Price Gouging the Desperate

A famous scene from Shakespeare’s Richard III:

ACT V SCENE IV. Another part of the field.

Alarum: excursions. Enter NORFOLK and forces fighting; to him CATESBY


Rescue, my Lord of Norfolk, rescue, rescue!
The king enacts more wonders than a man,
Daring an opposite to every danger:
His horse is slain, and all on foot he fights,
Seeking for Richmond in the throat of death.
Rescue, fair lord, or else the day is lost!



A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a horse!


Withdraw, my lord; I’ll help you to a horse.


Slave, I have set my life upon a cast,
And I will stand the hazard of the die:
I think there be six Richmonds in the field;
Five have I slain to-day instead of him.
A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a horse!


We have previously posted a detailed analysis of whether the trade King Richard proposes would constitute אונאה; the issue is whether one who pays more than the normal price out of desperation subsequently has a claim of אונאה. I recently encountered discussion of this case in R. Dr. Aaron Levine’s Case Studies In Jewish Business Ethics:

While a complaint of overcharge is not given validity when the reference price is anything but the current market norm, an exception to the rule can be identified: “It has been taught, R. Judah b. Batera [mid-1st. cent.] said: The sale of a horse, sword, and buckler on [the field of] battle is not subject to ona’ah, because one’s very life is dependent upon them.”

Given the life-threatening environment of the battlefield, the vendee would pay, if he had to, any sum to acquire the implements of war. Economists describe a desperate need of this sort with the phrase “perfectly inelastic demand.” Consider, too, that the buyer, for all intents and purposes, will not hazard to investigate market alternatives during a raging battle. The vendor therefore enjoys a monopoly position here.

Since the vendee’s demand for a horse or weapon in the battlefield zone is perfectly inelastic, he certainly receives subjective equivalence for whatever price he agrees to pay for these articles. This is the reasoning of R. Judah b. Batera. Whether his ruling represents mainstream talmudic thought is a matter of dispute among the early decisors. [R. Dr. Levine proceeds to cite various poskim who address this question, whom we have cited in our previous post.] …

The acceptability of R. Judah ben Batera’s opinion, according to R. Moses ha-Kohen of Lunel, a thirteenth-century French decisor, hinges heavily upon the validity of assimilating his battlefield case with the fugitive-ferryman case discussed at Bava Kamma 115a. Here, the Talmud relates that if an absconding criminal agrees to pay a ferryman an above-market price to provide him with conveyance across a river, he is entitled to recoup from the ferryman the differential involved.

The point of similarity between the two cases is that in both instances the buyer’s interest in the product involved is price-inelastic; i.e., he would agree, for all intents and purposes, to pay any price the seller insists on. In the ferryman-fugitive case, since the conveyance averts the fugitive’s imminent capture, the latter certainly receives subjective equivalence in his transaction with the ferryman. Nevertheless, if his fugitive status were removed, his demand for the conveyance would probably be described as price-elastic, and he would presumably not value the service above market price. With his price-inelastic demand reflecting transitory subjective value, the fugitive is entitled to recoup from the ferryman any amount he paid him above the competitive norm. Similarly, remove the condition of war and the vendee would presumably not agree to pay the asking price at hand for the implements of war.

Though R. Moses ha-Kohen advances no specifics to explain why this assimilation should be rejected, two points of dissimilarity stand out. First, whereas the demand-inducing factor in the battlefield case affects all market demanders equally, causing the aggregate demand schedule for implements of war to shift upward, no such upward shift in demand occurs in the fugitive-ferryman case. The demand-inducing factor uniquely affects the fugitive’s subjective evaluation of the ferryman’s services, leaving everyone else’s demand for the service unaffected. Second, whereas a competitive norm exists for the services of the ferryman at the time the fugitive struck his bargain, no competitive norm exists at the time an individual buys implements of war on a battlefield. While the commercial market for horses and weapons is normally subject to a competitive norm, the marketplace for these articles completely collapses within the framework of the battlefield zone. The economic environment that prevails in such a scene effectively precludes the emergence of a competitive price for these articles. Resource mobility and knowledge of market alternatives are conspicuously absent here, as the movement of market participants is severely restricted. With economic activity characteristically unorganized and sporadic, the market for these articles becomes minutely fragmented. Within this framework, price is determined by the individual bargains buyers and sellers reach. Since the buyer’s bid determines value here, his ona’ah claim should be denied, notwithstanding the circumstantial nature of his demand in this case.

