע אברהם ושרה בכל מיני הענוי:1

Radak and Tur take similar positions:

רד”ק

ותענה שרי, עשתה עמה יותר מדאי ועבדה בה בפרך, אפשר שהיתה מכה אותה ומקללת אותה ולא היתה יכולה לסבול וברחה מפניה.

ולא נהגה שרה בזה למדת מוסר ולא למדת חסידות, לא מוסר כי אף על פי שאברהם מוחל לה על כבודו ואמר לה עשי לה הטוב בעיניך, היה ראוי לה למשוך את ידה לכבודו ולא לענותה, ולא מדת חסידות ונפש טובה, כי אין ראויה לאדם לעשות כל יכלתו במה שתחת ידו, ואמר החכם מה נאוה המחילה בעת היכולת, ומה שעשתה שרי לא היה טוב בעיני הקל, כמו שאמר המלאך אל הגר כי שמע ד’ אל עניך, והשיב לה ברכה תחת עניה. ואברם לא מנע שרי מלענותה אף על פי שהיה רע בעיניו, משום שלום בית.2

טור

בורחת. ב’ במסורת הכא מפני שרי גברתי אנכי בורחת. ואידך מקול פרש ורומה קשת בורחת כל העיר (ירמיה ד:כט). לומר מפני ששרה הבריחה את ישמעאל לפיכך ברחו ישראל מפניו, כי רומה קשת הוא ישמעאל, כדכתיב ביה (להלן כא:כ) רובה קשת.3

For further discussion of this idea, see Rabbi Shimon Kasher in his Peshuto shel Mikra4 and Rabbi Chaim Dov Chavel in his notes to his edition of the Ramban.

Now, it would seem that however we may assess the conduct of Sarah and Abraham in the first Hagar episode (on which the above sources are commenting) we must concede that they did act correctly in the second, as G-d apparently endorsed Sarah’s demand for Hagar’s expulsion. Remarkably, though, Tur apparently maintains that Sarah’s conduct on this occasion, too, was wrong, as he asserts that her descendants were actually punished for it:

גרש. ג’ במסורת. גרש האמה. גרש לץ (משלי כב:י). כלה גרש יגרש (שמות יא:א). פירוש גרש את האמה הזאת ואת בנה, ואז תגרש הלץ. ובשביל שגרשה שרה להגר מביתה נענשה ונשתעבדו בניה והוצרכו להתגרש משם.5

The objection from G-d’s endorsement is raised by Rabbi Yaakov Koppel Reinitz in his notes to the above passage.6 The Aderes also has trouble with these remarks, and he notes that Tur’s source is unknown:

דברי רבינו סותרים סופם את ראשם דהוא אמר כשתגרש האמה ובנה תגרש הלץ, ומאי טעמא ישתעבדו, ואולי דמכל מקום היה לה לקרבם כדי להשיבם בתשובה להשגיח עליהם, וכמו שמצינו כה”ג ביעקב, עיין סנהדרין צ”ט ב’ בתמנע, וגם אמרו חז”ל כן בדינה שלא השיאה לעשו, אך לא ידעתי כעת מקור דברי רבינו אלו.7

I am not actually at all troubled by the internal contradiction raised by the Aderes; after all, the road to Hell is paved with good intentions. Peninah, too, meant well, and look what happened to her children …

The final sentence of the previous paragraph assumes that R. Levi’s statement that:

שטן ופנינה לשם שמים נתכוונו … פנינה דכתיב וכעסתה צרתה גם כעס בעבור הרעימה [רש”י: שתתרעם על שהיא עקרה ותתפלל]8

and R. Nehemiah’s statement that:

היה לפנינה עשרה בנים, היתה חנה יולדת אחד, ופנינה קוברת שנים, חנה יולדת שנים ופנינה קוברת ארבעה, שלשה ופנינה קוברת ששה, ארבעה ופנינה קוברת שמונה, כיון שעיברה חמישית, באתה פנינה ונשתטחה על רגליה, אמרה לה בבקשה ממך התפלל על שנים ויחיו, התפללה עליהן והיו נקראין על שמה:9

are consistent, and do not simply represent incompatible perspectives toward Peninah’s conduct. This is indeed Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz‘s understanding:

