Daughters and Distinctions: Part II

This is the second post in our series on the three invidious distinctions between males and females in the halachah of inheritance. The previous post discussed the rule that a son has precedence over a daughter in inheriting their parents; this one discusses the rule that a father inherits his children but a mother does not.

This halachah has aroused the least controversy of the three in question, although it is the subject of a brief but remarkably halachically inaccurate comment of Ibn Ezra. The context is the very obscure legal framework within which Naomi, Ruth, Boaz, and the anonymous “redeemer” were operating at the conclusion of Megillas Rus:

וּבֹעַז עָלָה הַשַּׁעַר וַיֵּשֶׁב שָׁם וְהִנֵּה הַגֹּאֵל עֹבֵר אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר בֹּעַז וַיֹּאמֶר סוּרָה שְׁבָה פֹּה פְּלֹנִי אַלְמֹנִי וַיָּסַר וַיֵּשֵׁב.

וַיִּקַּח עֲשָׂרָה אֲנָשִׁים מִזִּקְנֵי הָעִיר וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁבוּ פֹה וַיֵּשֵׁבוּ.

וַיֹּאמֶר לַגֹּאֵל חֶלְקַת הַשָּׂדֶה אֲשֶׁר לְאָחִינוּ לֶאֱלִימֶלֶךְ מָכְרָה נָעֳמִי הַשָּׁבָה מִשְּׂדֵה מוֹאָב.

וַאֲנִי אָמַרְתִּי אֶגְלֶה אָזְנְךָ לֵאמֹר קְנֵה נֶגֶד הַיֹּשְׁבִים וְנֶגֶד זִקְנֵי עַמִּי אִם תִּגְאַל גְּאָל וְאִם לֹא יִגְאַל הַגִּידָה לִּי ואדע [וְאֵדְעָה] כִּי אֵין זוּלָתְךָ לִגְאוֹל וְאָנֹכִי אַחֲרֶיךָ וַיֹּאמֶר אָנֹכִי אֶגְאָל.

וַיֹּאמֶר בֹּעַז בְּיוֹם קְנוֹתְךָ הַשָּׂדֶה מִיַּד נָעֳמִי וּמֵאֵת רוּת הַמּוֹאֲבִיָּה אֵשֶׁת הַמֵּת קניתי [קָנִיתָה] לְהָקִים שֵׁם הַמֵּת עַל נַחֲלָתוֹ.

וַיֹּאמֶר הַגֹּאֵל לֹא אוּכַל לגאול [לִגְאָל] לִי פֶּן אַשְׁחִית אֶת נַחֲלָתִי גְּאַל לְךָ אַתָּה אֶת גְּאֻלָּתִי כִּי לֹא אוּכַל לִגְאֹל.

וְזֹאת לְפָנִים בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל עַל הַגְּאוּלָּה וְעַל הַתְּמוּרָה לְקַיֵּם כָּל דָּבָר שָׁלַף אִישׁ נַעֲלוֹ וְנָתַן לְרֵעֵהוּ וְזֹאת הַתְּעוּדָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

וַיֹּאמֶר הַגֹּאֵל לְבֹעַז קְנֵה לָךְ וַיִּשְׁלֹף נַעֲלוֹ.

וַיֹּאמֶר בֹּעַז לַזְּקֵנִים וְכָל הָעָם עֵדִים אַתֶּם הַיּוֹם כִּי קָנִיתִי אֶת כָּל אֲשֶׁר לֶאֱלִימֶלֶךְ וְאֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר לְכִלְיוֹן וּמַחְלוֹן מִיַּד נָעֳמִי.

וְגַם אֶת רוּת הַמֹּאֲבִיָּה אֵשֶׁת מַחְלוֹן קָנִיתִי לִי לְאִשָּׁה לְהָקִים שֵׁם הַמֵּת עַל נַחֲלָתוֹ וְלֹא יִכָּרֵת שֵׁם הַמֵּת מֵעִם אֶחָיו וּמִשַּׁעַר מְקוֹמוֹ עֵדִים אַתֶּם הַיּוֹם.1

Then went Boaz up to the gate, and sat him down there: and, behold, the kinsman of whom Boaz spake came by; unto whom he said, Ho, such a one! turn aside, sit down here. And he turned aside, and sat down.