What proceeds clearly from the school of thought that accepts the analogy between the fugitive-ferryman case and the battlefield case is the general principle that exercise of monopoly power, when the relevant aggregate demand schedule is perfectly inelastic, is ethically immoral.

Selling at whatever price the market will bear when the relevant demand the monopolist faces is price-elastic, however, presents no moral issue in Jewish law. This is evident from the long-standing sanction given to the communal practice of auctioning the privilege of performing a public ceremonial function of a religious character to the highest bidder. With the ceremonial honor put up for sale unavailable elsewhere, the competitive bidding among the auction participants determines value. Hence, no moral issue is raised here. Capitalizing on “site value”, auctioning a rare painting, and selling the patent rights of a new invention to the highest bidder provide other examples of monopoly pricing under conditions of elastic demand.2

The basic inference from the case of the fugitive and the ferryman of the general principle that a deal made by someone “under pressure” to pay an unfairly high price need not be subsequently honored is also articulated by Ritva:

גמרא קידושין

רב כהנא שקיל סודרא מבי פדיון הבן אמר ליה לדידי חזי לי חמש סלעים אמר רב אשי לא אמרן אלא כגון רב כהנא דגברא רבה הוא ומבעי ליה סודרא ארישיה אבל כולי עלמא לא כי הא דמר בר רב אשי זבן סודרא מאימיה דרבה מקובי שוי עשרה בתליסר:3


פירוש וקים לן ודאי דשוה חמש לדידיה, אבל כולי עלמא דלא שוי’ ליה לא, ואף על גב דקבלי’ עליה לאו כל כמיניה.
ושמע’ מהכא שהמוכר חפץ לחבירו בשית ובשוק לא שוו אלא חמשה, אי להאי לוקח שוי שיתא אין בו אונאה, דבתר דידיה אזלינן, כי היכי דחשבינן ליה הכא דשוי חמש סלעים,
מיהו בדשוי’ לזבונא שיתא כי אורחיה, אבל אי לדידיה לא שוי’ אלא מפני שהוא דחוק בדבר, האי ודאי קציצה מתוך בדחק לא שמיה קציצה, ואפילו נתן לו הדמים חוזר וגובה אותם ממנו, והכי מוכח ביבמות … ושמעינן מינה שכל המתנה בשכירות יותר מכדי דמים מפני האונס ודוחק השעה שלו, יכול לומר משטה אני בך, ומכאן ללוקח סמנין הרבה בדמים יקרים מפני חולי הדוחק, דלא מחייב אלא בדמיהן וכן כל כיוצא בזה, מיהו אם התנה בשכר הרופא הרבה, חייב ליתן, שחכמתו מכר לו ואין לה דמים, וכן כתב אדונינו הרמב”ן ז”ל, וכן שמעתי מפי מורי נר”ו.4

It is worth noting that among contemporary secular economists and philosophers there is also no consensus on whether taking advantage of the misfortune of others to profit by raising prices constitutes immoral “price gouging” or is merely the standard and legitimate business practice of “charging what the market will bear”; here’s how Prof. Michael J. Sandel, an expert on the subject of justice, describes the debate (h/t: Minds and Discourse):

In the summer of 2004, Hurricane Charley roared out of the Gulf of Mexico and swept across Florida to the Atlantic Ocean. The storm claimed twenty-two lives and caused $11 billion in damage. It also left in its wake a debate about price gouging.

At a gas station in Orlando, they were selling two-dollar bags of ice for ten dollars. Lacking power for refrigerators or air-conditioning in the middle of August, many people had little choice but to pay up. Downed trees heightened demand for chain saws and roof repairs. Contractors offered to clear two trees off a homeowner’s roof — for $23,000. Stores that normally sold small household generators for $250 were now asking $2,000. A seventy-seven-year-old woman fleeing the hurricane with her elderly husband and handicapped daughter was charged $160 per night for a motel room that normally goes for $40.

Many Floridians were angered by the inflated prices. “After Storm Come the Vultures,” read a headline in USA Today. One resident, told it would cost $10,500 to remove a fallen tree from his roof, said it was wrong for people to “try to capitalize on other people’s hardship and misery.” Charlie Crist, the state’s attorney general, agreed: “It is astounding to me, the level of greed that someone must have in their soul to be willing to take advantage of someone suffering in the wake of a hurricane.”