וכבר ביארנו חומר העבירות שבין אדם לחברו, שלא מועלת כוונה טובה ואפילו עשה ונתכוין לשם שמים, וכמו שמצינו בפנינה שאמרו חז”ל שלשם שמים נתכוונה, ואף על פי כן נענשה באופן חמור כל כך שמתו כל בניה, ככתוב: “רבת בנים אומללה” (שמואל א’ ב:ה), ואף על פי שפנינה צדקת גמורה היתה, ובודאי היה קשה לה מאד לצער את חנה, וכל מה שעשתה לא עשתה אלא להביאה לידי תפילה, והיה בכך מסירות נפש ממש מצד פנינה, ובכל זה מה נורא עונשה.

וכל כך למה, כי הפוגע בחבירו, תהיה כוונתו אשר תהיה, הריהו כמכניס ידו לתוך תנור אש, ואין הכונה הטובה יכולה לשנות בזה מאומה. הסכנה שבעבירה שבין אדם לחבירו היא כמציאות טבעית, ממש כשם שהאש שורפת בדרך הטבע.10

While Rav Shmuelevitz apparently maintains that Peninah was severely punished although she may not have actually behaved wrongly, Rabbi Avraham Rivlin (the משגיח רוחני of ישיבת כרם ביבנה) explains she did indeed act most improperly:

ואף שפנינה התכוונה לשם שמים, לא הועילו לה כוונותיה הטובות להצילה מעונש על המעשה המחפיר. [והביא את המדרש הנ”ל שנענשה פנינה במיתת בניה, וביאר:] ללמדך שאין לאדם לעשות את חשבון הקב”ה ולקחת על עצמו לשמש כשליחו. אם פנינה רוצה בטובתה של חנה היא יכולה להתפלל עבורה, לסייע לחנה להתפלל בעצמה ע”י קיום מצוות תוכחה כראוי וכיוצא באלו דרכים שההלכה מתירה והמוסר מחייב לבוא לעזרת הזולת. אבל להציק לאדם ולגרום לו סבל, בשם התורה ובשם הקב”ה, כביכול – “לשם שמים”?? מי ביקש זאת מידכם? “בהדי כבשי דרחמנא למה לך? מאי דמפקדת אבעי לך למעבד” (ברכות י, ע”א). הבחירה החופשית של האדם בעולמנו התחתון, אסור לה שתביא בחשבון את חשבונות הבורא בעולמות העליונים.11

Update: Netanel showed me that Rav Eliyahu Lopian reportedly took the same position as Rav Shmuelevitz:

When Reb Elya was only 10 years old, his parents, brothers, and sisters emigrated to America.

Steeling himself against his family’s protests, the young Elyah refused to accompany them. He was convinced that his ability to grow in Torah and yiras shamayim as he so desperately desired would have been hampered in America, and that his dreams would be stifled. When he grew older and became a world renowned gadol hador, he did not change his attitude regarding this decision. He knew that, despite all the suffering he had brought upon himself by staying behind, he had done the right thing.

When Reb Elyah was visiting with his son Reb Avraham Yehoshua (Shea) in Chicago, Illinois in 1955, he asked his brother Avraham to accompany him to their father’s grave. He wished to ask his father’s forgiveness for not having followed him to America so long ago. Reb Elyah explained to his brother that there was no question in his mind that had he listened to his father and come to America, he never would have become the “Reb Elyah” that he was.

Nevertheless, he felt the need to beg his father to forgive him for the pain he had caused. He compared the situation to that of Peninah, who had been correct in acting cruelly toward Chanah in order to inspire Chanah to pray for children (I Shmuel 1), but was nevertheless obligated to beg Chana’s forgiveness for the pain she had caused her.12

Update: I recently saw that a distinguished disciple of R. Shmuelevitz, Rav Avigdor Nebenzahl is so troubled by the starkness of his teacher’s doctrine that he offers an “explanation, which [he] hope[s] will clarify the issue”, but which actually seems to be an alternate understanding of Hazal’s attitude toward Peninah:

I once heard from my illustrious teacher and Rav HaGaon Chaim Shmuelevitz, zt”l, that the subject of interpersonal relationships may be compared to fire. One who hurts his friend is like a person who thrusts his hand into fire. His intentions are irrelevant; he is burnt whether he wanted to extinguish the fire or intensify it. Although Peninah had the best of intentions, she did in fact cause anguish to Channah and was, therefore, punished to the full extent of the law.