And he took ten men of the elders of the city, and said, Sit ye down here. And they sat down.

And he said unto the kinsman, Naomi, that is come again out of the country of Moab, selleth a parcel of land, which was our brother Elimelech’s:

And I thought to advertise thee, saying, Buy it before the inhabitants, and before the elders of my people. If thou wilt redeem it, redeem it: but if thou wilt not redeem it, then tell me, that I may know: for there is none to redeem it beside thee; and I am after thee. And he said, I will redeem it.

Then said Boaz, What day thou buyest the field of the hand of Naomi, thou must buy it also of Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of the dead, to raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance.

And the kinsman said, I cannot redeem it for myself, lest I mar mine own inheritance: redeem thou my right to thyself; for I cannot redeem it.

Now this was the manner in former time in Israel concerning redeeming and concerning changing, for to confirm all things; a man plucked off his shoe, and gave it to his neighbour: and this was a testimony in Israel.

Therefore the kinsman said unto Boaz, Buy it for thee. So he drew off his shoe.

And Boaz said unto the elders, and unto all the people, Ye are witnesses this day, that I have bought all that was Elimelech’s, and all that was Chilion’s and Mahlon’s, of the hand of Naomi.

Moreover Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of Mahlon, have I purchased to be my wife, to raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance, that the name of the dead be not cut off from among his brethren, and from the gate of his place: ye are witnesses this day.2

Insofar as the field in question had belonged to Elimelech, why was it being purchased from Naomi and Ruth? What rights did they have in Elimelech’s property? Most commentators assume that they had either kesubah or spousal maintenance rights in his property, or that Naomi had inherited a portion of the field from her father, who had inherited it in turn from his father Nahshon jointly with his brothers Elimelech, Salmon (father of Boaz), and the redeemer.3 Ibn Ezra mentions the possibility of kesubah – but also another possibility:

כי האשה יש לה כתובה, גם האם יורשת הנשאר.4

As we noted a dozen years ago:

[R. Menachem Kasher] attempts to demonstrate that it was specifically Ibn Ezra, “the chief of the Pashtanim”, as opposed to various other exegetes, “the pillars of the Halachah”, who adressed the crucial question of the tension between Peshat and Derash, and he concludes that while the latter maintain that we are permitted to explain even the Halachic passages of the Torah in ways that contradict the Talmudic tradition (although, of course, the actual Halachah is still as Hazal teach), Ibn Ezra insists that these verses be explained only in accordance with the tradition …

But while Rav Kasher may be correct that Ibn Ezra does not usually diverge from Hazal in the area of Halachah, even he is forced to concede that at least occasionally, he does …

Another case where Ibn Ezra seems to ignore a Halachah that even תינוקות של בית רבן know is his explanation of the womens’ right to the field in the narrative of the גאולה in מגילת רות …

While I have no idea how Ibn Ezra’s comment can possibly be reconciled with the Halachah, perhaps we can at least suggest [that] Ibn Ezra was less particular about fidelity to Halachah in his exegesis of passages that are primarily narrative, as opposed to those that are primarily legislative.

  1. רות ד:א-י.‏ []
  2. King James Version. []
  3. עיין שורש ישי (תרנ”א) עמודים סח:-ע: ואגרת שמואל (תע”ב) עמודים מט.-נא. באורך.‏ []
  4. אבן עזרא שם.‏ []

Commentary On the Cooking Of Kids

The following verse is repeated, word for word, letter for letter, ניקוד for ניקוד, and טעם for טעם, in parashiyos Mishpatim and Ki Sisa:

רֵאשִׁ֗ית בִּכּוּרֵי֙ אַדְמָ֣תְךָ֔ תָּבִ֕יא בֵּ֖ית יְקוָ֣ק אֱלֹקיךָ לֹֽא־תְבַשֵּׁ֥ל גְּדִ֖י בַּחֲלֵ֥ב אִמּֽוֹ׃