Florida has a law against price gouging, and in the aftermath of the hurricane, the attorney general’s office received more than two thousand complaints. Some led to successful lawsuits. A Days Inn in West Palm Beach had to pay $70,000 in penalties and restitution for overcharging customers.

But even as Crist set about enforcing the price-gouging law, some economists argued that the law — and the public outrage — were misconceived. In medieval times, philosophers and theologians believed that the exchange of goods should be governed by a “just price,” determined by tradition or the intrinsic value of things. But in market societies, the economists observed, prices are set by supply and demand. There is no such thing as a “just price.”

Thomas Sowell, a free-market economist, called price gouging an “emotionally powerful but economically meaningless expression that most economists pay no attention to, because it seems too confused to bother with.” Writing in the Tampa Tribune, Sowell sought to explain “how ‘price gouging’ helps Floridians.” Charges of price gouging arise “when prices are significantly higher than what people have been used to,” Sowell wrote. But “the price levels that you happen to be used to” are not morally sacrosanct. They are no more “special or ‘fair’ than other prices” that market conditions — including those prompted by a hurricane — may bring about.

Jeff Jacoby, a pro-market commentator writing in the Boston Globe, argued against price-gouging laws on similar grounds: “It isn’t gouging to charge what the market will bear. It isn’t greedy or brazen. It’s how goods and services get allocated in a free society.” Jacoby acknowledged that the “price spikes are infuriating, especially to someone whose life has just been thrown into turmoil by a deadly storm.” But public anger is no justification for interfering with the free market. By providing incentives for suppliers to produce more of the needed goods, the seemingly exorbitant prices “do far more good than harm.” His conclusion: “Demonizing vendors won’t speed Florida’s recovery. Letting them go about their business will.”

Attorney General Crist (a Republican who would later be elected governor of Florida) published an op-ed piece in the Tampa paper defending the law against price gouging: “In times of emergency, government cannot remain on the sidelines while people are charged unconscionable prices as they flee for their lives or seek the basic commodities for their families after a hurricane.” Crist rejected the notion that these “unconscionable” prices reflected a truly free exchange:This is not the normal free market situation where willing buyers freely elect to enter into the marketplace and meet willing sellers, where a price is agreed upon based on supply and demand. In an emergency, buyers under duress have no freedom. Their purchases of necessities like safe lodging are forced.The debate about price gouging that arose in the aftermath of Hurricane Charley raises hard questions of morality and law: Is it wrong for sellers of goods and services to take advantage of a natural disaster by charging whatever the market will bear? If so, what, if anything, should the law do about it? Should the state prohibit price gouging, even if doing so interferes with the freedom of buyers and sellers to make whatever deals they choose? …

Sandel continues with his analysis of the issue.

I recently gave a brief talk on the possibility of rescission of a deal made by someone under pressure, in the context of the broader question of the halachic valuation of something that is worth more to a specific individual than the price assigned to it by the market; the lecture is available, along with some brief notes on the general topic, at the Internet Archive.

  1. Richard III, Act V Scene IV []
  2. R. Dr. Aaron Levine, Case Studies in Jewish Business Ethics, pp. 158-60. []
  3. קידושין ח.‏ []
  4. חידושי הריטב”א (מוסד הרב קוק) שם עמודים עד-עה ד”ה לעולם. []

The בעל מוסר and the Bard

Rav Shlomo Wolbe, in the midst of a characteristically eloquent and passionate – and uncompromisingly hard-line – essay insisting on the preservation of the independence and purity of the Haredi Yeshivos in Israel, lets slip a reminder that he was once (August) Wilhelm Wolbe (or Gustav Karl Friedrich Wolbe), a student at the University of Berlin:

ובעיקר: תורתנו הקדושה מצאה מקלט אחרון בארץ ישראל אחרי חורבנה של יהדות אירופה. כאן הננו רואים תקוה לבנות התורה מהריסותיה על טהרת הקודש, בלי שום השפעה מרוחות זרים, לא הרי כאמריקא הרי ארץ ישראל: גם שם נוסדו ישיבות רבות וגדולות, אבל בכולן – חוץ מלייקוואוד – ישנם לימודים תיכוניים וקשרים עם אוניברסיטאות, וזה פוגם פגימה רצינית ברוח השוררת בתוככי הישיבה, אשר גם גדולתם של ראשי הישיבות אינה מכריעה אותה. לא כן ארץ ישראל: גאונות בתורה, ישרות של מוסר, להב של חסידות ובירור של הלכה – כל אלה קיוינו לגדל כאן בלי מפריע ומעכב. …