I could never understand these words of Rav Shmuelevitz. It is commonly accepted that our intentions are taken into consideration by the Heavenly Court. As our Sages say, “An aveirah for the sake of Heaven is greater than a mitzvah performed without the proper intentions.” (Nazir 23b) With this in mind, I have added the following explanation, which I hope will clarify the issue.

When our Sages stated that Peninah’s intentions were for the sake of Heaven, they meant that this was her primary motive. Hidden in her subconscious, however, was the additional desire to aggravate her rival. Throughout the year she was able to restrain herself, but on these pilgrimage festivals, she took advantage of being “for the sake of Heaven.” At that time, her desire to aggravate was clothed in the guise of a mitzvah, and the deep-seated negative feelings were finally brought to the fore. Peninah was punished for this subconscious motivation, which did not befit a woman of her stature.

Our Sages have often noted that the expression “for the sake of Heaven” does not imply intentions which are absolutely pure. An extreme example of this is Potifar’s wife. Our sages tell us that her motivation was “for the sake of Heaven,” and they even compare her to Tamar, the wife of Yehudah: “Just as one acted ‘for the sake of Heaven,’ so the other’s deeds were ‘for the sake of Heaven.'” (Bereishis Rabbah 85:2) Yet Tamar’s actions are considered proper, and she was rewarded by having Mashiach as one of her descendants; while the Sages call Potifar’s wife “cursed” and “wicked” because only a small element of her motivation was “for the sake of Heaven.”

Based on the foregoing, we must conclude that not only do our overall achievements consist of a combination of good and bad traits, but each individual act is also comprised of both good and bad. Essentially, each and every one of our deeds is a mixture of good and bad. Everything we do is the result of a combination of motivations and thoughts – some pure and some in need of purification. For example, our Sages tell us that one who gives charity in a way which embarrasses the recipient will receive the reward for giving charity but will also be punished for embarrassing the poor person. (Chagigah 5a) In other words, one single act can have two totally opposite consequences.

Therefore, man’s first obligation is to increase the purity of his intentions insofar as he is able. The first step is not necessarily doing additional good deeds, but rather to increase the content of good in the actions already being performed – to increase as much as possible the degree of “for the sake of Heaven” in each act, to acknowledge that we are performing a mitzvah, not merely a humanitarian gesture.

As I have said, I do not understand how R. Nebenzahl’s explanation is compatible with R. Shmuelevitz’s words, with his vivid metaphor of the fire and his bald insistence that “intentions are irrelevant”.

  1. פירוש רמב”ן על התורה, בראשית טז:ו, מהדורת ר’ חיים דב שעוועל []
  2. פירוש הרד”ק שם, ירושלים תשס”ו []
  3. בעל הטורים על התורה, בראשית טז:ח, פלדהיים: ירושלים תשס”ג []
  4. Ibid. n. 8. []
  5. בעל הטורים שם כא:י []
  6. In his notes to the Feldheim edition. []
  7. עטרות אד”ר, מהדורת פלדהיים []
  8. בבא בתרא טז.‏ []
  9. מדרש שמואל פרשה ה’ אות י’ (על הפסוק (שמואל א’ ב:ה) “שבעים בלחם נשכרו ורעבים חדלו עד-עקרה ילדה שבעה ורבת בנים אומללה”, והובא ברש”י שם), מועתק מפה []
  10. שיחות מוסר מאמר ע”ו, עמוד שנ”ד. תודתי נתונה לגיסי נתנאל שהביא זה לתשומת עיני. []
  11. עיונים בהפטרות ראש השנה, pp. 3-4 (DOC).‏ []
  12. Rabbi David J. Schlossberg, Reb Elyah: The Life and Accomplishments of Rabbi Elyah Lopian (Mesorah Publications – 1999), pp. 26-27. []