Oddly, ArtScroll’s translation of the verse varies considerably, if not necessarily substantively, between the two instances:

The choicest first fruit of your land shall you bring to the House of Hashem, your G-d; you shall not cook a kid in the milk of its mother.1

The first of your land’s early produce you shall bring to the Temple of Hashem, your G-d. Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.2

[ArtScroll translates the final instance of the admonition of לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו, in parashas Re’eh, as:

you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.3]

Ibn Ezra, of course, would maintain that these sorts of trivial discrepancies do not matter, and that disregard of them is actually the way of “all scholars [writing] in all languages” (although I don’t think that ArtScroll would accept this position of Ibn Ezra):

אמר אברהם המחבר: משפט אנשי לה”ק פעם יבארו דבורם באר היטב ופעם יאמרו הצורך במלות קצרות שיוכל השומע להבין טעמם. ודע כי המלות הם כגופות והטעמים הם כנשמות והגוף לנשמה כמו כלי. ע”כ משפט כל החכמים בכל לשון שישמרו הטעמים ואינם חוששים משנוי המלות אחר שהם שוות בטעמן. והנה אתן לך דמיונות:

אמר ה’ לקין: ארור אתה מן האדמה. כי תעבוד את האדמה לא תוסף תת כחה לך נע ונד תהיה בארץ. וקין אמר: הן גרשת אותי היום מעל פני האדמה. ומי הוא שאין לו לב שיחשוב כי הטעם אינו שוה בעבור שנוי המלות.

והנה אמר אליעזר: הגמיאיני נא. והוא אמר: ואומר אליה השקיני נא.

אמר משה: בכור השבי אשר בבית הבור. וכתוב: בכור השפחה אשר אחר הרחים.

ומשה הזכיר התפילה במשנה תורה שהתפלל על ישראל בעבור העגל, ואינו דומה לתפילה הנזכרת בפרשת כי תשא ,למי שאין לו לב להבין והכלל כל דבר שנוי כמו חלום פרעה ונבוכדנצר. ואחרים רבים תמצא מלות שונות. רק הטעם שוה. וכאשר אמרתי לך שפעם יאחזו דרך קצרה ופעם ארוכה. כך יעשו פעמים להוסיף אות משרת או לגרוע אותו. והדבר שוה.

אמר השם: ותכלת וארגמן. ומשה אמר: תכלת וארגמן.

אמר השם: אבני שהם. ומשה אמר: ואבני שהם.

וכאלה רבים ושניהם נכונים, כי הכתוב בלא וי”ו אחז דרך קצרה ולא יזיק. גם הכתוב בוי”ו לא יזיק בעבור שהוסיף לבאר. והנה הוי”ו שהיא נראית במבטא הפה אין אדם מבקש לו טעם למה נגרע ולמה נכתב ולמה נוסף. כי זה וזה נכון. והנה על הנראה שיבוטא בו לא יבקש עליו בכתב טעם. א”כ למה נבקש טעם בנח הנעלם שלא יבוטא בו. כמו מלת לעולם למה נכתב מלא או למה חסר. והנה בני הדור יבקשו טעם למלא גם לחסר. ואילו היו מבקשים טעם לאחד מהם. או שהמנהג היה לכתוב הכל על דרך א’ הייתי מחריש.

והנה אתן לך משל: אמר לי אדם אחד כתוב לרעי וזה כתוב: אני פלוני אוהבך לעולם. וכתבתי פלני בלא וי”ו. אהבך גם כן בלא וי”ו. לעלם חסר. ובא ראובן ושאלני למה כתבת חסרים?!
ואני אין לי צורך לכתוב רק מה שאמר לי. ואין לי חפץ להיותם מלאים או חסרים אולי יבא לוי ויודיעני איך אכתוב. ולא ארצה להאריך רק המשכיל יבין ועתה אפרש לך השאלות הנזכרות.4

I discovered this curiosity while preparing my weekly halachah column for this past parashas Ki Sisa:

Parashas Ki Sisa contains one of the Torah’s three reiterations of the prohibition: “Do not cook [lo sevasheil] a kid [gedi] in its mother’s milk.” (34:26) The prohibition of cooking meat and milk together is not limited to a kid, or to the milk of an animal’s own mother (see, e.g., Chullin 114a); why, then, does the Torah say “in its mother’s milk”?