וייאמר בבירור ובגלוי לעומת המגמה לשבץ בני הישיבות במסגרת הצבא כל עוד הם לומדים בישיבה; איננו נכנסים בשום ויכוחים; “ישיבות ההסדר” ו”ישיבות תיכוניות” אינן קנה המידה עבורנו, זוהי עבורנו שאלה של להיות או לא להיות, כלומר, שאלה אם אמנם יש מקום לתורה בארץ ישראל או לא, ואין בזה שום פשרות. …

איננו נכנסים לויכוחים. איננו מסכימים לפשרות. לא התענינו בנו עד כה: התעלמו מהישיבות הגדולות בחלוקת תקציבים ממשלתיים ונתנו מעמד אקדמאי לכל בתי הספר הגבוהים חוץ מהישיבות. ליד נדיבה זכו ישיבות ההסדר והתיכוניות – ויבולע להם. אל יטרחו נציגינו בכנסת את עצמם להתריע על ההפליה של הישיבות הגדולות. אנו מוותרים על התקציבים הגדולים, על מעמד והתענינות. ופנו את הזרקורים אל מוסדות ההשכלה הגבוהה ויתנו לנו לעבוד את עבודתנו בצינעא ובשקט. עוד יזדקקו לישיבות הגדולות: בוא יבוא היום ויווכחו כלם כי חפרו בורות נשברים וסגדו לשקרים ודמיונות. וכשתגדל דרישת האמת, ויגדל הרעב לשמוע את דבר ד’ – אז ידפקו על דלתות הישיבות, ללמוד מיהו יהודי ומהי יהודית וכיצד חוזרים בתשובה. עד אז, אם אמנם ירצו שתישארנה בארץ – ירפו מהן, על ועד הישיבות להבהיר למשרד הבטחון בלשון חד משמעי. כי כל כלי יוצר על קיום הישיבות לא יצלח, לא מקל חובלים ולא מקל נועם.1

The line that I have emphasized is, of course, an obvious and unmistakable citation of “one of the most famous quotations in world literature”.

  1. הפרדס, שנה מ”ט כסל”ו תשל”ה (חוברת ג’), עמודים 25-26 []

Art and Literature In the United Kindgom

I recently returned from a visit to the United Kingdom, where I saw a matinée performance of Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1 at the reconstructed Globe theater. In two key scenes, Falstaff eloquently declares his preference for life over honor. The first occurs on the eve of the climactic battle:

Honor prickes me on. But how if Honour pricke me off when I come on? How then? Can Honour set too a legge? No: or an arme? No: Or take away the greefe of a wound? No. Honour hath no skill in Surgerie, then? No. What is Honour A word. What is that word Honour? Ayre: A trim reckoning. Who hath it? He that dy’de a Wednesday. Doth he feele it? No. Doth hee heare it? No. Is it insensible then? yea, to the dead. But wil it not liue with the liuing? No. Why? Detraction wil not suffer it, therfore Ile none of it. Honour is a meere Scutcheon, and so ends my Catechisme.1

He reiterates this sentiment during the battle, upon encountering the corpse of his ally, the eminently honorable Sir Walter Blunt:

Though I could scape shot-free at London, I fear the shot heere: here’s no scoring, but vpon the pate. Soft who are you? Sir Walter Blunt, there’s Honour for you: here’s no vanity, I am as hot as molten Lead, and as heauy too; heauen keepe Lead out of mee, I neede no more weight then mine owne Bowelles. I haue led my rag of Muffins where they are pepper’d: there’s not three of my 150. left aliue, and they for the Townes end, to beg during life. …

If Percy be aliue, Ile pierce him: if he do come in my way, so: if he do not, if I come in his (willingly) let him make a Carbonado of me. I like not such grinning honour as Sir Walter hath: Giue mee life, which if I can saue, so: if not, honour comes vnlook’d for, and ther’s an end.2

Faithful readers of this blog will realize that Falstaff’s attitude is the exact antithesis of Abravanel’s (see here and here). Falstaff would no doubt argue that his view is explicitly endorsed by the wisest of all men:

כִּי-מִי אֲשֶׁר יבחר (יְחֻבַּר), אֶל כָּל-הַחַיִּים יֵשׁ בִּטָּחוֹן: כִּי-לְכֶלֶב חַי הוּא טוֹב, מִן-הָאַרְיֵה הַמֵּת.3

but on the other hand, many have maintained that some of the opinions mentioned in Ecclesiastes are not actually correct, but are citations of the views of the wrongheaded. Indeed, Rav Saadia Gaon says just this about our verse:

והפן השלישי מה שאמר הכתוב:

כי מי אשר יבחר אל כל החיים יש [רכו] בטחון, כי לכלב חי הוא טוב מן האריה המת, כי החיים יודעים שימותו והמתים אינם יודעים מאומה, ואין עוד להם שכר כי נשכח זכרם. גם אהבתם גם שנאתם גם קנאתם כבר אבדה, וחלק אין להם לעולם בכל וגו’

שלשת הפסוקים הללו, ואף על פי שהם דברי החכם, לא אמרם דעת עצמו, אלא סיפור מה שאומרים הסכלים. …4

Later that day, I visited London’s National Portrait Gallery, which has an entire room dedicated to representations of one of the most sympathetic and attractive of all the British monarchs, Lady Jane Dudley (née Grey) (The Nine Day’s Queen). As William Hone says:

Young, beautiful, and learned Jane, intent
On knowledge, found it peace; her vast acquirement
Of goodness was her fall; she was content
With dulcet pleasures, such as calm retirement
Yields to the wise alone;–her only vice
Was virtue: in obedience to her sire
And lord she died, with them a sacrifice
To their ambition: her own mild desire
Was rather to be happy than be great;
For though at their request she claimed the crown,
That they through her might rise to rule the state,
Yet the bright diadem and gorgeous throne
She viewed as cares, dimming the dignity
Of her unsullied mind and pure benignity.

One particularly interesting portrait is actually a direct reference to her “intentness on knowledge”:

Interview between Lady Jane Grey and Dr Roger Ascham in the Year 1550

As the curators explain, this is a depiction of a celebrated anecdote related by Roger Ascham in his The Schoolmaster:

This print illustrates an episode recounted in Roger Ascham’s treatise on education, The Scholemaster (1570). In 1550, the royal tutor Ascham visited Lady Jane and found her reading Plato’s Phaedo in Greek while the rest of the household were out hunting. Ascham contrasted the joy that this ‘sweet and noble’ girl took in learning with her fear of her cruel parents. In the nineteenth century, Lady Jane’s reputation as a gentle and modest scholar made her a preferred role model for the education of girls.


Before I went into Germanie, I came to Brodegate in Leceter- shire, to take my leaue of that noble Ladie Iane Grey, to whom I was exceding moch beholdinge. Lady Iane Hir parentes, the Duke and Duches, with all the Grey. houshould, Gentlemen and Gentlewomen, were huntinge in the Parke: I founde her, in her Chamber, readinge Phædon Platonis in Greeke, and that with as moch delite, as som ientleman wold read a merie tale in Bocase.

After salutation, and dewtie done, with som other taulke, I asked hir, whie she wold leese soch pastime in the Parke? smiling she answered me: I wisse, all their sporte in the Parke is but a shadoe to that pleasure, that I find in Plato: Alas good folke, they neuer felt, what trewe pleasure ment.

And howe came you Madame, quoth I, to this deepe knowledge of pleasure, and what did chieflie allure you vnto it: seinge, not many women, but verie fewe men haue atteined thereunto. I will tell you, quoth she, and tell you a troth, which perchance ye will meruell at. One of the greatest benefites, that euer God gaue me, is, that he sent me so sharpe and seuere Parentes, and so ientle a scholemaster. For when I am in presence either of father or mother, whether I speake, kepe silence, sit, stand, or go, eate, drinke, be merie, or sad, be sowyng, plaiyng, dauncing, or doing anie thing els, I must do it, as it were, in soch weight, mesure, and number, euen so perfitelie, as God made the world, or else I am so sharplie taunted, so cruellie threatened, yea presentlie some tymes, with pinches, nippes, and bobbes, and other waies, which I will not name, for the honor I beare them, so without measure misordered, that I thinke my selfe in hell, till tyme cum, that I must go to M. Elmer, who teacheth me so ientlie, so pleasantlie, with soch faire allurementes to learning, that I thinke all the tyme nothing, whiles I am with him. And when I am called from him, I fall on weeping, because, what soeuer I do els, but learning, is ful of grief, trouble, feare, and whole misliking vnto me: And thus my booke, hath bene so moch my pleasure, & bringeth dayly to me more pleasure & more, that in respect of it, all other pleasures, in very deede, be but trifles and troubles vnto me. I remember this talke gladly, both bicause it is so worthy of memorie, & bicause also, it was the last talke that euer I had, and the last tyme, that euer I saw that noble and worthie Ladie.5

[See also here, and see here for many other depictions of this conversation.]

The Lady’s custom is reminiscent of Rema’s, as per his autobiographical note:

ומכל מקום אומר שסהדי במרומים שכל ימי לא עסקתי בזו [חכמת הפילוסופיא] רק בשבת ויום טוב וחול המועד בשעה שבני אדם הולכים לטייל, וכל ימות החול אני עוסק כפי מיעוט השגתי במשנה ובתלמוד ובפוסקים ובפירושיהם ושרי לצורבא מרבן לאודועי נפשיה כו’:6

[We have discussed this responsum of Rema here.]

Another interesting portrait that I saw in the Gallery is Thomas Jones Barker’s The Secret of England’s Greatness’ (Queen Victoria presenting a Bible in the Audience Chamber at Windsor):

'The Secret of England's Greatness' (Queen Victoria presenting a Bible in the Audience Chamber at Windsor)

The curators:

This group epitomises the Victorian concept of the British Empire, which was seen as conferring the benefits of European civilisation, and Christianity in particular, on the peoples over whom it ruled. Prince Albert stands to the left of Queen Victoria, while on the right in the background are the statesmen Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell. In the foreground Victoria presents a Bible to a man wearing African dress. Although the portraits of the British sitters are accurate as is the setting of the audience chamber at Windsor, including Benjamin West’s large painting of The Institution of the Order of the Garter carefully indicated in the background, no actual occasion for the picture’s subject has been identified. It was engraved under the title The Bible: The Secret of England’s Greatness in 1864, suggesting that it was conceived, in part at least, as an allegory of Empire.

This compares favorably to a story told of Ben-Gurion, who at a speech at Yeshiva University once declared:

הִנֵּה לֹא-יָנוּם, וְלֹא יִישָׁן– שׁוֹמֵר, יִשְׂרָאֵל.7

A member of the audience challenged Ben-Gurion: “Who is the שומר ישראל, God or the Haganah?” According to one version of the story, Ben-Gurion did not answer; another has him muttering “The Haganah, of course.” In any event, the heckler was forcibly removed from the room, protesting all the way.

The next day, after a repeat visit to the Portrait Gallery, I visited the National Gallery. I was only able to spend a very brief time there, as it was almost Shabbas, but one painting that caught my attention was Peter Paul Rubens’s The Brazen Serpent:

Image removed at the behest of the censor, due to the dishabille of a woman therein.

The curators:

Moses at the left, with the hooded Eleazar beside him, calls to the people of Israel who are being attacked by a plague of serpents that God sent them because of their sinfulness. He tells them to look at a bronze serpent he has set up on a pole, upper left, because ‘everyone that is bitten, when he looketh upon it shall live.’ Old Testament (Numbers 21: 6-9).

Several days later, I visited the National Museum of Wales at Cardiff, where I saw three more representations of Hagar and Yishmael:

Andrea Sacchi’s Hagar and Ishmael in the Wilderness:

Hagar and Ishmael in the Wilderness

Thomas Gainsborough’s Rocky Landscape with Hagar and Ishmael:

Rocky Landscape with Hagar and Ishmael

Jan Victors’s The Dismissal of Hagar:

The Expulsion of Hagar and Ishmael

[The image of this last one taken from here.]

  1. Act V Scene I – link. []
  2. Ibid. Scene II. []
  3. קוהלת ט”ד – קשר []
  4. הנבחת באמונות ובדעות (תרגום של רב קאפח), מאמר שביעי פרק ג’ – קשר []
  5. From here. []
  6. שו”ת הרמ”א סימן ז []
  7. תהילים קכא:ד – קשר []