Ibn Ezra and Bechor Shor (23:19) suggest that the prohibition does refer primarily to the cooking of a kid in its own mother’s milk, since this constitutes cruelty, and is analogous to the slaughtering of an animal and its offspring on the same day (Vayikra 22:28) and the taking of the mother bird with its young (Devarim 22:6). Ibn Ezra explains that the reason the Torah forbids cooking in all milk is that since milk is commonly obtained from commercial sources, and the purchaser may be unaware of the kid’s mother’s location and may not realize that the purchased milk contains the kid’s mother’s milk, the rule that “every doubt regarding a Biblical matter is prohibited” applies.

Bechor Shor also makes the startling assertion that the simple meaning (peshat) of the prohibition is something else entirely: the words lo sevasheil here do not mean “do not cook” but rather “do not ripen”, i.e., do not allow a kid [presumably a first born one, which must be offered as a sacrifice and given to a priest] to grow and be raised on its mother’s milk, but offer it immediately. The prohibition is thus analogous to the commandment in the beginning of the verse: “The choicest first [reishis] fruit of your land shall you bring to the House of Hashem, your G-d”. [Bechor Shor seems to understand reishis not as a description of the fruit to be brought, but rather as an imperative to bring the fruit immediately upon its formation.]

Some commentators take this idea even further, and explain that the word gedi here actually means fruit, and ‘mother’ refers to the tree on which it grows, so this portion of the verse itself is an exhortation to bring the first fruit immediately to the House of Hashem, and not to allow it to ripen on the tree (Hadar Zekeinim ibid., and cf. there for yet another reading of the verse).

  1. The Chumash, the Stone Edition (eleventh edition), p. 437. []
  2. Ibid. p. 513. []
  3. Ibid. p. 1013. []
  4. אבן עזרא שמות כ:א []

Calves and Coins

My weekly halachah column:

During the episode of the Golden Calf, Aharon seemingly goes along with the mob’s frenzy, to the point of proclaiming that “Tomorrow is a feast to ‘Hashem’” (32:5), apparently intending an idolatrous feast. The Ibn Ezra struggles greatly to reconcile Aharon’s conduct in this episode in general, and in this proclamation in particular, with his holy and pious character, in the course of which he reports that “many say” that what Aharon actually meant by “Tomorrow is a feast to ‘Hashem’” is that the worshipers of the calf would be executed by Moshe. The Ibn Ezra vigorously rejects this solution, declaring that a blasphemer (megadeif) and one who incites others toward idolatry (meisis) are executed based solely upon their verbal utterances, irrespective of their internal intentions. He makes the following analogy: Suppose someone asks his friend in court “Are you my friend to whom I lent such and such a sum?” and the friend replies “I am.” The respondent cannot then retreat from his concession and explain that he meant merely that he is his friend, but nothing more.

The claim that a megadeif cannot defend himself with the claim that when he blasphemed against “G-d” he really meant some other deity seems to be contradicted by a Talmudic assertion that when Moshe charged the Jews to “obey what G-d (elokah) says”, it was necessary for him to expressly stipulate that the oath he was imposing upon them was to be interpreted from the perspective of Hashem and Moshe, since otherwise it could have been interpreted as referring to an idol, since the Hebrew word elokah sometimes has that meaning. Similarly, the Talmud entertains the possibility that when a debtor swears that he has repaid his creditor, without the express stipulation that the oath the court is imposing upon him is to be interpreted from its perspective, the taker of the oath could plead that he really meant that he had given him some [worthless] tokens (iskundri), which he has chosen to refer to as “coins” (zuzi) (Shevuos 29a).

We have previously discussed these passages from the Talmud and Ibn Ezra here.